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This is an investigation into the methods and techniques used by Lord Denning in pursuit 
of his notion of doing justice to the case in front of him.  
The thesis examines Denning’s upbringing and biography to attempt to identify incidents 
and influences on his character which may have shown themselves in his later judicial 
career.  
The thesis then examines his judicial style and philosophy to attempt to isolate a theory of 
adjudication which accounts for some of his decisions. 
The theory of the interstitial spaces within the law wherein judges are entitled to exercise 
their discretion in coming to judgement is examined. 
This is then set against Denning’s actions in three cases which are examined at length to 
analyse his methods of obtaining the space to exercise his discretion and then the way he 
actually exercised that discretion is examined and analysed. There is in analysis of the 
legitimacy of each of these exercises of discretion and the legacy of each of them (if any). 
The conclusion pulls all these threads together and expounds a theory of adjudication that 
may fit these decisions and his judicial style and then analyses this theory against the 













Introduction and Thesis 
 
Thesis 
it is generally accepted that judges are entitled to exercise discretion where  existing law 
does not provide an appropriate answer for the case currently in front of them, because 
the case is in that interstitial space between established precedent and/or statute law. Lord 
Denning, on many occasions during his judicial career, exercised his discretion. There are 
several questions to be answered. In the first case was he operating within the interstitial 
spaces that are recognised as a legitimate arena for judicial discretion or did he extend 
this beyond what is legitimate. Secondly if he did so extend, how far was this and his 
subsequent exercise of his discretion coloured by and influenced by those events in his 
early life and education which contributed to his overall philosophy. Thirdly, did the overall 
exercise of his discretion, taking into account all these factors, fall within any recognisable 
school of jurisprudential thought; in particular was Denning, as a judicial activist also a 
legal positivist or are there also elements of the natural lawyer there? The final question is 
whether the answers to all of the above result in Denning’s legacy in the law being positive 
or overall was he a negative influence. 
Background 
Lord Denning was one of the twentieth century’s most famous judges; from the 1950s 
through to his death in 1999 he was probably one of the few, if not the only judge that the 
average man in the street could name. After his death, one of his successors described 
him as the best known and best loved judge in our history1. For this reason alone he would 
be a worthy object of study but his influence and contribution go a lot deeper than this.  
Denning lived to be over 100 years old, having been born in January 1899 and dying in 
March 1999 and therefore lived through the most tumultuous century in history. The 20th 
Century saw great changes in the law and the pace of change was accelerating 
throughout the century. The purpose of this study is to analyse Denning’s contribution to 
what the law has now become but more importantly to understand what influences and 
philosophy combined to produce the seminal judgements that occur throughout Denning’s 
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judicial career. It is the how and why of judges decisions that are perhaps the most 
important part of any study of the judiciary. Denning was prolific and to some extent 
idiosyncratic in his judicial output and this coupled with his somewhat unusual background 
for a 20th century English judge means that an analysis of his judicial style and more 
importantly his judicial philosophy will lead to a better understanding of not just his 
particular judgements but the development of judicial reasoning subsequent to his career. 
As will be seen, in some ways, an analysis such as set out above, is somewhat assisted to 
a greater or lesser extent by his own writings both on his own judgements and his views 
on the process of judging. Also of course, during his career he attracted comment, both 
complimentary and adverse, from various judges who were above him in the hierarchy at 
any given time. 
Denning was, in many ways, considered to be a maverick in that he would go out of his 
way to avoid a precedent if it interfered with what he considered to be justice in a particular 
case. He claimed to eschew traditional jurisprudence and championed the judge as the 
sole arbiter of the law and the only person able to do justice in the particular claim before 
the court. His judgements were, despite his professed reluctance to be bound by 
precedent, always carefully crafted and gave due attention to precedents even if Denning 
was only doing this in order to avoid a particular precedent. Many of his judgements 
contained novel and progressive views on particular aspects of the law especially when, in 
the early years, these were given as dissenting judgements. It is these progressive 
judgements that have led Denning to be labelled as a judicial activist by many 
commentators. Denning’s approach to the judicial process will be examined in the next 
chapter however it is by no means certain that Denning himself would have seen himself 
as a judicial activist and it may at this stage be apposite to attempt to some extent  to  
define judicial activism, or at least to set out what some commentators have chosen to 
describe as such. 
Lord Bingham describes four steps in the progression from the judge declaratory to the 
judge activist.2 in the first category, he places those judges who will hold that there is no 
role for the judge as lawmaker and that they would merely declare the law rather than 
decide what the law should be and perhaps the greatest exponent (if such a term is 
apposite) is Lord Simonds who was very much of a different stamp to Denning and his 
attitude is perhaps best summed up by his response to Denning in the Scruttons case 
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wherein Denning had invited Simonds to overrule the law on privity of contract, his 
response was 
To that invitation I readily respond. For to me heterodoxy, or, as some might say, 
heresy, is not the more attractive because it is dignified by the name of reform. Nor 
will I easily be led by an undiscerning zeal for some abstract kind of justice to ignore 
our first duty, which is to administer justice according to law, the law which is 
established for us by act of Parliament or the binding authority of precedent. The 
law is developed by the application of old principles to new circumstances. Therein 
lies its genius. It is reformed by the abrogation of those principles is the task not of 
the courts of law but of Parliament3 
this is very clearly an absolutist approach which we shall see is a long way from Denning’s 
interpretation of the role of the judge. It is however important to note that in this case Lord 
Simon is not talking about interstitial spaces or lacuna as such but to the overturning of 
established principle which remains unattractive to this day. Even after the 1966 practice 
statement, the House has only overturned its own decisions about 20 times which 
indicates perhaps a real caution about creating uncertainty in the law.  
Bingham would say that the second step is that judges do make law however there are 
those judges that would maintain that such judicial lawmaking should be hidden from view 
and indeed Lord Radcliffe espoused that was recently as 1960 
If judges prefer to adopt the formula-for that is what it is-that they merely declare the 
law and do not make it, they do no more than show themselves wise men in 
practice. Their analysis may be weak, but the perception of the nature of law is 
sound. Men’s respect for it will be the greater the more imperceptible and subtle its 
development4 
There is no record of any comment from Denning upon this particular view however it is 
likely that Lord Radcliffe would have found himself numbered by Denning amongst those 
timorous souls that he identifies in Candler.5 
The third approach is that which modern lawyers are thoroughly familiar with; in that it is 
acknowledged that judges do make law and that this is an entirely proper judicial function 
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provided it is exercised within certain limits. In broad terms those limits are the interstitial 
spaces between legislation and precedent where it is conceded that there is no existing 
statement of the law and that the judge is entitled to exercise his discretion in such cases. 
The fourth approach which Bingham identified is that which not only avowedly 
acknowledges a law making role for the judge but, in Bingham’s words, “glories” in such a 
role6. Bingham identified the prime exponent of this fourth step as Denning himself.  
 The question to be asked is whether Denning is operating within the interstitial spaces or 
whether he considers that he is not bound by this formula and that he is entirely free to 
decide the cases before him relying solely on his own untrammelled judgement. 
I would contend that that the truth lies between these two parameters and that Denning 
does exercise his discretion by applying his own judgement but that he does consider that 
he is operating in areas where the law does not appear to be settled. Furthermore I would 
also contend that it is his background and personality to which he gives licence when 
exercising his discretion. It must be acknowledged that all judges to some extent must rely 
on their experiences and their own values in arriving at judgement in these areas. Indeed 
Hart recognises this in some of his later work as follows: 
“Nonetheless there will be points where the existing law fails to dictate any decision 
as the correct one, and to decide cases where this is so the judge must exercise his 
lawmaking powers. But he must not do this arbitrarily: that is he must always have 
some general reasons justifying his decision and he must act as a conscientious 
legislator would by deciding according to his own beliefs and values. But if he 
satisfies these conditions he is entitled to follow standards or reasons for decision 
which are not dictated by the law and may differ from those followed by other 
judges faced with similar hard cases.”7 
This essentially is the crux of the matter and the question to be answered. Hart clearly 
accepts that in areas where the law is unclear (this must be what he means when he says 
the law fails to dictate any decision as being correct) then the judge may make his decision 
based on his own beliefs and values provided always that he can rationalise that decision. 
So this brings us to whether Denning exercised that discretion in any way which Hart 
would recognise or whether Denning is an example of a judge who is going beyond the 
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interstitial spaces and is continually deciding cases solely by reference to his own values 
and beliefs. I will show that this is not so and that whilst Denning was often a creative 
lawmaker he always had a rationale for his decision but that rationale is frequently 
coloured, sometimes to a considerable extent, by his own values and beliefs. 
The use of the term interstitial is taken from Oliver Wendell Holmes in Southern Pacific 
Company v Jensen.8 it is more apposite than the more usual legal term of lacuna. Lacuna 
implies a rather larger gap than is necessarily the case. We are looking here at the gaps 
that have to be found by analysis and to some eyes they may not seem to exist and 
identifying the gap is as much a part of the process as exercising discretion. 
When it is suggested, as Hart does, that judges have discretion, this should really be taken 
to mean that judges are charged with the responsibility of interpretation, and that the 
outcome of their interpretive deliberations cannot be made precise and predictable there is 
no doubt, as Hart says, that there is a penumbral area wherein rules require judicial 
imagination and wherein the exercise of discretion is inevitable. It is the seeking out of that 
penumbra that is the subject of the first part of the judicial exercise that Denning carries 
out. 
We have referred to these as the interstices of the law, and it is here that we might see the 
most important skills of adjudication being brought into play to make the law appear 
seamless in the sense of imparting to it completeness,  coherence and consistency which 
are all required for legitimacy in decision making. The way Denning goes about this 
exercise of discretion is what we should properly understand when we speak about his 
judicial style and it is the place we should look to uncover his moral and constitutional 
character. 
Jurisprudence can perhaps strive to suggest ways in which the concept of law demands 
that this discretion should be exercised in adjudication. These range from the view that the 
judge is entirely at liberty in these interstitial circumstances to interpret the laws as he sees 
fit, to the view that far from adjudication being dependent upon the personal views and 
experience of individual judges, the very idea of the authority of the state expressed 
through the rule of law demands that a Herculean effort to achieve the answer consistent 
with the foundational values of a democratic polity must be brought to bear. Either way, 
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looking at how a judge interprets his or her obligations in this regard must be the focus of 
just what and who we take that judge to be. 
Another reason for choosing Denning as a subject is the amount of secondary and primary 
sources available. He wrote copiously throughout his life and particularly towards the end 
of his career when he published four books detailing what he saw as vital developments in 
the law and in particular his contributions to those developments.9 After his somewhat 
enforced retirement in 1982 he set out what he considered to be the most notable cases in 
English legal history10. These consist more of historical meanderings through some 
highlights of English History rather than any structured attempt to analyse the development 
of the law. Even in these meanderings however there is much to be gained both from the 
selections which he makes and from his commentaries on those cases. It is clear that he 
sees the cases as forming a coherent narrative of improvement of English law and he of 
course includes himself in this narrative at the pinnacle of development. He describes 
cases such as the Protestant Martyrs and the trial of Roger Casement in a manner which 
throws more light on Dennings’ views and character than on the law itself. There is no 
attempt at critical analysis of the judgements nor does he attempt any essay in the 
direction of a theory of adjudication but rather he writes for a nonlegal audience, which is 
of course a feature of many of his judgements. He does however set out what he 
considers to be his most important case and somewhat surprising to the lawyer (but not to 
anyone who had read his earlier work) he chooses the Profumo affair in connection with 
which he was commissioned to conduct an enquiry and produced the first government 
report to become a best seller11. His judicial contribution was recorded and to some extent 
analysed immediately after his retirement12. The aim of this thesis will be to assess his 
judicial style and the theory of adjudication that he adopted (whether consciously or 
otherwise)  and how that has affected the law of tort as it presently stands and a 
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Lord Denning’s judicial career encompassed 38 years and during that time he sat 
successively as a puisne judge in the Family Division of the High Court followed by the 
Kings Bench Division of that court and then as a Lord Justice of Appeal in the Court of 
Appeal before being appointed to the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords. His final 
and most famous appointment was as Master of the Rolls, a post which he occupied from 
April 1962 until September 1982.This is a tenure which is unique in modern times and 
which is unlikely to be surpassed as the Judicial Pensions Act 1959 made retirement at 75 
compulsory for all Judges appointed after the act came into force, Denning was of course 
exempt having been appointed in 1944 and indeed was the last such exempt member of 
the judiciary to sit. In the course of his long and distinguished career he sat on many cases 
and his reported cases number in the thousands13 covering all aspects of the law. From 
this it can be seen that any attempt at an analysis and assessment of his contribution to 
the law as a whole would be beyond the scope of this study if it is to have any depth. 
Denning’s contribution can be broken down into discrete strands some of which overlap to 
a greater or lesser extent. It is however largely, but not solely, in the field of tort law that 
this study will concentrate to attempt to answer the question posed above. This is a field in 
which Denning was judicially active and indeed many would say creative and indeed was 
in some instances at his most creative but it is not seen by previous commentators as 
having been a field in which he was prolific or particularly influential, a view that this 
dissertation will challenge. As an example of this view Jowell and McAusland14 devote only 
22 pages to tort in contrast to 52 on family law. In choosing tort as an area to study it is 
necessary to define tort at the outset and a good definition is that it is a civil wrong 
committed against an individual who is protected by a court by an award of damages or an 
injunction15. Denning was active in many areas of tort law, in particular; negligence; 
negligent misstatement; trespass and damages together with contributions in the area of 
economic loss and defamation. It was however his jurisprudential contributions to the 
philosophy of tort law (which he never claimed nor indeed you acknowledged) that provide 
the best insight to his judicial style and reasoning as well as perhaps his most lasting 
contribution to English law. 
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It will be necessary to include a brief outline of Denning’s life and times as it is only within 
that context that it is possible to evaluate his contribution or begin to understand his 
reasons for deciding certain cases as he does. He wrote what is to some extent his 
autobiography in The Family Story16 in which he sets out certain aspects of his life and 
career and in particular deals with his early life and his siblings. It is clear that this is 
tremendously important to him and he is proud of his family and their achievements. It 
should be remembered that Denning was a teenager during the Great War and served in 
the latter stages himself. Two of his brothers died in the war and he was affected by this as 
might be expected. To the end of his life he always read out the roll of the fallen at the 
Remembrance Sunday service in his Parish Church and many of the names he read out 
would be of young men he was familiar with from his childhood. Two biographies have 
been written about Denning, both being published in his lifetime. The first being “Lord 
Denning a Biography” by Edmund Heward17 and the second, ”Lord Denning a Life” by Iris 
Freeman18. Both were written with Denning’s co-operation and are as might be expected 
fairly uncritical of in their treatment of Denning. So far there is no posthumous biography of 
Denning which may perhaps be a little more detached in dealing with its subject. This 
particular chapter will be one of the most important within the thesis as it will attempt to 
tease out those influences which had the most marked effect on his judgements and will 
start to relate some of those influences to particular judgements and to start to put together 
a theory of adjudication which can explain to some extent why Denning in particular 
reason decisions that he did in certain cases therefore draw the war along a path which 
leads to, in some instances, where we are today. 
 Methodology  
Denning himself once confessed to having little patience with the philosophers of the law19 
and revealing that he only obtained a gamma in that subject at University. This however is 
countered by the his own writings in which he reveals that he does have a very decided 
philosophy of the law it’s just that it is his own philosophy based on his own experiences 
and drawing very little on the more mainstream legal philosophers. If this however were 
the case, and he was to stand completely outside a theory of jurisurisprudence that could 
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be recognised then there would be very little point in assessing his contribution as it would 
have been unlikely to have stood the test of time. Within this we should see, to some 
limited extent, that Denning’s judicial activism does to some extent fall in with, and indeed 
precede Harts theories on legal positivism and activism. It is in the exercise of his 
discretion that Denning is at his most creative and it is that which has given rise to most of 
the criticism of his judgements, by higher courts, his fellow judges and by academic 
commentators. He very usefully expounded his views early on in his judicial career in a 
series of lectures and addresses he gave to students in South Africa, Canada and the 
USA during 1954 and 1955, he published these addresses as The Road to Justice20. In his 
preface to the book he expressly states his intention as” I determined to show, as well as I 
could, what is the right way to arrive at justice”21 This is as good a definition of 
jurisprudence as any. The book will be dealt with in greater detail in a later chapter will 
help to form and inform theory of adjudication to deal with at least some of Denning’s 
judgements. It is a clear statement by Denning of his own approach to the question of 
justice and in 118 pages he ranges over questions such as what is justice?22 and the 
nature of a  fair trial23 and goes on to consider the Just Judge24 where he looks at 
independence and the place of evidence in the law and then sets out that a judge must be 
beyond reproach25. He never expressly states the proposition but is clear from the tone 
and content that he considers himself to embody these qualities that he is setting out as 
essential in a judge. He does not expound how a judge should, in any philosophical sense, 
arrive at his judgements nor how a judge with these qualities would fit into any societal 
view of judges duties but simply regards it as self-evident that a good judge is good for 
society as a whole and that this is what a good judge looks like.  It should be noted at this 
stage that one message that comes through in all of Denning’s writings is that he 
considers himself to be an exceptionally good judge if not indeed a great judge. This is 
another question which will be examined in later chapters .One of the outcomes of this 
work will be to try and answer as far as possible within the narrow scope selected how far 
that self-confidence was justified. It is worth noting in passing at this point that a judge 
without confidence in his own ability would be an exceptionally poor judge and indeed The 
Judicial Appointments Commission seems to agree with him as it list amongst the 
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attributes for appointment to judicial office; integrity, independence of mind, sound 
judgement decisiveness and objectivity26, qualities which Denning would have 
unhesitatingly identified in himself. 
There are a number of possible ways to approach research in this area ranging from an 
assessment of the reported cases on through an analysis of academic writing on the 
subject to reliance on Denning’s own words. All of these have some validity but to assess 
Denning’s contribution at the present time it is essential to identify the principles 
enunciated in his judgements and follow these through subsequent judgments of his own 
and other judges, identify and analyse any legislation arising from the principles and then 
to set out the law as obtaining today clearly identifying any contribution from Denning. The 
obvious starting point is Denning’s own judgments tracing back if necessary through cases 
he identifies as founding the principle which he is propounding, it is a trait of his that he 
would often retreat through legal history to find some justification for even the most radical 
propositions. Contemporary academic comment is a useful barometer of the effect of the 
judgement and is considered at this stage. As this dissertation is concerned with the 
enduring legacy of its subject, the next stage is to consider the immediate judicial reaction 
to the judgement, in some cases this will be contained in the same case as in some of his 
most important contributions Denning was in a minority usually of one. A good example of 
this is Candler v Crane Christmas and Co27 which will be considered in detail in a later 
chapter of this dissertation. There are instances where Denning was conscious at the time 
that he was being controversial and indeed seems to have used the controversy in an 
attempt to overturn cases he regarded as flawed. A good of example of this, which is 
discussed at length later, is Broom v Cassell and Co28. In this case Denning decided that 
the law on exemplary damages was wrong and advised lower courts to ignore what he 
saw as a per incurium decision of the House of Lords, this provoked an irate reaction from 
Hailsham LC on appeal29 and a rueful acknowledgement that his approach may have been 
wrong but no real contrition from Denning who continued to consider himself in the right. 
This is by no means the end of the matter and lead to the introduction of Order 18 r3 of the 
Rules of the Supreme Court which required specific pleading of any case on exemplary 
damages. Denning’s view of the author of the offending book, David Irving that he was 
simply trying to get a scandal to sell his books was borne out many years later when Irving 
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again appeared before a court on a libel action and had his own reputation severely 
criticised but this time by the trial judge.30  
After considering the immediate reaction, which may be more indicative of contemporary 
attitudes than any considered criticism of the case itself, later academic comment and 
criticism would be relevant in showing how the case has endured and the contribution 
made to the particular thread involved. 
The final step would be to show how these judgements are considered today by analysis 
of more recent cases and articles. Dennings legacy in this area is by now mature and a 
proper balanced view can now be taken. 
Expected Outcome  
It is expected that this analysis will indicate that his contribution was considerable and 
enduring. It is expected that much of his judicial philosophy will be linked to his upbringing 
and his own deep attachment to his roots Denning was considered by some to be a 
maverick and in some of his judgements he does indeed appear to be somewhat 
swimming against the tide but far from being capricious or indeed has been suggested, 
mischievous it will be apparent that he was entirely consistent with his own philosophy of 
what constitutes justice and that certain aspects of that jurisprudence have survived into 
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 Chapter 2 
Biography and Influences 
 
In this chapter I will examine Denning’s upbringing and identify those early influences on 
his character which later manifest themselves in his approach to the business of judging. 
His early life was marked by the turbulence of the early twentieth century and his own 
experiences of the First World War. 
Alfred Thompson Denning was born on the 23rd January 1899. He was the fourth son (of 
an eventual five) and fifth child of Clara and Charles Denning. He was born at the family 
home in Newbury Street in Whitchurch Hampshire, a small town which he always proudly 
identified as home throughout his long life. His father Charles was a draper in a small way 
of business in the town and was by all accounts a pleasant if somewhat diffident man. 
Denning himself describes him as a “dreamer, a singer and a poet”31. His business skills 
do not appear to have been well developed as the family were always in somewhat 
straightened circumstances.  
The family home in Whitchurch was modest and Denning himself describes it as being 
unfit for human habitation by modern standards32. With no mains water, electricity or 
sewerage it was typical of most houses at the end of the nineteenth century and whilst to 
modern eyes it would seem to be inadequate it would have been a respectable dwelling by 
contemporary standards in Whitchurch. The importance of the perception by Denning of 
the humble nature of his origins is to be found by contrasting it with the origins of many of 
his contemporaries at the bar and bench. Lord Goddard ( 1877- 1971) for instance was the 
son of a successful solicitor and was born in Ladbroke Grove, then a fashionable area of 
London33, Lord Devlin (1905-1992) was the son of a successful architect from 
Chislehurst34. His Successor as master of The Rolls, Lord Donaldson (1920-2005) was the 
son of a successful consultant Gynaecologist35 and his predecessor Lord Evershed (1899-
1966) was again the son of a successful solicitor36. 
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Denning was however anxious to stress the antiquity of his family and makes a case that 
Denning is from the old English meaning “son of the Dane”37. This is perhaps a little 
fanciful as there are many alternative explanations for the etymology of the name but 
Denning’s explanation echoes Bressler in his opening to his Biography of Lord Goddard 
who ascribes the origins of the name Goddard to the Norse “Godr”, or sacred race38. It is 
probably not a coincidence that Denning wrote the foreword to Bresslers biography. 
Denning goes on to trace the family line through the Poyntz line through from the Norman 
Conquest through the Civil War and up to his father. It must be noted that for all the colour 
that Denning injects into his forebears, the first established ancestor is his great 
grandfather who was born in 1798 in Frome and became an organist and music teacher39 
Denning was clearly not ashamed of his background but was concerned to show continuity 
and an essential Englishness.  
Clara Denning was clearly the main driving force behind the family and Denning is very 
clear about this, he describes her as “very intelligent, very hardworking. Determined to 
succeed in whatever she undertook.”40 
Hard work was a feature of Denning’s early life and he had a strong work ethic all his life. 
The drapers shop was open 6 days a week with his father serving in the shop in the 
mornings and then loading up his horse drawn cart every afternoon and driving it round the 
outlying villages and farmsteads. 
Tom Denning seems to have been regarded by his family as someone special from an 
early age and throughout his life this persisted in the family with all his siblings reposing 
unusual confidence in him41 
Denning started his schooling at the Modern School in Whitchurch which was run by his 
parents’ friends, Mr and Mrs Greer.42 This was a small school of some 25 to 30 pupils 
which definitely had a part to play in the formation of Denning’s later attitudes. He provides 
this description of the school and it’s teacher, 
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 He had He had never taken a degree but wore a scholars gown – torn and tatty- to 
show his learning. The boys called him “cave” not knowing what it meant. I now 
know it is Latin for “beware.” But there was nothing in him to beware of - except 
wrong –doing. His prime concern was to build character, and next to teach his 
pupils to write good English and to speak it. He always saw to their cricket, urging 
them in the game – as in life- to keep a straight bat.43  
In 1904 as a result of straightened circumstances (Clara’s father provided a life boat loan 
of £100) Charles and Clara made the decision that the elder children Marjorie, Jack and 
Reg would finish their schooling at the Modern school but that Tom and Gordon must 
move to the free elementary school44. This must have been quite a traumatic event in 
Denning’s life but he never seems to mention it. It is omitted from The Family Story entirely 
but as can be seen he made much of the Greer’s school. The conclusion must be that he 
was to some extent ashamed of it. The Modern School was regarded as a cut above the 
Elementary School which was a much larger establishment of some 400 pupils. According 
to Freeman the main difference between the two was that 
Mr Greer “wanted to make gentlemen” of his pupils, while the aim of the elementary 
school was to produce literate working men and women.45  
We don’t know what Denning made of his time there but it may be that he felt that he was 
a cut socially above the other pupils and it may be that this accounts for the occasional 
glimpses of snobbery that one encounters in his later life and judicial career. 
Whatever Denning’s opinion of the National School may have been it was good enough to 
get both him and Gordon up to sufficient standard to obtain scholarships to Andover 
Grammar School here he went in 190946. This was a famous old school, largely fee 
paying, but the Denning boys both got scholarships. Andover is about 8 miles from 
Whitchurch and required a train journey both ways. 
Again this was small school, Denning says it had 80 pupils and 5 masters47.Denning refers 
to the strong discipline that the Headmaster exerted and makes reference to his propensity 
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for physical punishment but he himself does not appear to have suffered. He won 
numerous prizes at the school and he says that it was at this stage that he first declared 
his intent to become a barrister48 
Whilst at Andover Denning was steered by the Headmaster Mr R. O. Bishop towards a 
university education and began studying for the University entrance examinations and 
after winning a place at University College Southampton he persevered further and was 
finally offered an exhibition at Magdalene College Oxford. In itself this is remarkable 
achievement.  
Denning went up to Magdalene in October 1916 and thanks to the influence of the 
President of the college, Sir Herbert Warren, his exhibition was converted to an £80 
demyship with an additional £30 from the Goldsmiths Company49. In The Family Story, 
Denning exaggerates the extent of his poverty by stating all he went up with was his £30 
exhibition50, in fact his exhibition was worth £50 and in addition Hampshire County Council 
awarded him a £50 scholarship51. 
The First World War had of course started before Denning went to Oxford and his elder 
brothers had all joined the services and by 1916 all were commissioned officers, Jack and 
Reg in the Army and Gordon in the Navy. A remarkable record for three draper’s sons and 
a testament to Clara’s drive and determination which she had clearly imbued in all her 
sons.  
Denning himself was conscious that he would be joining the forces when he reached 
eighteen and a half and his early Oxford career was combined with preparation for that 
entry. Magdalene is credited by Denning himself as being a prime influence on him 
I do not use the Latin, Alma Mater,. I prefer the English Fostering Mother. For 
Magdalene has been the college that has helped me to grow to what I am.52  
At Magdalene, Denning was clearly uncomfortable with his Grammar School background 
as he says himself 
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Often freshmen ask one another “what school were you at”. Most men in my day 
were apt to name a famous public school. I turned the question to one side or 
prevaricated in one way or another. I felt ashamed at having been at a grammar 
school.53 
He does go on to say that he need not have worried but he obviously did worry and one 
wonders if he was still worrying 65 years later when he wrote that passage as he does 
seem sometime ambivalent to his origins, at one time proud of them and at others 
conscious of the contrast between them and the background of his colleagues at bar and 
bench. 
At this time, the bar was to a large extent upper middle class in origin. For example Rayner 
Goddard, who was Lord Chief Justice at the time Denning was in the Court of Appeal 
(albeit older than Denning) was a product of Marlborough and Oxford. He was by no 
means aristocratic coming from a family of city solicitors. The public school ethos does 
however run strong through both bench and bar during Denning’s time. A glance at his 
contemporaries illustrates this. If we look at the two judges who sat with him on Candler 
and Crane Christmas, Lord Cohen was a product of Eton and New College Oxford and 
Lord Asquith had the benefit of an education at Winchester and Balliol as well as having 
the advantage of being the fourth son of HH Asquith, a former Prime Minister. Similarly his 
near contemporary Patrick Devlin was educated at Stonyhurst and Christ’s Cambridge. It 
would seem that Denning’s origins were more modest than this but he was by no means 
unique in this. As examples, Lord Atkin was educated at a Welsh Grammar School and 
like Denning obtained a scholarship to Magdelene, Lord Diplock,a near contemporary of 
Denning, was educated at a local grammar school in Croydon followed perhaps inevitably 
by University College Oxford. 
Despite these examples, there is no escaping from the fact that the young Denning was 
being thrust into an environment populated in large part by the products of the major 
English public schools. Whilst there is no evidence that Denning was ever treated with 
anything other than courtesy and certainly he himself never give any examples of anyone 
slighting him for his origins, it is likely that the air of effortless superiority that these schools 
imparted to their pupils at that time was intimidating to a young man who had up to this 
point lived his whole life within the confines of his own family and a small Hampshire town. 
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As this town was his home and almost his total environment for his formative years, it is 
inevitable that it would play a large part in forming Denning’s character and to that end it 
will be instructive to look in some detail at Whitchurch as it stood in the early part of the 
20th century. 
Whitchurch is a small town in Hampshire which even today has a population of only 4500, 
the population at the start of the 20th century was around 2000. The Hampshire Star 
newspaper had this to say about it in 1888 
Whitchurch is in Hampshire. People who live IN it call it a town. People who live 
OUT of it call it a village. It is about as big as a good-sized pocket handkerchief. It 
has three shops and 19 public houses.54 
By 1899 it had of course acquired the draper’s shop of Charles Denning but in other 
respects to is highly unlikely to change much in the 11 years since the comment was made 
and would have been a typical small country town of the era. 
This is reinforced by the entry in the County history of Hampshire which has this to say 
about Whitchurch in 1911 
the small town of Whitchurch is situated at the junction of the London to Andover 
and Newbridge to Winchester roads. The market place is in the centre of the town 
and from it diverged these four roads and a fifth running north-west around 
Hurstbourne Park towards St Mary Bourn. The Test flows to the south of the 
marketplace and is famous for its fishing. It is crossed by a modern brick bridge of 5 
arches on the Winchester Road. There is a railway station on the London and South 
Western Railway about half a mile north of the centre and another on the Newbury 
Winchester branch of the Great Western Railway to the north-west.  
Beyond the church there are few buildings of interest in the place probably the most 
interesting being the White Hart Hotel an old posting house at the corner of the 
London and Newbury roads; it dates from the time of Queen Anne and contains a 
good ceiling of that period. Opposite the hotel in the Newbury Road is the town hall, 
a plain small structure dating perhaps to the same period as the hotel; its lower part 
is now used as a reading room et cetera, several of the cottages and small shops 
about the marketplace are of some age and contain picturesque half timber work, 
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but the town is now fast being modernised. The vicarage opposite the church 
probably contains some remains of the house in which Mr Richard Brooke 
entertained Charles I in 1644, but all its details are now modern.55 
of the 11 pages dedicated to Whitchurch in the County history nor less than four 
concentrate solely on the church. This church played a large part in Denning’s life, both his 
early life and later in life when he returned to Whitchurch at the height of his career and in 
retirement. Denning is buried in the churchyard and the bell tower contains a new tenor 
bell named “Great Tom” which was commissioned and hung for his 100th birthday in 1999. 
This close connection with the church has contributed throughout his career to his judicial 
decision-making. He was a very religious man, being a communicant Anglican for all his 
adult life. He was for many years president of the Lawyers Christian Fellowship and the 
influence of religion on his life and his judicial philosophy was stated explicitly by himself in 
an address he gave to the Fellowship in 1954 
So I ask you to accept with me that law is concerned with justice and that religion is 
concerned with justice. And thence I asked the question - what is justice? That 
question has been asked by many men far wiser than you or I and no one has yet 
found a satisfactory answer. All I would suggest is that justice is not something you 
can see. It is not temporal but eternal. How does one know what is justice? It is not 
the product of his intellect but of his spirit. Religion concerns the spirit in man 
whereby he is able to recognise what is justice, whereas law is only the application, 
however imperfectly, of justice in our everyday affairs. If religion perishes in the 
land, truth and justice will also. We have already strayed too far from the faith of our 
fathers. Let us return to it, for it is the only thing that can save us.56 
Denning had his £30 exhibition at Magdalen increased to an £80 Demyship and this led to 
an incident which is instructive in illustrating the sheltered life that Denning had led up to 
that time and his personal inclinations which on occasion are reflected in his judgement. 
One of the conditions attached to the Demyship was that the holder was occasionally 
required to read a lesson in Chapel. Denning was taken unawares and simply took the first 
reference that was available, this turned out to be Genesis 39.7 which is the tale of 
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Potiphar’s wife and her sexual advances to Joseph. Having to read this passage out loud 
caused him acute embarrassment. Denning himself said that  
our good professor of philosophy, Clement C.J.Webb, who was always kind to me 
took me aside afterwards and consoled me57 
it is clear from this that Denning’s upbringing had been particularly sheltered in matters 
such as this. The passage in question is tame even by the standards of the King James 
Bible: 
And it came to pass after these things that his master’s wife cast her eyes upon 
Joseph; and she said lie with me58 
Denning clearly had an unshakeable faith in monogamy and faithfulness and perhaps it is 
this clear moral view that influences his judgement in later times particularly in cases such 
as Ward v Bradford Corporation which will be discussed later. 
The three older brothers at this time were in the thick of the fighting with Reg being 
wounded in France and Gordon taking part in the battle of Jutland. Jack was killed as a 
company commander on the Somme in September 1916. This was a devastating blow to 
the whole family. Denning describes his mother swooning when the telegram was 
received59. Denning himself always regarded Jack and Gordon as the best of them. 
It may be trite to say it but the First World War was the dominant formative event in 
Denning’s early years. Jack was the eldest son and very much a hero to Denning and it is 
clear that his death affected Denning greatly. When he came to write The Family Story in 
1981 he confessed that Jack’s last letter still had the power to move him to tears. He ends 
that chapter on Jack in his book with Rupert Brooke’s poem “The Soldier” out in full. The 
poem of course reflects the high Victorian values of the early part of the war rather than 
the later cynicism of the 20s and 30s which there is no evidence that Denning ever 
adopted. 
Reg joined up at the beginning of the war as a private and served in Flanders. It was 
commissioned in 1915 and was wounded on the Somme in 1916 when he suffered a head 
wound. He was evacuated to England and eventually returned to serve in France at the 
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end of the war. Denning says that Jack’s death affected him so much that he attempted to 
take Jack’s place and that in the army henceforth he was known as Jack rather than Reg. 
Gordon had joined the Merchant Navy in 1913 as a cadet and when the war started was 
called up into the Royal Navy and commissioned as a midshipman in the Royal Naval 
Reserve. After an initial posting to HMS Hampshire, a cruiser, he was posted to HMS 
Morris, a destroyer and was present in her at the battle of Jutland in 1916. 
Immediately after Jutland, Gordon was appointed Sub Lieutenant in the Royal Navy, this 
was a considerable achievement and Denning remained proud of Gordon’s achievements 
throughout his life. 
Unfortunately shortly afterwards, Gordon was diagnosed with tuberculosis. In 1916 this 
was a killer disease with no known cure. He lingered on finally dying on 23rd of May 1918, 
five days after his 21st birthday. At the time of his death Denning was serving in France. 
Denning signed up for the army in August 1917 when he reached 18 ½, the youngest age 
which he was allowed to join. There is an interesting quote from him at the time he joined 
the Army and by reference to Shakespeare in Henry V refers to soldiers being 
 “full of strange oaths, and bearded like the pard,”60 
he then goes on to say: 
Nor was I full of “strange “oaths,” our parents had forbidden them. Damn was a 
swear word-not to be used, profane, irreligious, meaning, “condemn to hell”. Bloody 
was worse-why I know not. Even Brewer’s dictionary does not help much except 
that it gives an illustration from Swift “it was bloody hot walking today”. At any rate it 
was never to be used in our family. In the Army I heard all kinds of strange oaths-
four letter words and the rest-but I never copied them. I never put them into 
common use so strict was my upbringing.61 
Even in 1917, this was a particularly sheltered upbringing and is in many ways evidence of 
a strong puritanical streak in Denning’s upbringing. This may of course in part have 
contributed to his judicial attitude which is particularly evident in the Ward case which is 
considered in a later chapter. 
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Denning was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in the Royal Engineers and was sent 
out to France in April 1918. At this time the Germans counter-attacked and the fighting it 
was bloody. Denning was involved in the crossing of the Ancre under fire, followed by 
further crossings of waterways all under fire until the armistice in 1918 at which time 
Denning was in hospital with Spanish flu. This was a particularly virulent strain of flu and 
Denning recalls many men dying on his ward. He was justifiably proud of having taken part 
and quotes Shakespeare’s Henry V eve of battle speech in the Family Story. 
There is some justification for considering that throughout his life Denning felt a strong 
sense of obligation to the fallen and this in many ways coloured his approach to the judicial 
task where there was any element of that generation concerned. 
Until his last years, on Remembrance Sunday, he read out the roll of the fallen in the 
parish church in Whitchurch in memory of those men of Whitchurch who had given their 
lives in both world wars. It is impossible that this did not leave a strong impression on 
Denning, and indeed it would be a strange man who was not affected by such cataclysmic 
events and there are threads in his judgements which reflect this. 
In the case of Broome v Cassell and Co,  which will be considered in a later chapter, there 
are elements of this sympathy for those who served (and in particular those with 
distinguished service records) which are particularly evident in that judgement. The plaintiff 
was a distinguished naval officer who was being libelled by a young author’s behaviour 
which Denning considered to be particularly egregious. 
After the war, Denning was discharged on 6 February 1919 and returned to Oxford where 
he resumed his studies in mathematics; one of his biographers has speculated that this 
grounding in mathematics, which involved building from point to point, a line of thought, 
was reflected in his later decisions, in fact the biographer comments on the lucidity of his 
decisions62. As will be seen that this is not always the case and there is little evidence of 
his mathematical background in his later career. 
There is no evidence that whilst he was at Oxford he took part in the wider social life of the 
University or indeed so much interest in anything much beyond his studies. The sole 
exception to this was his growing friendship with Mary Harvey, the daughter of the Vicar of 
Whitchurch. 
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He graduated with a first in mathematics and started as a master at Winchester College in 
the autumn term of 1920. There is some evidence that he was a good teacher however he 
decided that this was not a career for him, he was also turned down by Mary Harvey at this 
time. 
This may be another spur to Denning’s ambition, one reason why Mary may have been so 
reluctant to accept his proposal is that as the daughter of the Vicar she would have been 
of considerable higher standing than the son of the local draper, notwithstanding 
Denning’s temporary commission and Oxford degree. Once again Denning would have 
been brought face-to-face with his humble origins. 
Tom left Winchester at the end of the summer term and returned to Oxford to read 
jurisprudence in the autumn. He was awarded an Eldon scholarship and joined Lincoln’s 
Inn. 
At this time at Oxford the leading legal scholars were Sir Paul Vinigradoff and William 
Holdsworth both of whom successively held the Vinerian chair and both were distinguished 
legal historians. Throughout his career, Denning was always prone to delve into the distant 
past of the common law to support whatever decision he had come to in a particular case. 
It is hard not to come to the conclusion that this is as a result of the influence of these two 
scholars. 
Denning graduated with a first in jurisprudence in June 1922. Then he formed a friendship 
with a young law professor by the name of Jeffrey Cheshire, a friendship which would 
affect both their lives in unforeseen ways in years to come. Many years later Cheshire 
showed Denning his marks, amongst a plethora of alphas was one gamma,for 
jurisprudence. This led Denning to write 
“Jurisprudence was too abstract a subject for my liking, all about ideologies, legal 
norms and basic norms, “ought” and “is”, realism and behaviours and goodness 
knows what else. The jargon of the philosophers of the law has  always been 
beyond me. I like to get down to the practical problems which called for decision. 
Contracts, torts, crime and the like.”63 
this lead people to conclude that Denning knew little of jurisprudence and cared even less. 
This is not the case. It is clear from his judgements that he had a very well developed 
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sense of his own theory of the law and as he says quite clearly, it is the jargon of the 
philosophers of the law of which he disapproves and the not the theories themselves. 
At the time the main school of jurisprudential thought at Oxford was that of English 
positivism as proposed by Austin, this this had, as its main tenet, a system of top-down law 
propagated by an all-powerful sovereign backed up by threats and coercion. As can easily 
be seen this was not in any way the view that Denning shared. 
At Oxford and later at the Bar, Denning was a near contemporary of H.L.A. Hart who 
attended New College between 1925 and 1929, he is of course responsible for one of the 
most important texts in 20th-century jurisprudence64 which rejects Austin’s view of 
positivism and any sovereignty  theory of law. There are interesting parallels between 
Harts fully formed theories and those threads of jurisprudence which can be pulled from 
Denning’s judgements. It is tempting to ascribe this similarity to Oxford in the 1920s 
however this is to mistake coincidence and cause. There is similarity in their backgrounds 
in that both were the sons of minor tradesman in provincial towns (in Hart’s case, the 
family were furriers in Harrogate), Denning did at least have the social advantage that he 
was a communicant Anglican whereas Hart was Jewish. There is no record that they ever 
met at Oxford although they must have been aware of each other.  
Denning started pupillage at Brick Court in the Temple in September 1922 with Henry 
O’Hagen as his pupil master. He remained in Brick Court for the next 22 years until he 
became a judge. 
The same time Denning applied for a fellowship at All Souls, he was unsuccessful, a fact 
he ascribes to his deficient Latin pronunciation. 
“I could answer the legal questions all right, but we had to read Latin out loud. My 
pronunciation was mixed between the old and the new. That did not suit that 
stronghold of classicists. So I joined the distinguished company of “Failed All 
Souls.”!”65 
it is clear that even 60 years later Denning does not agree with this judgement 
Denning made up for this failure (if such it was) by coming out top in the bar examination 
in June 1923 and being awarded the prize studentship which was a very useful 100 
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guineas for three years and was accompanied by a seat in Chambers where he was to 
remain for many years until he took on chambers of his own. 
As is usual, in his early years at the bar, work was somewhat difficult to come by. He was 
asked to work on a new edition of Smith’s leading cases, this was a mainstay of the legal 
profession for 100 years. The book consisted of, as the title implies, a digest of the leading 
cases of the time together with commentary upon them. It was this commentary that 
Denning was engaged to write together with another young barrister. The fee was 600 
guineas which was a considerable sum at the time. Denning himself said this was a 
considerable undertaking which involve him in prodigious research but which he claimed 
taught him most of the law he ever knew.66 
Whilst he may be exaggerating to claim that this was the sole source of his legal 
knowledge it is clear that he had a prodigious, indeed encyclopaedic, knowledge of 
common law cases, many of which were obscure to start with and had faded into the mists 
of time by the time Denning chose to resurrect them in support of some contention in a 
judgement. He had a habit of bringing cases from within his own knowledge rather than 
relying on those which counsel had already laid before the court. It could be said that 
continual judicial activism arose from the voluminous but unstructured wealth of cases that 
he reviewed for this 13th edition of Smith. It should be noted that this was the last edition of 
Smith’s leading cases and not for the final time Denning managed to have the last word. 
His practice at the bar was starting to prosper at this time and he had got work from his 
home county of Hampshire appearing for the prosecution at Winchester Assizes. It is 
worth noting that this brief came from Mary Harvey’s uncle who was Clerk of the Peace to 
the City of Winchester. He obtained a number of briefs before Winchester Assizes and 
thus cut his teeth as a barrister on his home turf further reinforcing the influences of this 
small corner of Hampshire on him early in his career much as it did in his childhood. 
He also obtained regular work from the Southern Railway Co travelling round the region 
prosecuting people for non-payment of fair. This grew into more demanding work from the 
railway and his practice continued to grow. In 1926 he obtained his first brief in the High 
Court where he was to spend much of the rest of his career. 
Tom became engaged to Mary Harvey 25th of January 1930 the courtship prove rapid 
however before the wedding may was diagnosed with tuberculosis which at that time was 
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largely a death sentence this delayed matters and it was over two years before they were 
finally married. 
Denning then started up started chambers at 4 Brick Court in 1932 , initially with four 
tenants and with himself as Head of Chambers. 
In 1934 Denning was instructed by the defendant company in the famous case of 
L’Estrange v Graucob67. The case concerned exclusion clauses in contracts for hire of an 
automatic slot machine. The shop owner had won the case in the County Court, not 
surprisingly as the slot machine completely failed to work. Denning was instructed to take 
the matter to the Court of Appeal on the basis that the contract contained an exclusion 
clause which stated that any express or implied condition or warranty, statutory or 
otherwise was excluded. Denning of course won this case and developed a lucrative line 
of business in taking this judgement round various county courts for the company and 
winning judgement for them. That judgement Denning says: 
in those days I wasn’t concerned so much with the rightness of the case. I was 
concerned only, as a member of the bar, to win it if I could.68 
whilst acknowledging that this is a fairly succinct rendering of the barristers duty it is 
nonetheless worthy of note that this is very much at variance with Denning’s attitude to 
exclusion clauses when he became a judge he goes on to say following the above 
quotation 
when you are a judge you don’t care who wins exactly. All you are concerned with 
is justice.69 
From this we can take away the fact that whatever may be identified as influences on his 
jurisprudence when he became a judge, he did not give free rein to those instincts and 
influences in his time at the bar. 
 
It is invidious to accuse Denning of being mercenary, and almost certainly untrue in any 
event but it is worthy of note that it is recorded that in 1936 as a junior barrister he earned 
£3000. This is an enormous sum for the time and by way of comparison it was more than 
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was earned by the Permanent Secretary to the Lord Chancellor and Clerk to the Crown in 
Chancery that year.70 
The average working man’s wage that year was £100 which shows that Denning was, at 
the age of 36, a wealthy man. Financially, he had left behind the drapers shop in 
Whitchurch but its influences were to stay with him when he became a judge. 
It was also at this time also that Denning took his first steps into the judicial world on his 
appointment as Chancellor of the Diocese of Southwark the plan which he held to 1944. 
The Chancellor is the bishop’s legal surrogate and effectively is the judge of all cases that 
come before the diocesan court. In this role Denning would have been involved in 
determining matters as mundane as the positioning of candles on an altar and as 
important as the exhumation of bodies. Proceedings of the diocesan courts are very rarely 
reported and it is only when matters are appealed to the Dean of the Arches Court that 
they reach the law reports. There are no records of Denning’s work in the Diocese of 
Southwark or from his later and concurrent appointment as Chancellor of the Diocese of 
London. 
These appointments however highlight Denning’s attachment to the Church of England. 
Appointments to post of Chancellor of the Diocese, where at that time, restricted to 
practising barristers who where also communicant members of the Church of England. 
Clearly Denning would fit that bill as well as being the son-in-law of a Church of England 
clergyman.          
The next logical step was to take silk which he did on 1 April 1938.One of only 15 
appointed that year. 
On the outbreak of war in 1939, Denning volunteered for service and was appointed as 
legal adviser for the north-east region, it was envisaged that in the event of invasion 
country was split into regions and Denning would be senior legal adviser in the north-east. 
In this capacity Denning was responsible for detaining, without trial, people suspected of  
being a danger to the realm under wartime regulations. He appears to have no qualms in 
doing this despite his later espousal of liberty under the law. He does quote with approval 
Lord Atkin’s dissent in Liversedge v Anderson71 which he refers to in the Family Story72 
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Notwithstanding that, he does not seem to have been in any way disturbed in exercising 
what was effectively an unfettered discretionary power. Presumably this is in line with his 
view that judges are the ones who are to be trusted with discretionary power and that he in 
particular had all the attributes of a good judge. 
Denning first sat as a High Court Judge in December 1943 when he was asked to sit as 
Commissioner of Assize in Manchester and was finally appointed to the High Court bench 
on 6 March 1944 and was assigned to the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division.  
Moving on to events in his personal life which were to have profound effects on his later 
career and which in particular were was to influence his judicial style.  
In November 1941 Mary finally succumbed to tuberculosis and died leaving Denning alone 
with his son Robert who was only three-year-old three years old. The other event was 
Norman’s burgeoning career in naval intelligence. Norman was effectively the chief 
intelligence officer to the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound and it was Norman who 
was responsible for conveying the intelligence reports regarding the Tirpitz’s movements in 
May 1942 which resulted in Pound’s disastrous interference with the convoy PQ 17, which 
interference contributed to the destruction of this convoy. Denning, many years later had 
an appeal in a libel case involving the convoy escort commander and a young author, one 
David Irving73. The line that Denning took in this case involved him in an undignified spat 
with the House of Lords resulting in a rebuke from the then Lord Chancellor, Lord 
Hailsham.74 
As will be seen, it is hard to think that in that case that Denning was not to some extent 
perhaps unconsciously influenced by the family connection. 
Denning remarried on 27 December 1945 choosing a widow of around the same age as 
himself and he was to remain married to Joan until her death in 1996. There is no doubt 
that it was her support of him, both moral and physical (for instance, he never learned to 
drive so she drove him everywhere) that enabled him to effectively discharge his  duties as 
a judge. 
Denning had a rapid rise through the judicial ranks moving to the Queen’s Bench Division 
and then to the Court of Appeal as soon as the 12 October 1948.  
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There is only one case from his time as a Queen’s Bench judge where he came in for any 
sort of criticism from higher up the judicial hierarchy and this is a case involving a barrister 
and MP, in the same person, namely one Mr David Weitzman MP75, the defendant was 
known to Denning having been his junior in a case some years earlier. The case involved 
contravention of regulations designed to limit the manufacture and distribution of certain 
toilet preparations; this was designed to husband scarce resources following on from the 
war. Weitzman was convicted and sentenced to 12 months imprisonment which would 
also have disqualified him from the House of Commons. The matter was appealed and 
was heard before the Lord Chief Justice who at the time was Lord Goddard. The 
conviction was overturned with the Court of Appeal stating that there was no shred of 
evidence against the defendant and that there had never been any and furthermore 
Denning should have stopped the trial at the close of the prosecution case. There was 
further criticism that evidence favourable to this defendant had not been put properly 
before the jury by the judge. 
This is a damning criticism and is indicative perhaps of Denning’s inexperience in criminal 
trials. He never had a strong criminal practice nor indeed much contact with the criminal 
law at all. One of his biographers has speculated that the fact that Weitzman was a Jew 
may have influenced Denning’s conduct of the trial. This is unlikely as there is no other 
evidence anywhere in his career either at the bar or as a judge which indicates any degree 
of anti-Semitism. It is more likely that he was influenced by the black market nature of the 
alleged offences and the involvement of a member of the bar from whom he would have 
always expected the highest standards. Notwithstanding this it is clear that the Court of 
Appeal considered that a miscarriage of justice had occurred and Denning presided over 
that miscarriage. 
During this time than Denning developed his unique style of judgement which is by turns, 
entertaining, absorbing and irritating. He set out his approach as follows 
I try to make my judgement live-so that it can be readily understood, I start my 
judgement, as it were, with a prologue-to introduce the story. Then I go on from act 
to act as Shakespeare does-each with its scenes-drawn from real life. I draw the 
characters as they truly are-using their real names-. I avoid long sentences like the 
plague: because they lead to obscurity. It is no good if the hearers cannot follow 
them. I strive to be clear at all costs. Not ambiguous or prevaricating. I refer 
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sometimes to previous authorities-I have to do so-because I know that people are 
prone not to accept my views unless they have support from the books. But   they 
are mere lawyer’s stuff. They are unintelligible to anyone else. I finish with a 
conclusion-an epilogue-again as the chorus does in Shakespeare. In it I gather the 
threads together and give the result.76 
This is extremely illuminating and gives an insight into Denning’s judicial philosophy as 
much as it does into his prose style, which is of course extremely idiosyncratic, particularly 
in its use of the hyphen. It has to be said that there is little of prevarication or ambiguity 
about any of his judgements and it must be acknowledged that there is seldom any dispute 
as to the meaning of any particular judgement of Denning’s as distinct from whether it was 
right or not. 
Perhaps however the most interesting phrase is his reference to precedent,  
“I refer sometimes to previous authorities-I have to do so-because I know that 
people are prone not to accept my views unless they have support from the books”  
What he appears to be saying here is that he forms his judgement from his own personal 
environment and philosophy and then effectively dresses it up in precedent to establish its 
legitimacy. If this is what he is saying then it effectively validates the thesis that whereas all 
of us are shaped in our opinions and judgements by our environment and experiences and 
judges are no exception, Denning seems to regard this as entirely proper. It comes back to 
his view that judges are the right persons to have unfettered discretion in the law, that he 
is an embodiment of all the qualities that make a judge and therefore his judgements must 
be right. This is perhaps a rather extreme exposition of his view and he would never have 
made such a bold statement himself but as we shall see this is borne out in some of his 
judgements and is an entirely legitimate conclusion to draw from this statement. As we’ve 
seen, Denning had developed an encyclopaedic knowledge of cases and the statement 
throws light on some of his later judgements which will very often overlook the obvious 
case and trawl back through the history of a particular line of reasoning and jurisprudence 
to find cases which he would then deploy in support of his particular argument. What this  
does indicate is that Denning was, to put it at its lowest, not indissolubly wedded to the 
doctrine of binding precedent. 
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Denning sat as an appeal court judge on this first occasion from 1948 to 1957 and sat on 
many cases during that time, in particular his dissenting judgement in Candler v Crane 
Christmas and Co, which is perhaps his most important contribution from this time and will 
be fully considered in a later Chapter. It is his first case in the Court of Appeal which once 
again illustrates how the influences identified here came to colour his judicial approach. 
His first case in the Court of Appeal was the case of Wingham77. This case concerned a 
will made by a young airman who was killed in a training exercise in Canada during the 
war. The will did not comply with the formalities of the Wills Act 1837 and the court of first 
instance declared it to be invalid and the appeal was on the basis that the will had been 
made by a serviceman in privileged circumstances. The test was whether at the time the 
will was made the testator serviceman could be considered to be in expeditione as the 
Latin would have it. 
Denning said this: 
“the words of our statutes are plain English: “in actual military service” I found this 
easier to understand and to apply than the Latin: in expeditione. If I were to enquire 
into the Roman law, I could, perhaps, after some research say how Roman law 
would have dealt with its soldiers on Hadrian’s Wall and the camp at Chester, but I 
cannot say how it would have  dealt with an airman in Saskatchewan who was only 
days flying from the enemy. Nor can anyone else. This supposed throwback to 
Roman law has confused this branch of the law too long. It is time to get back to the 
statute.”78 
In actual fact of course this was not and never was a question of Roman law and the use 
of Latin was merely a term of art which had been employed for some considerable time, 
Denning was of course right in that the question before the court was the definition of 
actual military service. His judgement here is perhaps a reflection of his impatience with 
lawyers who attempted to interfere with what he considered to be the lawful rights of a 
serviceman who fell in the late conflict. This judgement has been described as “a song of 
thanksgiving for those who served in the war so recently ended and a promise to those 
who might serve in the future.”79 
                                                
77
 Wingham, Re, Andrews v Wingham [1949] P 187, [1948] 2 All ER 908, [1949] LJR 695, 92 Sol Jo 660, 64 
TLR 594 
78
 Ibid  195 
79
 Freeman at p195 
37 
 
In this judgement Denning was concerned that the law should reflect and serve the needs 
of those bereaved by the war needing to rely on Wills made in privileged circumstances. 
Again we see that, perhaps mindful of sacrifices his own family had made in the First 
World War he is sympathetic to the claims of serviceman on the law. As has been 
mentioned above, this is an attitude we shall see reflected later in his career. 
We have seen that Denning was a religious man with a strong Anglican faith and it would 
be surprising if this did not to some extent to influence his judicial outlook. Indeed he 
delivered a public lecture on the subject of “the influence of religion on law”80 in which he 
expounded the theory that many of the fundamental principles of the common law have 
been derived from the Christian religion, whether this is so or not is outside the scope of 
this thesis but suffice to say that a strong argument could certainly be made in favour of 
the proposition. But perhaps a remark that throws the most light on Denning’s religious 
approach to the judging process is where he said 
“I cannot help thinking that the literal interpretation of contracts and statutes is a 
departure from real truth. It makes words the master of men instead of the servant” 
This highlights the purposive approach which characterised so many of his judgements 
and his persistent refusal to abide by what some would consider to be the literal letter of 
the law if he could find any excuse not to do so. It follows from this that he considered that 
if the literal interpretation was a departure from the real truth then, in refusing to apply the 
literal interpretation, he was the guardian of that real truth. To indicate perhaps where he 
felt his claim to be the bearer of this truth rested, he said in conclusion: 
“Religion concerns the spirit in man whereby he is able to recognise what is truth 
and what is justice; whereas law is only the application, however imperfectly, of 
truth and justice in our everyday affairs.” 
Denning was also the president of the Lawyers Christian Fellowship and gave time to 
many charitable organisations. More significantly, in 1952 he became Chairman of the 
trustees of the Cheshire Homes, set up by Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC.    
Leonard Cheshire was the son of Professor Jeffrey Cheshire, Denning’s old tutor and 
friend. Denning remained Chairman of the trustees until his appointment as Master of the 
Rolls in 1962. 
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In April 1957 Denning was appointed to the House of Lords Judicial Committee as a Lord 
of Appeal in Ordinary. 
Is fair to say that Denning did not enjoy his time in the House of Lords and his famous 
comment was 
“to most lawyers on the bench the House of Lords is like heaven-you want to get 
there someday-but not while there is any life in you” 81 
Denning was not in any real sense a rebel in the House of Lords, he only dissented in 16% 
of the cases which he took part in. This is a much lower percentage than several of his 
contemporaries, for example Lord Keith, who was regarded as a very orthodox judge, 
dissented in 22% of his judgements. 
In April 1962, Denning got the appointment which he craved as Master of the Rolls. This 
uniquely placed him to influence and develop the law. As the senior judge on the civil side 
of the Court of Appeal, he could pick and choose cases and additionally, pick and choose 
the judges who sat with him. Shortly after his appointment came the incident which thrust 
him to the forefront of national affairs and for a time, made his name a household word. 
Denning was appointed in June of 1963 to enquire into the circumstances surrounding 
what became known as the Profumo affair. This was at the time a matter of great public 
interest involving, as it did, a government minister, a call girl and a Russian spy with a 
supporting cast of socialites, gangsters and pimps. 
Denning was appointed on 21 June and his report was published on 26 September, he 
interviewed all the witnesses himself and produced the report himself. The report has often 
been criticised as a whitewash and there is no question but that it is supportive of the 
establishment. However it does contain some trenchant criticism of the government. The 
report sold 4000 copies in its first day and has been reprinted many times, a unique 
distinction for a government report.  
The allegation which the report was essentially set up to investigate was whether the 
government tried to stifle the Profumo affair. In this Denning was clear that there was no 
such attempt. However the Prime Minister (Harold Macmillan) and his handling of the affair 
was criticised. Denning considered that they had not asked themselves the right questions 
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“did the ministers ask themselves the proper question? They concentrated their 
attention on the matter of immorality. And the one question they asked themselves 
was whether Mr Profumo had in fact committed adultery: whereas the proper 
question may have been: was his conduct, proved or admitted, such as to lead 
ordinary people reasonably to believe that he had committed adultery? If that were 
the proper question the answer was clear. His conduct was such as to lead to that 
belief”82 
This approach came in for some criticism with some ministers equating this view with a 
reversal of the presumption of innocence, which would have meant ministers condemning 
a colleague on mere suspicion only. Denning however was right, Profumo had admitted an 
association with Christine Keeler and Stephen Ward which had given rise to rumours 
which brought discredit on himself and the government, whether they were true or not, 
they were such as it was as it would be reasonable for ordinary people to believe and it 
was this conduct that ministers should have dealt with and didn’t. The government seems 
to have worked on the “good chap”83 principle and taken Profumo’s word at face value. 
Denning, without a public school background, coupled with his education in the law, was 
not impressed by this and felt that ministers should have looked behind Jack Profumo’s 
denials. Whilst not reversing the presumption of innocence, he considered that Profumo’s 
admitted behaviour, in itself, was enough to give ministers cause to investigate further and 
they didn’t.  
It was around this time that Denning returned to what is perhaps the greatest influence on 
his life and work when he went back to live in Whitchurch. In the early 1960s the Denning’s 
bought “The Lawn” in Whitchurch, this was at the time perhaps the grandest house in 
Whitchurch. Denning, after quoting sales particulars of 1868 had this to say about it: 
“That is the sort of establishment which judges of olden days used to have. They 
used to live in style befitting their standing. In the 17th century Lord Coke had his 
great house at Stoke Poges and 1000 acres. Near the house, a stream was 
dammed to make a lake, after the fashion when a man improved his country place. 
His domestic accounts showed his attraction to pleasant country living-sheep to 
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crop the turf, cows grazing near the house, the stables within sight and sound, and 
so forth. He loved it. Just as I love The Lawn .”84 
There can be no doubt at all that Denning would have enjoyed being able to buy The Lawn 
and he would not have been human had he not got a certain pleasure from rising from his 
humble beginnings to being the undoubted top of Whitchurch society. 
All that he says about it though is this: 
“so you see I am back in the place where I was born. It is good for a man to have 
his roots deep down. It is good for him to return to the place of his childhood. It is 
good for him to meet and to talk with those whom he knew when he was a boy. And 
to feel that he has done something to keep its character as a period piece.85” 
Once again we are coming back to the place of Whitchurch in Denning’s character; this is 
an acknowledgement by Denning himself of the importance he attaches to place in his life. 
Denning was to remain at the lawn for the rest of his life and indeed he is now buried in the 
churchyard next door. 
Denning had always been involved in external lecturing and overseas tours. However, as 
Master of the Rolls, these tours took on a more official character. In 1963 and early 1964 
Denning went on official tours to India and Pakistan making a great impression where ever 
he went. 
It was as Master of the Rolls that he began to exercise that judicial activism which 
characterised the later part of his career and in particular he began a campaign to win the 
Court of Appeal freedom to depart from previous decisions of the court. This was 
ultimately doomed to failure but is very illustrative of Denning’s approach to judicial 
decision-making. 
As we shall see later, in the case of Broome, Denning attempted to take this campaign one 
step further and even attempted to take the Court of Appeal away from being bound by 
decisions of the House of Lords. This is not an example of megalomania but a reflection of 
his belief in his own judicial capacity and a desire to right what he perceived as wrongs 
inflicted on individuals. Ultimately as we have seen his intent was always to do justice, as 
he saw it, to the individual before him. 
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It was in the field of trade union law that Denning next exhibited his independent line of 
reasoning and his determination to do justice. 
Denning was certainly not anti-union but there is a consistent line running through his 
judgements wherein he seeks not to limit union power but to ensure that that power was 
properly utilised and not abused. This reached its zenith in the case of Duport Steels Ltd v 
Sirs86. This was a case of secondary industrial action which was exercising all strata of 
government and society at the time.  
It was always this extension of union power beyond what Denning considered to be a 
legitimate trade dispute and the consequent impact on unconnected and innocent 
individuals and companies that led to many of his most controversial judgements and in 
many minds he became known as a judge who was antagonistic to trade unions. This was 
not the case and in more than one case he gave judgements which protected trade 
unions. 
Denning’s zeal for reform was not always frustrated by higher courts and a good example 
of this is his development of the Mareva injunction87, now known as freezing injunctions. 
This is an entirely new procedure which enabled a creditor to freeze the assets of his 
debtor before obtaining a judgement for the debt. The principal identified by Denning was 
to prevent a debtor from avoiding a judgement by removing his assets from the jurisdiction 
of the court either by taking them overseas or by dissipating them. 
Unfortunately however, whilst the Mareva injunction itself survived, a later attempt to 
extend the scope and reach of the Mareva injunctions resulted in yet another rebuke from 
Lord Hailsham. This was in the case of the Siskina88. In this case Denning sought to 
extend the jurisdiction of a Mareva injunction outside England and Wales. The brief details 
of the case are that the buyers of the cargo on the Siskina had paid for the cargo prior to 
delivery, the ship disappeared and the Cyprus-based owners claimed the insurance 
money. The buyers applied for a Mareva injunction to stop the dissipation of those 
insurance monies pending the determination of the claim. 
In his judgement Denning clearly demonstrates his judicial approach once again 
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It was suggested to us that this course is not open to us, it would be legislation; and 
that we should leave the law to be amended by the Rules Committee. But see what 
that would mean. The ship owning company will be able to decamp with the 
insurance money and the cargo owners would have to whistle for any redress. To 
wait for the rules committee would be to shut the stable door after the steed had 
been stolen and who knows that there will ever again be another horse in the 
stable? I ask, why should the judges wait for the Rules Committee? The judges 
have an inherent jurisdiction to lead in the practice and procedure of the courts: and 
we can invoke it now to restrain the removal of these insurance monies. To 
timorous souls I would say in the words of William Cooper: 
Ye Fearful Saints, fresh courage take, 
The Clouds ye so much dread 
Are big with mercy, and shall break 
In blessings on your head. 89 
Not surprisingly this approach did not find favour with the House of Lords and Lord 
Hailsham aimed a personal rebuke that Denning 
The second point upon which I wish to comment is the argument of Lord Denning 
MR fortified by authority of a quotation from Hymns Ancient and Modern that judges 
need not wait for the authority of the Rules Committee in order to sanction a change 
of practice, indeed an extension of jurisdiction in matters of this kind. The 
jurisdiction of the Rules Committee is statutory, and for judges of first instance or on 
appeal to preempt its function is, at least in my opinion, for the courts to usurp the 
function of the legislature.90 
Denning was always minded to find ways round inconvenient rules if he felt that justice, in 
a particular case before him, demanded it. In doing this he did not always plough a lonely 
furrow. In 1961 the House of Lords had decided that judgements must always be given in 
Sterling91 .This was a case in which Denning himself had sat. By the mid-1970s however 
the economic situation had changed and Sterling was no longer the strong currency it had 
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been in 1961 and commercial pressures were demanding that judgements be given in 
Sterling and other currencies if appropriate. Denning supported this92 and got round the 
earlier judgement, to which he had been a party by the simple expedient of a Nelsonic 
blind eye93. 
This approach was later affirmed by the House of Lords who on this occasion did not feel it 
necessary to wait for the rules committee. 
Denning was also involved in the gestation of the Anton Pillar94 order. In one of the first 
cases concerning such an order which reached the Court of Appeal Denning was in a 
minority in rejecting the appeal. Once again his judgement demonstrates his firm view to 
do what he saw as justice for the party appearing before him in the instant case: 
to allow wrongdoers to take advantage of the wrongdoing in this case was an 
affront to justice in itself. It is a great disservice to the public interest. It should not 
be allowed. If this illicit trade is to be stopped strong measures are needed. Whitford 
J has much experience in cases of this kind. He has made a strong order. I agree 
with it. I would dismiss the appeal.95 
the Anton Pillar order prove to be a step too far for the House of Lords who disagreed with 
Denning and upheld the appeal however the matter was resolved by Parliament who gave 
the Anton Pillar order statutory force. 
Throughout his career, Denning frequently found himself at odds with the House of Lords 
some of these cases will be analysed in greater detail in succeeding chapters, but the 
overriding concern of Denning was always never to let the law get in the way of what he 
saw as being justice. in some instances this of course was of great benefit to the 
development of the law and some of Denning’s greatest and most enduring contributions 
to the law have arisen either from his dissent or a Court of Appeal judgement which whilst 
it was overturned by the House of Lords nonetheless later gave rise to the change in the 
law which Denning advocated. Probably the best example of a dissenting judgement 
giving rise to profound change in the law was Denning’s powerful dissent in Candler v 
Crane Christmas & Co. Ltd.96 again this will be examined fully in a later chapter that it is no 
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exaggeration to say that Denning’s judgement was at least as influential on the law of 
negligence as that of Lord Atkin in Donoghue v Stevenson97, the judgement which 
Denning sought to expand in Candler. 
Perhaps the clearest illustration of the difference between Denning’s approach and that of 
the more cautious and orthodox Law Lords is that the clash between Denning and Lord 
Simonds in the case of Magor and St Mellons District Council v Newport Corporation98 
the details of the case are discussed elsewhere however it is the contrast in statements 
made by Denning and Simonds which provide the illustration. Denning’s view is 
“we do not sit here to pull the language of Parliament and of Ministers to pieces and 
make nonsense of it. We sit here to find out the intention of Parliament and of 
Ministers and to carry it out, and we do this better by filling in the gaps and making 
sense of the enactment than by opening it up to destructive analysis” 
This was anathema to Simonds who couched his disagreement in these terms: 
“the general proposition that it is the duty of the court to find at the intention of Parliament, 
and not only Parliament but ministers also, cannot by any means be supported. The duty 
of the court is to interpret the words that the legislators used, these words may be 
ambiguous, but even if they are, the power and the duty of the court to travel outside them 
on a voyage of discovery are strictly limited” 
it is of course Denning’s approach which has found modern favour, albeit not perhaps to 
the extent that he would himself have advocated and courts are now not only expected to 
find out the intention of Parliament in appropriate cases but are specifically allowed to refer 
to extraneous aids in doing so.99 Lord Simonds would not have approved. 
In another dissent which led to another rebuke from Lord Simonds, Denning upheld the 
rights of a third party to rely on a contractual document to which they were not a party.100 
Simonds held that it was an elementary principle that only a party to a contract could sue 
on it and that it was for Parliament, and Parliament alone to change this. In this case 
Simonds was right. However Parliament agreed with Denning eventually and gave third 
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parties with an interest the right to sue on a contractual document to which they were not a 
party101. 
Denning gave a dissenting judgement in his first and his last cases in the House of Lords 
and the many others in between. On occasions Denning’s dissent was less than measured 
but never merely capricious. On other occasions however Denning showed himself to be 
ahead of current judicial thinking whilst clearly showing the way that others should follow. 
There are instances where he could take the steps himself but if not others would take up 
the battle as in Candler which led directly to Headley Byrne102 and Caparo and hence the 
modern law of negligence. 
During his later career Denning sat down to write several books expounding his views and 
theories on the law as well as giving his view on his life and career. In 1979 he published 
in The Discipline of Law, in 1981 The Due Process of Law, in 1981 The Family Story and 
in 1982 What Next In The Law was published. It was this latter book which led to his 
resignation and in some minds cast a shadow over his judicial career. 
In writing this book Denning had intended to be controversial as he felt that he needed to 
push the agenda for reform in the law and one area that he chose for that reform was the 
rights of peremptory challenge of the defendant to obtain a sympathetic jury, in his view, 
others may of course have taken the view that the defendant would use his right to obtain 
a fair and balanced jury. Unfortunately Denning chose the then recent Bristol riots to 
illustrate his point and referred to a trial of 12 coloured people where he considered the 
jury had been packed. He proposed several reforms to the jury system and then included 
this unfortunate passage 
it grew up in the ages when the English were a homogenous race, they shared the 
same standards of conduct, the same code of morals, and the same religious 
beliefs. Above all they adhered uniformly to the rule of law. The English are no 
longer a homogenous race. They are white and black, coloured and brown. They no 
longer share the same standards of conduct. Some of them come from countries 
where bribery and graft are accepted as an integral part of life: and stealing is a 
virtue so long as you are not found out. They no longer share the same code of 
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morals. They no longer share the same religious beliefs. They no longer share the 
same respect for the law. 
Denning appears to have been genuinely not aware of how offensive this paragraph was 
until he was interviewed by Ludovic Kennedy for the BBC. He was then shown a transcript 
of the trial in Bristol which quite clearly showed that the challenges were prompted by the 
judge who was anxious to secure a representative jury. Denning was threatened with libel 
actions from black jurors and was subjected to criticism from all sides of the political 
spectrum. An example of this was an article in the Times which said: 
Lord Denning’s ill-considered remarks on the unsuitability of many blacks for jury 
service have, understandably, caused considerable offence in the black community. 
Should he have to give judgement in a case in which race is a factor, he will be 
exposed to charges of prejudice and to suggestions that his decision might be 
affected by his personal feelings on racial matters. Such criticism would, it is hoped 
and expected, be unwarranted. Lord Denning has only himself to blame for placing 
himself in a position where such attacks could be made. It was the same on issues 
affecting industrial relations. The accusations which the political left and many trade 
unionists have made against Lord Denning have only partly been based on the 
judgements he has given against unions in a number of court cases. Much of 
feeling against him has resulted from remarks he has made in lectures and in his 
books.103 
Denning realised that feeling was such that he would have to retire and he brought this to 
the Lord Chancellor, Lord Hailsham, who suggested that rather than retiring immediately 
he should retire at the end of the long vacation. Denning sat until 29 July 1982 with his 
valedictory sitting being held on 30 July. As a postscript to the longest judicial career in 
English history, the valedictory sitting was full and the compliments fulsome. 
No writs for libel were ever issued and the offending passages were withdrawn from later 
editions of the book. The reference to the Bristol trial now reads: 
there was a recent case about the disturbances at Bristol. The accused were 
encouraged by the judge to use the peremptory challenges so as to secure a 
representative jury. So the accused were fully justified to use them as they did. It is 
always desirable that a jury should reflect the community from which its members 
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are drawn. The use for that purpose it is quite proper but it is not right to use it 
otherwise104 
So which one is the real Denning, the answer must be that they both are. The first is drawn 
from his Whitchurch boyhood and the certainties of Edwardian England whereas the 
second is based on his experiences and is a result of reflection. 
That Denning was not a racist was acknowledged by Rudy Narayan the President of the 
Society of Black Lawyers who said: 
A great judge has erred greatly in the intellectual loneliness of advanced years; 
while his remarks should be rejected and rebutted he is yet, in a personal way, 
entitled to draw on that reservoir of community regard which he has in many 
quarters and to seek understanding, if not forgiveness.105 
 Denning was active in retirement, attending the House of Lords until 1988 when ill-health 
forced his retirement from the house. Denning remained, even in retirement, true to his 
principles and did not shrink from taking any opportunity to expound them. On 20 October 
1988 there was a government statement that they intended to change the law on the right 
to silence. Tom King the Northern Ireland Secretary was interviewed on the television 
news and gave his views in favour of the change and Denning was interviewed by 
Channel 4 News again supporting the change. At the same time there was a trial in 
Winchester of three alleged IRA terrorists who would exercise their right to silence. The 
three were all convicted and sentenced to 25 years. This was appealed to the Court of 
Appeal which quashed the convictions and once again Denning was mentioned in a Court 
of Appeal judgement: 
The statements of Mr King and Lord Denning, which were powerfully made, were 
on the face of general application, but had a particular relevance to the trial of the 
accused. Their Lordships were left with the definite impression that the impact 
which the statements made in the television interviews may well have had on the 
fairness of the trial could not be overcome by any direction to the jury and that the 
only way in which justice could have been done and have been seen to be done is 
by discharging the jury and ordering a retrial.106  
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 This did not please Denning at all and he had no right of reply to the court and indeed had 
not even known about the proceedings, he did however send a trenchant letter to the 
Times setting out his views. The letter is worth quoting at some length. 
The right to silence had been brought under public scrutiny on October 20, 1988 by 
a written answer by the Home Secretary to Parliament. It was a matter of general 
public interest which all others were entitled to comment. My comment on television 
was the same as those which I have made publicly many times before and was 
based on the report of the Criminal Law Commission in 1972, who proposed that 
the so-called right to silence enjoyed by suspects should be greatly restricted. 
I knew, as most people knew that three people were being tried at Winchester for 
conspiring to murder Mr King but I knew nothing of the course of the trial. I have 
read nothing of it and had no idea that it involved the right to silence. If I had been 
charged I should have pleaded the defence of freedom of speech given by section 5 
of the Contempt of Court Act 1981: a publication made as or as part of the 
discussion in good faith about public affairs or other matters of general public 
interest is not to be treated as contempt of court under the strict liability rule if the 
risk of impediment or prejudice to particular legal proceedings is merely incidental to 
the discussion. 
That section was inserted into the statute on the recommendation of the Contempt 
of Court Committee supported by speeches of distinguished Law Lords. Yet the 
Judges of the Court of Appeal have condemned me without hearing my defence. 
They did it under the cloak of an absolute privilege. In the face of it, all I can do is to 
write to you. My view is that justice was done in the Crown Court at Winchester by 
Mr Justice Swinton Thomas (the presiding judge of the Western Circuit) and a 
Hampshire jury. It was not done at the Old Bailey in London by three judges of the 
Court of Appeal.107 
This is very much in line with his judicial approach throughout his career and shows that 
even at the age of 90 his principles remained the same and still reflected those influences 
which were brought to bear upon him during his childhood in Whitchurch and were honed 
during his time at the bar and his subsequent long judicial career. In this statement are 
contained many of his strands of judicial philosophy. His belief that the law and the 
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interpretation thereof is best left in the hands of a competent sensible judge, usually 
himself but in this case Swinton Thomas J; his belief in the good sense of the reasonable 
man, in this case the jury and finally the sentimental tug of his Whitchurch childhood, a 
Hampshire jury in fact. 
As the years advanced Denning paid the penalty of increasing old age as his companions 
and contemporaries were taken from him. The first to go was Norman who died of a heart 
attack in December 1979. Norman had risen to the rank of Vice Admiral and had served as 
Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (intelligence) and was knighted as Vice Admiral Sir 
Norman Denning GCB, a remarkable achievement for a non-seagoing officer in the Royal 
Navy at any time. This was a severe blow to the Dennings, especially as Norman was the 
youngest of the family and his death was unexpected. 
Reg died on the 23rd of May 1990, he was by this time a Lieutenant-General and a Knight. 
He had served as GOC Northern Ireland and was the first Colonel of the Royal Anglian 
Regiment. In addition he was for 20 years chairman of SSAFA. Denning admitted to being 
desolate at Reg’s death, he had this to say in writing 
“If I were to name his qualities, I would put above all his courage, his courage when 
severely wounded; his courage against all odds.”108 
It was a sign of Denning’s increasing frailty that he was not well enough to go to London 
for the memorial service.  
In July of that year he was interviewed by A.N Wilson for an article in the Spectator and 
made several unwise comments about the recent overturning of the convictions against 
the Guildford four. 
Denning had reached that stage in life when in the words of one of his biographers he was 
no longer subject to restraint and self-examination109 and simply did not realise how 
offensive some of his remarks and opinions could be to others. Fortunately Denning still 
had a large reservoir of public approval for him to draw upon and his extreme old age 
inclined some commentators not to treat his pronouncements as seriously as perhaps 
Denning himself would have liked110 
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Joan Denning died on 23rd October 1992 and was buried in the church next to their home 
in Whitchurch. Denning soldiered on alone passing his hundredth birthday in January 
1999. He died on 5th March 1999 in the Royal Hampshire County Hospital in Winchester of 
an internal haemorrhage. He lies buried next to Joan in the churchyard in Whitchurch not 
far from his birthplace in Newbury Street.  
This is not a detailed examination of all Denning’s legacy but it is perhaps appropriate to 
put in a final word on his life and career (borrowing from a comment made about another 
great Englishman, the Duke of Wellington). He wasn’t always a good judge but he was 
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Denning’s Approach to The Judicial Process 
And a theory of Adjudication 
Throughout his life, Denning was always open about his view of a judge’s role and 
expounded it at length both in his writings and in judgements. Early in his career he set out 
his views in The Road to Justice112He was always anxious to portray himself as the 
defender of the common law tradition but in many of his writings and judgements he 
betrayed himself as having a much more purposive and indeed continental approach. It 
was this approach which led, in some degree, to him being labelled as a judicial activist.  
His own position on Jurisprudence was somewhat ambivalent in that he affected a disdain 
for legal philosophy and seemed to be almost proud of the Gamma minus he achieved in 
this subject at Oxford. 
Many Alphas in most subjects .But one Gamma. That was in jurisprudence. Gamma 
Minus. Jurisprudence was too abstract a subject for my liking. All about ideologies, 
legal norms and basic norms, ought and is, realism and behaviourism: and 
goodness knows what else. The jargon of the philosophers of the law has always 
been beyond me. I like to get down to the practical problems which require a  
decision. Contracts, torts, crimes and the like.113 
What he is actually saying here is not that there is no philosophy underpinning the law but 
that the philosophy expounded by legal philosophers is not relevant for English law and it 
becomes clear that he thinks that judges are the right men to expound English legal 
theory. He does not expound any explicit jurisprudential theory nor for that matter support 
of contemporary judges such as Patrick Devlin. Devlin expounded a theory that the judge 
was bound, by his judicial oath, to give justice according to law. Devlin contrasts this with 
judgements according to the merits of the particular case which is in front of the judge at 
that moment, this is the polar opposite to Denning’s view 
. Devlin says 
“the hallmark of judgements according to law is its conformity with a set of rules. 
The rules should be designed so as to ensure justice in the normal case and also in 
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any foreseeable exceptions, at least to the extent the provision for the exceptions 
does not make the rule intolerably cumbersome. But to frame a set of rules that 
would do complete justice in every case which could be brought within them, would 
be, if not theoretically impossible, at any rate practically unattainable”.114 
We will contrast this view with Denning’s later in this chapter. 
Denning maintains that he developed his own judicial philosophy in the Court of Appeal; 
Not many of the judges – even of the Court of Appeal - have any conscious 
philosophy of the law: but subconsciously each develops his own philosophy. 
During my term as a Lord Justice of Appeal – from 1948 to 1957 – I found myself 
evolving a philosophy of my own.115 
He then goes on to set out his philosophy as falling under three headings:   
 let justice be done;  freedom under the law   put your trust in god.116 
These are interesting headings and shed a considerable amount of light in themselves on 
his approach but they are far from a comprehensive philosophy and as this was set out at 
the end of his judicial career there is more than a hint of post hoc rationalisation in it. 
Perhaps more useful is the more comprehensive philosophy he set out nearer the 
beginning of his long judicial career. 
He sets out his agenda at the beginning of the Road to Justice  
I have often heard judges say “we are only concerned with what the law is not what 
it ought to be” or “If this leads to an unjust result, it is a matter for Parliament not for 
us.” They wash their hands of it as if it was not their concern. It is my purpose here 
to challenge that facile assumption”117 
This is a sweeping statement of intent and also a condemnation in many ways of the 
doctrine of binding precedent, an attitude which Denning would often display throughout 
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his career. Indeed it is this point which underpins the assertion that he would often 
exercise his discretion outside that legitimate arena which was identified in chapter 1. 
He goes on to explain that statutes are drafted by lawyers and interpreted by lawyers and 
that it is often in the lawyers’ part that injustices occur.118 The clear implication of this is 
that he considers that unjust outcomes are a result of either bad drafting or poor 
interpretation. It must be remembered that this was at a time when a much more literal 
approach to statutory interpretation was the norm. This part of his philosophy can perhaps 
best be summed up as “Parliament cannot have intended an unjust result, the result is 
unjust and therefore not intended by parliament and I am therefore free to interpret this 
statute in such a way as to avoid the injustice.” This is an explicit statement that there are 
occasions in which Denning does not feel that he is stepping outside the legitimate arena 
for the exercise of his discretion and in effect what is doing here is self-legitimising the 
exercise of his judicial discretion outside of those normal interstitial spaces where we have 
seen that it is considered acceptable and indeed necessary for the judge to exercise his 
discretion in accordance with the accepted norms. The alternative argument which 
Denning himself would propound is of course that he is not operating outside the legitimate 
arena of the interstices as he is particularly, possibly uniquely, able to interpret these 
interstices to come to a judgement which he considers just on the facts of the case before 
him. This is in many ways to extend the boundaries of what is considered legitimate and in 
doing so if the judge in a particular instance wants to gain acceptance for the judgement 
that he eventually delivers in the wider world of the law outside of the parties to the 
particular case then that view expounded in the judgement will have to command a 
consensus in society. Alternatively of course, if it is a minority judgement, which some of 
Denning’s most influential judgements are, then to achieve a legitimate acceptance, the 
judgement will need to lead to the building of a consensus in favour of the particular 
innovation in the law which the judgement intends to bring about. This can best be seen in 
Denning’s minority judgement in Candler v Crane Christmas and Co Ltd119 which is 
considered more fully in a later chapter. In this judgement Denning explores the existing 
precedents and dissects them in an attempt to create the space in the interstices that he 
needs to develop law along the lines that he considers just. 
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There are other cases however when he is not able to create the space that he needs in 
order to at least appear to legitimately exercise his discretion and on occasions he will 
simply ignore an inconvenient precedent. Or if this is not possible he will contend that it is 
wrongly decided. 
This is a dangerous attitude in many ways and we shall see the outcome later. Denning 
clearly does not agree with judges who simply state that they are compelled by law to 
come to an unjust result and he considers this to be drawing a line between law and 
morality and having no interest in the moral dimension.120 This is coupled with a belief in 
the jury system, which he ascribes (not entirely accurately) to the reign of Henry II. 
Whereas it more probably owes its place in English law to the impetus given to criminal 
procedure by the 2nd Lateran Council of 1215, which banned the clergy from taking part in 
trial by ordeal. The ascribing of the rise of the jury to Henry is perhaps significant as an 
example of Denning’s belief in the ancient nature of the common law and its place in his 
jurisprudence.  
This is at variance with the ex-aequum et bonum which we will consider later in the 
chapter. 
In his opinion he sees the jury as an essential element in the habit of obedience to the law 
which he sees as central to the English way of life. 
This participation in justice has, I believe, done more than anything else to establish 
the English habit of obedience to law which a great historian has described as “the 
strongest of all forces making for the nations peaceful continuity and progress”.121 
He doesn’t identify the quotation but it is probably from G M Trevelyan’s History of England 
(1926). It does of course have some advantage from Denning’s point in that the decisions 
of juries are to a large extent opaque to any theories of adjudication or jurisprudence. 
He ties this observation in with his view of the role of the judge by stating that it is an 
essential part of the compact between the law and the people that the law must deliver 
justice122. 
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This is of course poses the question “what is justice” and Denning sets out to answer this. 
It is really at this stage that we can see the almost mystical nature of his view of the law 
and therefore of the role of the judge as the upholder of the law, 
All I would suggest is that justice is not something you can see; it is not temporal 
but eternal. How does man know what is justice? It is not the product of his intellect 
but his spirit.123  
This is an unusual statement for Denning as to some extent it appears to support a natural 
law theory in that he seems to suggest that there is immutable concept innate within 
mankind. It can perhaps be reconciled by noting that he is not espousing any particular set 
of rules or laws as being natural, but merely the desire for justice, although he does seem 
to suggest that every man will know justice when he sees it. 
 He then goes on to try and relate this rather high minded abstract to the more mundane 
The nearest we can get to defining justice is to say that it is what the right minded 
members of the community – those who have the right spirit within them – believe 
to be fair.124 
This is closer to the positivist viewpoint than the natural lawyer and would seem to be 
getting closer to the view of Denning which comes across in some of his judgements. 
This is an explicit espousal of justice as a somehow immutable and eternal concept but 
also a concept only available to those who have the right spirit and no doubt Denning 
would place himself among those. Indeed we shall see that this is in many ways the 
central theme of much of his judicial career that he knew best and this page of his judicial 
manifesto perhaps starts to get to the heart of why he had this unshakeable belief in his 
own judgment.  
He quotes Bunyan in the Pilgrims Progress when Christian was advised to seek advice 
from Legality. According to Bunyan, Christian followed this advice with disastrous 
consequences and was only rescued by recourse to Evangelist.  Denning takes this and 
expands it thus 
“There are two great objects to be achieved: one is to see that the laws are just: the 
other that they are justly administered. Both are important: but of the two, the more 
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important is that the law should be justly administered. It is no use having laws if 
they are administered unfairly by bad judges or corrupt lawyers. A country can put 
up with laws that are harsh or unjust so long as they are administered by just judges 
who can mitigate their harshness or alleviate their unfairness.125 
This again is Denning placing the judge at the centre of jurisprudence and essentially 
saying that provided a judge is just then he can be trusted to do the right thing. This is 
clearly not a theory that would appeal to law makers or indeed many of his colleagues on 
the judicial bench. An example of the explicit rejection of this approach can be found in the 
case of Magor and St Mellons Rural District Council v Newport Corporation126. 
Leading into this Denning had taken some steps down the road in the case of Seaford 
Court Estates and Asher127 the case involved interpretation of an obscure section of the 
Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act 1920. The facts are mundane 
and the amount in question relatively small but this was a test case arising from wartime 
conditions. Denning clearly set out the facts as follows: 
The flat was let from 1935 to 1939 at 175l. a year. The landlords were then under 
no obligation to provide hot water, but they did in fact do so. The flat was empty 
from 1939 to 1943. Then it was let at 250l. a year, but with the significant difference 
that the landlords bound themselves to provide hot water. The cost of fuel and 
labour had, of course, greatly increased between 1939 and 1943; and, whilst in 
1939 it was no doubt economically possible for the landlords to provide hot water 
free for his tenants, it may well have been economically impossible for them to do 
so in 1943 unless there was some increase in the rent. At any rate the tenant then 
agreed to pay 250l. a year for the flat. Now the tenant says that the increase from 
175l. to 250l. was invalid. If his contention is correct it means that in return for 175l. 
a year he will not only get the benefits which the 1939 tenant got for that sum, but 
he will also get this additional benefit thrown in; he will be able to insist on the 
landlords providing hot water free of any cost to the tenant no matter how much the 
cost of fuel and labour has already increased or may hereafter increase, and he will 
be able to recover two years' over-payments at 75l. a year.128 
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The central issue was that under the legislation, unless the tenant had obtained an extra 
benefit or the landlord had incurred an extra burden then any purported rent increase 
would essentially be unenforceable. The section in question, S2 (3), was notoriously 
obscure.  
"Any transfer to a tenant of any burden or liability previously borne by the landlord 
shall, for the purposes of this Act, be treated as an alteration of rent, and where, as 
a result of such a transfer, the terms on which a dwelling-house is held are on the 
whole less favourable to the tenant than the previous terms, the rent shall be 
deemed to be increased, whether or not the sum periodically payable by way of rent 
is increased and any increase of rent in respect of any transfer to a landlord of any 
burden or liability previously borne by the tenant when, as the result of such 
transfer, the terms on which any dwelling-house is held are on the whole not less 
favourable to the tenant than the previous terms, shall be deemed not to be an 
increase of rent for the purpose of this Act."129 
Lord Greene MR said 
I may say, however, that the true interpretation of s. 2, sub-s. 3, of the Rent Restrictions 
Act, 1920, is a matter which appears to me to be left by the authorities in some obscurity130 
This in many ways left the field clear for Denning to take an early opportunity to exercise 
his ideas and he seized on the opportunity 
The English language is not an instrument of mathematical precision. Our literature 
would be much the poorer if it were. This is where the draftsmen of Acts of 
Parliament have often been unfairly criticized. A judge, believing himself to be 
fettered by the supposed rule that he must look to the language and nothing else, 
laments that the draftsmen have not provided for this or that, or have been guilty of 
some or other ambiguity. It would certainly save the judges trouble if Acts of 
Parliament were drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity. In the absence of 
it, when a defect appears a judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the 
draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of 
Parliament, and he must do this not only from the language of the statute, but also 
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from a consideration of the social conditions which gave rise to it, and of the 
mischief which it was passed to remedy,131 
 He was not, however, at this early stage of his career, prepared to take his views to the 
full extent that he set out in the Road to Justice. He set what he saw as the limit with these 
words  
A judge should ask himself the question: If the makers of the Act had themselves 
come across this ruck in the texture of it, how would they have straightened it out? 
He must then do as they would have done. A judge must not alter the material of 
which it is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases.132 
At the first glance this is an unobjectionable comment but on closer inspection, the point 
which arises is precisely who is to decide where the creases are. The answer is of course 
the judge and again Denning is chafing at the restrictions imposed on his discretion by the 
doctrine of binding precedent and of the rules of statutory interpretation is they then 
existed. 
A year or so later in Magor and St Mellons133 he was prepared to go much further and in 
doing so, drew down a magisterial rebuke from the incumbent Lord Chancellor. Not the 
last such rebuke that he would receive in his career.  
The case again revolved round a question of statutory interpretation, in this case ss151 
and 152 of the Local Government Act 1933. The facts of the case are complex and they do 
not need to be set out here. The crux of the case was whether the new Rural District of 
Magor and St Mellons was entitled to receive financial compensation from Newport 
Borough Council for the richer areas of the district which had belonged to the original 
authority that had been merged to form the new rural district. The formation of the new 
district, the transfer of property to Newport and the extinguishment of the former districts 
had all taken place simultaneously which meant that the new authority of Magor and St 
Mellons had either never held the property or if it had it was for a scintilla only and in either 
case no compensation was payable. 
The majority decision (Somervell and Cohen LJJ) was that no compensation was payable 
to the new Authority. Denning could not agree. 
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Denning summed up the position as he saw it as follows 
 I confess that I find it difficult to deal with these questions of interpretation in the 
abstract. I like to see their practical application, and for that reason I propose to set 
out a hypothetical sets of facts which, I suppose, are probably the true facts 
although they are not stated in the Case. Newport, Monmouthshire, is a very 
progressive borough. By 1935 it had expanded beyond its original boundaries into 
the adjoining rural districts. This had proved very helpful to the original ratepayers of 
those rural districts, because the new residents brought more money in to the rates 
than it cost the rural district councils to look after them. The new rich grounds, in 
effect, helped pay for the old poor grounds in the rural districts. But the time came in 
1934 when the borough of Newport obtained an Act of Parliament extending its 
boundaries so as to take these rich grounds into the borough and out of the rural 
districts. This meant, of course, that, if nothing was done about it, the rates in the 
rural districts would have to go up, because they would be left with the poor 
grounds and with no help from the rich grounds which they had lost. To remedy this 
hardship on the ratepayers in the rural districts, Parliament expressly enacted that 
the Borough of Newport should pay compensation to the rural district councils. The 
amount was to be agreed between them, or if not agreed was to be decided by an 
arbitrator. Parliament laid down rules to guide him. He was to have regard to the 
increase in rates which would fall on the ratepayers of the rural districts because 
they had lost the rich grounds and to the length of time their rates would have to be 
increased on that account. 
That is all intelligible enough. The new boundaries were to take effect on 1 April 
1935, and, if the matter had been left where Parliament left it, the arbitrator would 
probably have solved all his difficulties and awarded the appropriate compensation 
without consulting the court about it, but the trouble has arisen because in 1935 the 
Minister of Health made an Order on top of the Act of 1934. He made an Order 
combining two of the rural districts, shorn as each was of its rich grounds, and 
made them one district, and he said that this combination was to take place also on 
1 April 1935, but immediately after they had lost their rich grounds to the borough. 
No one would suppose that this innocent combination would take away from the 
ratepayers of the rural districts the right to compensation which Parliament had 
given them, but the judge has held that it has. If he is right, it means that the rural 
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ratepayers have to bear all of the increased burden themselves, without any help 
from the borough, and the borough gets off scot free by reason of a ministerial 
Order with which it had no concern.134 
This is worth quoting at length because as can be seen he has expressly either made up 
facts or at the very least filled in the gaps in the factual matrix of the case to suit his 
hypothesis, albeit he was probably right.  
Denning went on to distinguish what the actual effect of the judgement was, he contended 
that whist the entity had changed, the increased burden still fell on the ratepayers of Magor 
and St Mellons and it mattered not to them who they had to pay their increased rate 
burden to.  
It is very clear here that Denning is quite consciously taking the opportunity to express his 
views on what he considers to be an injustice against the ratepayers of the communities 
concerned. He must have known that he had no support from his fellow judges and in that 
respect this was a safe exercise. It is however an interesting example of another way in 
which Denning sought the space to exercise his discretion, to continue with the theme, he 
is extending the interstitial space by hypothesising from the results of the original intention 
of the Minister. In essence what Denning is saying is that this is an unjust result and that 
the Minister could not possibly have intended such an injustice and therefore the 
interpretation that the lower court and arrived at must have been wrong. 
He goes on to say  
I cannot think that the judge is right about this. The Minister's Order expressly 
provided that the property of the two Rural District councils should be transferred to 
and vest in the combined council. The right of the two councils to compensation 
was clearly "property" which vested in the combined council, and the judge so held, 
but he thought that the right was worth nothing because the two councils only lived 
for a moment of time after they had been shorn of their rich grounds. Much as I 
respect his opinions, I cannot agree with him about this. The effect of the Minister's 
Order was, if I may use a metaphor, not the death of the two councils, but their 
marriage. The burdens which each set of ratepayers had previously borne 
separately became a combined burden to be borne by them all together. So, also, 
the rights to which the two councils would have been entitled for each set of 
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ratepayers separately became a combined right to which the combined council was 
entitled for them all together.135 
Whilst this does appear on the face of it be logical, this is not what the legislation actually 
says and he has used, as he admits, a hypothetical series of facts to aid the trail of logic 
which leads to this conclusion. It cannot be that in any sense Denning is operating in the 
legitimate arena which has previously been identified. Indeed he makes no pretence that 
this is so. 
He need go no further than this but in a fashion which became increasingly familiar as his 
career advanced; he took the opportunity to set out his view of the judicial role. 
This was so obviously the intention of the Minister's Order that I have no patience 
with an ultra-legalistic interpretation which would deprive them of their rights 
altogether. I would repeat what I said in Seaford Court Estates Ltd v Asher. We do 
not sit here to pull the language of Parliament and of Ministers to pieces and make 
nonsense of it. That is an easy thing to do, and it is a thing to which lawyers are too 
often prone. We sit here to find out the intention of Parliament and of Ministers and 
carry it out, and we do this better by filling in the gaps and making sense of the 
enactment than by opening it up to destructive analysis.136 
It was this paragraph which attracted the ire of the House of Lords. It is apparent from the 
foregoing that what Denning has actually done is to set out the political position. The 
legislation has produced a result which disadvantages the two smaller communities on this 
occasion. Denning has, as we have seen, reached his conclusion by hypothesis. In the 
real world it may well be that the interpretation that Denning puts upon the legislation is 
capable of producing a similar injustice from a different set of facts. As was pointed out 
forcefully to Denning by the House of Lords, he had overstated the judges’ role and it is for 
Parliament to amend defective legislation. That indeed was the case here. 
By the time the appeal reached the Lords137, the legislation in question had been repealed 
and the 4 page judgement revolved solely around their Lordships criticism of Denning’s 
judgement  
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The criticism which I venture to make of the judgment of the learned Lord Justice is 
not directed at the conclusion that he reached. It is after all a trite saying that on 
questions of construction different minds may come to different conclusions, and I 
am content to say that I agree with my noble and learned friend. But it is on the 
approach of the Lord Justice to what is a question of construction and nothing else 
that I think it desirable to make some comment; for at a time when so large a 
proportion of the cases that are brought before the courts depend on the 
construction of modern statutes it would not be right for this House to pass 
unnoticed the propositions which the learned Lord Justice lays down for the 
guidance of himself and, presumably, of others.138 
 He then sets out his view of Denning’s attempt at setting out the judicial role.  
It appears to me to be a naked usurpation of the legislative function under the thin 
disguise of interpretation. And it is the less justifiable when it is guesswork with what 
material the legislature would, if it had discovered the gap, have filled it in. If a gap 
is disclosed, the remedy lies in an amending Act.139 
Simonds had been appointed as Lord Chancellor by Churchill in 1951; this was a surprise 
choice and he was considered by many to be deeply conservative in outlook and would 
therefore be a natural antagonist to Denning’s perceived judicial activism.  
Denning commented  
“So injustice was done. The new approach was scotched. It took a long time to 
bring it to life again”140 
Whilst Denning may well have felt that way, there is clearly no injustice here as the 
legislation has been repealed. The comment is clearly indicative of his later view that he 
was able to interpret statute, unfettered by any restraint, solely to do justice as he saw it to 
the case before him. This is unquestionably outside any legitimate arena for the exercise 
of judicial discretion and Denning quite definitely does not embrace the aequum et bonum 
approach. 
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This will remain a recurring theme for Denning but it never stopped him trying and 
throughout his career as a judge he drew down criticism from colleagues by his insistence 
on interpreting statutes in his own way to avoid what he perceived as injustice but what his 
colleagues saw as unwarranted judicial interference in the sphere of the legislature. Even 
as he neared retirement he did not hesitate to explicitly put his own interpretation onto a 
statute when he felt that an injustice would otherwise arise, or indeed as we shall see later, 
when it did not accord with what he saw as just.  
An interesting example is the case of Duport Steels Ltd and others v Sirs and others141. 
This arose from a protracted dispute in the steel industry in the winter of 1979/80. At the 
time the majority of the industry was 80% comprised by the nationalised British Steel 
Corporation (BSC) with around 20% of production being the output of several private 
companies. The new Conservative Government of Margaret Thatcher had told BSC that 
the corporation must now cover its own operating losses rather than these being made up 
from public funds and accordingly the company sought to impose some level of wage 
restraint on its employees. These employees were represented by the Iron and Steel 
Trades Confederation (ISTC) who engaged in negotiations on behalf of their members and 
making little progress they eventually called out on strike that portion of their membership 
employed by BSC. The strike did not have the effect that the ISTC wanted and they 
resolved that they would then call out their members employed by the private steel 
companies although they acknowledged that there was no dispute with the private 
employers.  
It was at this point that the private employers sought an injunction to prevent the strike. 
The defendants being William Sirs, the General Secretary of the ISTC and the members of 
its executive.  
Legislation, in a chain back to 1906142 , gave Trades Unions immunity from liability in tort 
where actions were taken in furtherance of a trade dispute. At the time of this particular 
case, the relevant legislation was The Trade Union and Labour Relations Acts of 1974 and 
in particular ss13 and 29 thereof.  
Denning expressed himself in robust terms  
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It seems to me that that the second dispute cannot be regarded as a trade dispute 
within section 29 at all. In so far as the acts done — or the calling out of these 
workers — was in furtherance of that second dispute, they are entitled to no 
immunity whatsoever. It is not a trade dispute. It is not a dispute between employers 
and workers. It is a dispute between the union and the government.143 
The other two members of the Court of Appeal, Lawton and Ackner LJJ. Concurred and 
the private steel companies got their injunction. Denning may well have been right that this 
was not at the heart of it a trade dispute but was a political dispute between the unions and 
the incoming government, it must remembered that only five years before the government 
had called a general election on the question of who runs the country, trade unions or the 
government and had lost that election. With the benefit of the longer view given by the 
passage of time it does become abundantly clear that this was the first round in an 
ideological dispute between the Thatcher government and the trade union movement144. 
This would not necessarily been clear at the time and should be questioned that even if 
this had been clear to Denning, would he have been entitled to take the essentially political 
stance that he did. As will be seen the conventional answer was no. 
The ISTC appealed to the House of Lords and whilst their Lordships were no more 
impressed than Denning by the ISTC’s action they nonetheless felt that the act could not 
be interpreted as Denning sought and that yet again Denning was straying into the 
province of the legislature. 
Lord Diplock in allowing the appeal stated the orthodox view that Denning had railed 
against throughout his career.  
My Lords, at a time when more and more cases involve the application of legislation 
which gives effect to policies that are the subject of bitter public and parliamentary 
controversy, it cannot be too strongly emphasised that the British constitution, 
though largely unwritten, is firmly based upon the separation of powers; Parliament 
makes the laws, the judiciary interpret them. When Parliament legislates to remedy 
what the majority of its members at the time perceive to be a defect or a lacuna in 
the existing law (whether it be the written law enacted by existing statutes or the 
unwritten common law as it has been expounded by the judges in decided cases), 
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the role of the judiciary is confined to ascertaining from the words that Parliament 
has approved as expressing its intention what that intention was, and to giving 
effect to it. Where the meaning of the statutory words is plain and unambiguous it is 
not for the judges to invent fancied ambiguities as an excuse for failing to give effect 
to its plain meaning because they themselves consider that the consequences of 
doing so would be inexpedient, or even unjust or immoral. In controversial matters 
such as are involved in industrial relations there is room for differences of opinion 
as to what is expedient, what is just and what is morally justifiable. Under our 
constitution it is Parliament's opinion on these matters that is paramount.145 
A politer but perhaps a more reasoned and emphatic rebuke than that delivered by Lord 
Simonds earlier.  
Diplock here is explicit in that Denning is not operating within the legitimate arena for the 
exercise of his discretion. He talks about the invention of fancied ambiguities where there 
is a plain meaning to be discerned from a simple reading of the words of the statute. This 
was not quite the stance that Denning had taken, what he was doing was attempting to 
give himself the latitude to exercise his discretion by concentrating on the meaning of a 
trade dispute. If we look back to Bingham’s definitions of judicial activism, notwithstanding 
that he would put Denning into a fourth more extreme category, it could be said that there 
is some legitimation of Denning’s stance in that he is responding to a societal consensus, 
evidenced by the victory of the Conservative Party at the recent general election. This of 
course is not the full story and it does appear that for approval of judicial activism there 
needs to be both an element of responding to a consensus in society and some legitimate 
exercise of discretion within that response to consensus. On the face of it that is an 
irreconcilable dilemma in that Hart would say that judicial discretion can only be exercised 
in the interstices between the law. Whereas Bingham is saying judicial activism, which 
obviously by definition must include an exercise of discretion, can be legitimised by 
reference to the consensus. Could it be that Denning has found a way of legitimising the 
extension of those interstitial spaces by saying, in effect, that where there is a societal 
consensus for change then it must follow that there is a gap in the law, an interstice, which 
provides him with the legitimate arena in which he can exercise his discretion and mould 
the law in the direction which he thinks it should go. 
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The issue was indeed later resolved by legislation to bring the law in line with that which 
Denning had stated146 but this is of course wholly consistent with the stance taken by 
Diplock in that it is for the legislature to amend defective legislation and not for the judges 
to interfere with the expressed will of Parliament .Denning does not agree with this as we 
have seen and it is this insistence on doing justice as he sees it that characterises and 
underpins his judgments and indeed colours his whole judicial career. As we will 
investigate, in the exercise of his discretion he very often draws upon those incidents and 
influences from his early life that we have identified in a previous chapter. 
He frequently went well beyond the immediate case before him in order to further this 
agenda and we will see the most egregious example of this in a later chapter when we 
consider the case of Cassell and Co Ltd v Broome147.He continued to set out his belief that 
a judge must do justice to the parties before him. No judge would argue but that this is the 
essence of the judicial task but the fundamental disagreement is around what is meant by 
doing justice. Denning is clear  
Some people seem to think that now that there is a Law Commission the judges 
should leave it to them to put right any defect and to make any new development. 
The judges must no longer play a constructive role. They must be automatons 
applying the existing rules. Just think what this means. The law must stand still until 
the Law Commission have reported and Parliament passed a statute on it: and, 
meanwhile, every litigant must have his case decided by the dead hand of the past. 
I decline to reduce the judges to such a sterile role. They should develop the law, 
case by case, as they have done in the past: so that the litigants before them can 
have their differences decided by the law as it should be and is, and not by the law 
of the past.148 
It is interesting that Denning said “the law as it should be and is,” what he means by this of 
course is what he thinks the law should be and what he thinks it is. There is no mention of 
the limits of judicial discretion at this point or at any other within the judgement which we 
are about to consider. Not for the last time in his career Denning is blind to, or ignores the 
value of certainty, which is of course the distinguishing mark of binding precedent. 
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This particular case was one which would be bound to attract all of Denning’s sympathy. 
The facts of the case were that Liverpool City Council had built some tower blocks in the 
late 60s in Everton and these had by bad design, vandalism etc, become almost 
uninhabitable despite all that the council could do. This was a test case brought by a hard 
working family man. Denning’s father was just such a hard working family man and 
Denning himself, as we have seen, always espoused this virtue. This is a case whereby 
his upbringing and early experiences are brought fully into play in considering the 
circumstances of the case and the facts behind it. 
The question before the court was, in essence, whether the duty to repair implied into the 
letting contract by The Housing Act 1961 s32 extended beyond the demised premises to 
the common areas which the council had retained to itself and which were in a dreadful 
state of repair. The other members of the court absolutely declined to do so and stuck to 
the orthodox view that only those terms which are necessary to make the contract work 
should be implied into any contract and that to extend the scope of this statute beyond the 
clear and precise circumstances it outlines is beyond the remit of the judiciary. 
This position was outlined by Ormerod LJ  
I sympathise with the tenants and agree that their rights in this respect ought to be 
defined. It is an ideal subject matter for the Law Commission, and in fact it is the 
subject of a paper and a draft Bill recently published by the commission after full 
inquiries. The court is not able to conduct inquiries and cannot form a reliable 
judgment on issues like this. So far-reaching a change must be made by 
Parliament.149 
This of course was the very reasoning that Denning had expressly condemned in The 
Road to Justice. It was his view that the court should always seek to do justice in 
accordance with the facts of the particular case that was in front of the court at the time 
and should not be blind to the issues and slavishly follow precedent even when the judge 
himself thought the precedent was bad. Denning himself felt that this was leaving a legacy 
of problems to which judges in future cases could give divided answers. He did however 
feel that the House of Lords should have gone so far as to kill off the ” officious bystander” 
test in so far as it might apply to statutory interpretation. This is going a long way down the 
road to judicial invention in pursuit of statutory interpretation. 
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In another example of creative statutory interpretation Denning was prepared to go beyond 
the words of the statute and examine as far as he could, the expressed intentions of the 
legislator. It should be remembered that at this stage it was not possible for courts to 
examine Hansard directly, that had to wait for the decision in Pepper v Hart. Denning used 
considerable ingenuity to get round this problem and in the case of R v Local 
Commissioner for Administration for the North and East Area of England, ex parte 
Bradford Metropolitan City Council150 he was prepared to look at textbooks which quoted 
Hansard. 
This again was a case that was designed to engage Denning’s sympathies. This was a 
case of a mother with two children aged five and four who were both received into care by 
the local authority. There was a history of court applications but the long and short of it 
was that throughout the proceedings the mother objected to the way the local authority 
had been acting and it was clear that she was not prepared to grant consent to adoption, a 
matter that was at that time pending before the County Court. The substance of her 
greivance was that she had complained to a councillor who had declined to send her 
complaint forward to the Local Commissioner (what we would know today as an 
ombudsman), nonetheless the Commissioner did become aware of the substance of the 
complaint and he had addressed himself to the issues. 
The case was brought by the council who contended that the local Commissioner had no 
grounds upon which he could exercise the discretion conferred upon him by section 26 of 
the Local Government Act 1974. This was dealt with by Denning on the basis that whilst 
there was some procedural irregularity there was nonetheless a proper basis on which the 
decision could be investigated. 
The essential question for Denning to consider was whether there had been 
maladministration. Maladministration is expressly not defined in the act and Denning 
referred to the fact that the Parliamentary Ombudsman acknowledged that he had used 
the reports of the debate in Parliament to inform his decision as to what and what wasn’t 
maladministration. 
In this case it does seem that some extent Denning is attempting to operate within the 
legitimate arena of his discretion although of course he does not himself define it as such. 
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There was a lacuna in the law at this point and it is at least debatable that this could be 
defined as an interstitial space which required the application of judicial discretion. 
At the present time Denning was inhibited indeed expressly prohibited, from referring to 
Hansard by the decision in Davis v Johnson151 and he acknowledged this fact in his 
judgement. 
Now the question at once arises: Are we the judges to look at Hansard when we 
have the self-same task? When we have ourselves to interpret the word 
"maladministration." The construction of that word is beyond doubt a question of 
law. According to the recent pronouncement of the House of Lords in Davis v. 
Johnson [1978] 2 W.L.R. 553 , we ought to regard Hansard as a closed book to 
which we as judges must not refer at all, not even as an aid to the construction of 
statutes.152 
Having expressed himself in this way he then proceeded to get round the express 
prohibition of the House of Lords. 
By good fortune, however, we have been given a way of overcoming that obstacle. 
For the ombudsman himself in a public address to the Society of Public Teachers of 
Law quoted the relevant passages of Hansard (734 H.C. Deb., col. 51 (October 18, 
1966)) as part of his address: and Professor Wade has quoted the very words in his 
latest book on Administrative Law, 4th ed. (1977), p. 82. and we have not yet been 
told that we may not look at the writings of the teachers of law. Lord Simonds was 
as strict upon these matters as any judge ever has been but he confessed his 
indebtedness to their writings, even very recent ones: see Jacobs v. London County 
Council [1950] A.C. 361 , 374. So have other great judges. I hope therefore that our 
teachers will go on quoting Hansard so that a judge may in this way have the same 
help as others have in interpreting a statute.153 
Whilst some extent this could be characterised as pure sophistry in that Denning was 
ignoring the spirit of the prohibition while sticking to the letter thereof, a most unusual 
reversal of the normal state of affairs for Denning. 
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This case was never appealed and therefore we have no way of knowing what on this 
occasion their Lordships may have made of Denning’s judicial lawmaking. It can be said 
however that on this particular occasion he was at least trying to show some evidence for 
his interpretation and trying to follow the intentions of Parliament. Denning himself makes 
no great play of the fact that he managed to circumvent precedent and consult Hansard at 
least obliquely. In the Discipline of Law he has this to say 
The judges cannot look at what the responsible minister said to Parliament-at the 
object of the statute as he explained it to the house-or to the meaning of the words 
as he understood them. Hansard is for the judges a closed book. But not for you. 
You can read what was said in the house and adopt it as part of your argument-so 
long as you do not acknowledge the source. The writers of law books can go further 
they can give the very words from Hansard with chapter and verse, you can then 
read them whole to the judges. That is what happened in a recent case about the 
ombudsman, Parliament give him power to investigate complaints of 
maladministration: but deliberately did not define it in the statute. The only person 
who attempted a definition was Mr Richard Crossman, the Lord President of the 
Council. He made a speech in Parliament giving illustrations of what “ 
maladministration” means. His illustrations became the guidelines for the 
ombudsman himself and his advisers. They were known as the “Crossman 
catalogue”. They were quoted in full in a public address given by the ombudsman 
and also by the professors and text writers. In that form they could be, and were, 
read by the judges: and helped them as much as they did the ombudsman.154 
This case is clearly one which did contain within it the relevant matter for the exercise of 
judicial discretion. It is clear that there is a space between the words of the statute and the 
accepted practice of the ombudsman that this space is filled by the guidance given by 
Richard Crossman in Parliament. On this occasion Denning was clearly right to take the 
action that he did and if we are talking about this is an act of judicial creativity and activism 
then it is plainly not only in: in accordance with a societal consensus for such a consensus 
as was expressed by a government minister in Parliament. In passing it is worth noting 
that it is strange that the guidelines had never been published and communicated formally 
to the commissioners.  
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In the quote above, there is no mention here that he was the judge involved. This is 
somewhat at variance with his usual approach that he is not shy in claiming credit for what 
he sees as an innovation. Was it that on this occasion he was conscious that he had gone 
too far and did not want to draw attention to it? That is unlikely given the lapse of time and 
the fact that the case had never been appealed but had been mentioned favourably on 
several occasions. It is more likely that on this occasion he was merely reflecting a 
mainstream approach which was made explicit by the House of Lords later.  
It was some years after Denning’s retirement when House of Lords acceded to the logic 
that in trying to determine the intentions of Parliament it was permissible in certain 
circumstances to look at the words of the legislators themselves155 
By this stage Denning had long since retired from judicial office and at the age of 92 he 
was no longer actively writing and publishing. He has never commented publicly on his 
view of Pepper and Hart but given his constant striving throughout his career; it is difficult 
to see any circumstances in which he would not have approved of this judgment. To some 
extent the ability to refer to Hansard and to try and define the intention of ministers does 
extend that legitimate arena for the exercise of judicial discretion that we have previously 
referred to but in doing so it limits the exercise of that discretion in that it is only possible to 
exercise discretion in some far as it can be demonstrated that the interpretation put upon a 
statute by a particular judge was in accord with the intention of Parliament as evidenced by 
Hansard. It is interesting to speculate how Denning would have dealt with that particular 
restriction is nothing we can be satisfied that he would have been equally creative and 
extending that space as he was creating the space needed in the first place. 
Denning, at least publicly, merely said that this was a matter of statutory interpretation and 
allied himself with the purposive approach to statutory interpretation. In the case of 
Nothman v Barnet London Borough Council156 he had this to say: 
The literal method is not now completely out of date. It has been replaced by the 
approach Lord Diplock described as the “purposive approach”… In all cases now in 
the interpretation of statutes we adopt such a construction as will promote the 
general legislative purpose underlying the provision. It is no longer necessary for 
the judges to wring their hands and say: “there is nothing we can do about it”. 
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Whenever the strict interpretation of statute gives rise to an absurd or unjust 
situation, the judges can and should use their good sense to remedy it-by reading 
in, if necessary-so as to do what Parliament would have done, had they had the 
situation in mind.157 
This case concerned the inequality in retirement age is between men and women 
teachers, the complaint was one of unfair dismissal by a woman teacher sacked on the 
grounds of incompetence by the defendant local authority. She had made a claim to the 
employment tribunal and the council had taken the preliminary point against her that she 
was not able to bring the claim under the terms of the Trade Union and Labour relations 
Act 1974 as she had passed normal retirement age. In this case the claimant had a letter 
of engagement which expressly stated her retirement age to be 65; no differentiation was 
made between men and women. 
The issue was that by schedule 19 para (10) of the act it was quite clearly said that an 
employee would not be subject to unfair dismissal if the employee: 
On or before the effective date of termination attained the age which, in the undertaking in 
which he was employed, was a normal retiring age for an employee holding the position 
which he held,-if a man he had attained the age of 65, or if a woman attained the age of 
60…158 
The Employment Appeal Tribunal had felt that they were effectively barred from hearing 
the complaint by what they considered to be clear statutory provision. Although they 
expressed themselves in trenchant terms about the absurdity of the law they felt unable to 
come to any other conclusion than to dismiss the claim 
Clearly someone has a duty to do something about this absurd and unjust situation. 
It may well be, however, that there is nothing we can do about it. We are bound to 
apply the provisions of an Act of Parliament however absurd, out of date and unfair 
they may appear to be. The duty of making or altering the law is the function of 
Parliament and is not, as many mistaken persons seem to imagine, the privilege of 
the judges or the judicial tribunals.159 
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As it can be imagined this was not an approach which commended itself to Denning and 
he had this to say:  
In the light of what I have said it seems to me a sensible interpretation can well be 
put upon this provision. As Miss Nothman has just pointed out to us, “upper age 
limit” points to only one limit for any one person. The whole provision can be 
interpreted, so as to do justice, by inserting the words “where there is no normal 
retiring age” before the second part. If those words are inserted, it means that there 
is only one upper age limit for any one person. Everything fits together. If there is a 
“normal retiring age,” the first part applies. The person cannot claim for unfair 
dismissal if he has passed that age. If there is no normal retiring age, the second 
part applies. A man cannot claim if he is over 65: a woman cannot claim if she is 
over 60. On the other hand, in order to get the appeal tribunal's interpretation, it is 
necessary to insert other words. You must have to insert “either” at the beginning or 
“whichever is the earlier” at the end: or you would have to divide sub-paragraph (b) 
into two separate parts and put a “( c )” in. I much prefer to read in the words “where 
there is no normal retiring age.” So that is what we should do.160 
it is difficult to see how he can justify this is an example of the purposive approach when 
what he is in fact doing is rewriting the statute to get to the result which he thinks is fair. 
The only other judgment that was made out in anything like the same length as Denning’s 
was that of Lawton LJ who agreed with Denning but without entering into the exercise of 
justifying himself on the basis of a purposive approach to statutory interpretation. 
The words of the statute were express and clear and whilst they may well have created an 
injustice there is no evidence that that this injustice was not in accordance with 
Parliament’s intentions. The statute is remarkably clear and whilst Denning may feel that 
there is no justice in this case, and indeed it is clear that his view is shared by all the 
judges it is nonetheless clearly within the scope of that “naked usurpation of the legislative 
function” that Lord Simon railed against in Magor and St Mellons District Council. 
In these judgments Denning would contend that all he is doing is using a less rigid form of 
statutory interpretation to do justice to the case that is before him. This as we have seen is 
what he considers the judge’s duty to be, however there are occasions on which his view 
of what constitutes justice is less concerned with what he believes the law should be and 
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is more concerned with his particular views on the case before him. As we have seen this 
is not necessarily outside the judges role but these examples demonstrate that Denning’s 
view of the judges role was ahead of his contemporaries, who would take a more 
restrictive and some would say, logical view. 
The question to be asked at this stage is whether there is any structure to Denning’s 
developing portfolio of judgements or whether it is simply ad hoc improvisation on the facts 
of the case before him. There is a structure and whether it fits into any recognised theories 
of adjudication is a vital subject which must be examined.  
There are two questions which need to be answered, namely, what is adjudication and 
why is it important. 
Adjudication, at its simplest, is the process by which judges arrive at their decisions. Views 
on how this process works have evolved over the years. The historical attitude was to 
regard the judiciary as the keepers of the ancient rules and traditions. The maxim 
associated with this is “In scrinio pectoris sui” the best translation of which is “all laws in 
the shrine of his breast” this maxim is often associated with the papacy and illustrates the 
often sacerdotal status that was ascribed to judges at this time. Whilst this would not be a 
view that Denning would subscribe to, he does on occasion exhibit an almost sacred 
reverence of the judicial role. 
Adjudication does not stand on its own. it is contended that the role is part of what is 
described as an institutional nexus of conduct. What is meant by this is that the judge 
together with the written and customary law, rules of procedure and other institutions of the 
law are interconnected and the judicial process must act in a relationship with these other 
institutions.161 
Society does expect judges to act in a certain way to resolve disputes; judges are an 
essential part of the social order. Hart did put forward a version of society where there 
were no judges of any sort however this can only be effective in very primitive societies 
and has many disadvantages not least by being entirely dependent on universal 
recognition of all aspects of the particular law of that community which is often largely 
unchanging. 162 
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Once society has accepted the role of the judge, he or she is expected to carry out this 
role in a rational way, conforming to accepted standards and applying a set of rules and 
procedures that are transparent and largely agreed. 
Hart developed the concept of the rule of recognition. Being that process by which society 
has accepted and validated particular laws. In a complex system such as English law, Hart 
maintains that the rule of recognition is correspondingly more complex in and of itself and 
relies on such elements as a written constitution, enactment by the legislature and judicial 
precedent.163 
It is perhaps this last element that has caused the most difficulty to Denning and has also 
been the source of some of his most important decisions. The doctrine of binding 
precedent is central to the common law and whilst it has its strengths and weaknesses 
most judges will acknowledge its place. Denning is one of the few judges who has, on 
occasion, ignored it completely. 
As is well known the doctrine has its origins in the principle of stare decis, the decision 
stands. This is then reinforced by a hierarchical system of courts, subordinating decisions 
of junior courts to those of more senior courts. 
Given Denning’s propensity for ignoring it, it is important to establish the justification for the 
doctrine. 
There are several models that have been postulated to justify adherence to the doctrine, 
the first is the natural model which would say that past decisions naturally generate 
reasons for deciding cases along the same lines. Llewelyn has argued that this is 
desirable because it reinforces a universal sense of justice that says that men are to be 
treated alike where the circumstances are alike164. 
Following on from this Cahn argued that  
“if decisions differ, some discernible distinction must be found bearing an intelligible 
relation to the difference in result.”165 
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In other words, if a judge comes to a different result he must be prepared to explain it in 
rational terms. This takes us back to Hart’s criteria for the exercise of judicial discretion; 
whereby in those interstitial spaces where the law does not cover the particular case, the 
judge is entitled to exercise his discretion provided he can give reasons for his decision 
and acts as a conscientious legislator would by deciding according to his own beliefs and 
values.166 To extend this we will also say that if the judge is engaged in expanding those 
spaces he must also be able to justify that expansion in a similar fashion.  
The second model is a rule-based model which in effect says that the Superior Court has 
the authority not only to decide the case before it but to rule that subordinate courts are 
bound by the decision. 
Third model is results based, it is the result that binds rather than any rule. What this rule 
requires is that the court 
 “must decide its case for the party analogous to the winner in the precedent case if 
the constrained case is as strong a case  or a stronger case for that result than the 
precedent case was for its result.” 167  
 
Of these rules, it is the first that would best describe Denning’s approach to precedent. 
The justification for this is often given as certainty and equality before the law. As we’ve 
seen however Denning would argue that if certainty and equality were to give rise to an 
absurdity then the precedent should be overridden. He often extends this to give himself 
the room to override precedent if it gives rise to what he perceives to be an injustice in the 
case in front of him. 
We have already considered what some of his contemporaries as judges considered to be 
a just exercise of discretion. Denning was by no means alone in recognising that the law 
can sometimes do what might be perceived as an injustice in any particular case.  
The concept of ex aequo et bono, (what is just and fair according to equity and good 
conscience) was often used by agreement in arbitration and was proposed by some 
judges that it could be used by English judges to fill out those gaps that were left in 
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statutes and precedents, precisely those interstitial gaps that were identified by Hart as the 
legitimate arena for the exercise of judicial discretion.  
Patrick Devlin developed this argument and provided the counter argument to limit that 
arena. Devlin contends that judgements according to law help to secure legitimacy by 
imposing a norm. 
“Against the number of cases in which the law hinders the good judge from 
expressing the aequum et bonum, there must be put the number in which it 
prevents the judges from giving effect to idiosyncratic notions. For most of the law’s 
history the public has looked upon it as a protection against corrupt or stupid 
judges.”168 
Denning is clearly neither corrupt nor stupid but he is arguably idiosyncratic. Devlin 
however goes on to develop the argument in a way which is much more sympathetic to the 
Denning jurisprudence.  
Devlin identifies four ways which he says exists to mitigate the harshness of the normative 
rule and bring the result of the case more in line with justice. It is the third of these which 
does concern here. That is the discretion of the judge. Devlin refers to a road map analogy 
contending that the judge has a discretion in what he refers to as uncharted areas.  
“They are the wild spaces which the motorist sees on his map, framed in by the 
motorways and trunk roads, avoided even by the first and second class roads, 
crossed only by thin white lines, sometimes dotted, quite far apart. In these fields 
that are at best only roughly marked the judge must act- more or less, according to 
the state of the map-in his own discretion.”169 
This is a more picturesque description of the interstitial spaces identified by Hart. Devlin 
however does not comment on how the judge should exercise that discretion as Hart does, 
he does however, by stretching the road map analogy, shed some light of how far he 
thinks the space to exercise that discretion extends. He would allow an absolute discretion 
only if the map is “quite unrouted” he would allow a limited discretion in cases where there 
are some routes and signposts, that is to say that  there is some law to be followed and 
some principles not to be ignored. This really does not take the debate much further as it is 
simply saying that there is no discretion where the law is clear and it is in the spaces 
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between that discretion can be exercised. It is precisely these spaces and the identification 
and creation thereof that are the basis of Denning’s adjudication style. 
Thus it can be seen that in substance, there was support for Denning’s approach. There 
was some uniformity of opinion that in these spaces where the law is not clear that a 
proper exercise of judicial discretion is legitimate. Whether the spaces are referred to by 
the road map analogy or as interstitial spaces does not alter the fundamentals. It is how 
that discretion is exercised that is important to any further consideration of Denning’s 
jurisprudence. 
Bingham would tie the definition and exercise of discretion as follows: 
An issue falls within a judge’s discretion if, being governed by no rule of law, its resolution 
depends on the individual judges assessment (within such boundaries as have been laid 
down) of what is fair and just to do in the particular case. He has no discretion in making 
his findings of fact. He has no discretion in his rulings on the law. But when having made 
any necessary finding of fact and any necessary ruling of law, he has to choose between 
different courses of action, orders, penalties or remedies he then exercises a discretion. It 
is only when he reaches the stage of asking himself what is the fair and just thing to do or 
order in the instant case that he embarks on the exercise of a discretion.170 
Bingham then would limit a judge’s discretion only to areas where the law doesn’t operate 
at all and veto any exercise of discretion without this arena.   
It follows inevitably then that if an exercise of a discretion is considered to be outside the 
legitimate arena then it must, by definition, be arbitrary. Denning himself would not have 
recognised any arbitrary jurisdiction.171 
This is the central question to be answered, was Denning an arbitrary judge or was he 
always exercising his discretion legitimately, by identifying correctly that arena between 
the expressed law where judicial discretion is allowed. It may be so even if, as may often 
have been the case, this was not appreciated by his contempories in equivalent or higher 
courts.  
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Arbirtrary justice is most likely to give rise to feelings of injustice and Denning identified 
fairness and justice as the hallmarks of the good judge and as we have seen he attributed 
to himself the essential characteristics of the good judge. 
To answer the question posed we should look to the work of the man in question and turn 
to some of his judgements. These have been chosen, not at random but in order to 
illustrate some facet of the exercise of his discretion which is particularly coloured by those 
experiences and influences which have been earlier identified.   
The cases chosen each illustrate how he creates the space to exercise his discretion and 
then how he uses this space. Consideration is also given to the legitimacy of the space 
and the usage thereof.   
The individual cases represent a progression (albeit not chronological) through Denning’s 
judicial creativity and show each stage of that creativity in action; the wholly illegitimate 
both in creation of the space and the use of discretion, the legitimate use of discretion 
failing because of an illegitimate creation of the space and finally the masterclass in the 
creation of a legitimate space and the legitimate exercise of discretion.   
Ward was chosen because it is well known and attracted much opprobrium at the time. It 
shows Denning at his worst, acting in a fashion which verges on the arbitrary and may 
appear to be motivated by his own restricted and out of date view of morality.  
Broome in contrast shows him in an altogether better light. It also is famous in its own way, 
mainly for the rebuke delivered by Hailsham. Once again Dennings own values come very 
much to the fore here, his respect for the military man, strong family identity and his deep 
attachment to the virtues of the common law. He exercises his discretion in accordance 
with these values in a manner that would have been unassailable if his creation of the 
space for such exercise had been legitimate, unfortunately it wasn’t.  
Candler is in many ways a masterclass in the deployment of this theory of the creation of 
the interstitial space and the legitimate use of judicial discretion. It is arguably the bedrock 
of much of the modern law of negligence and represents a large part of Denning’s 
enduring legacy. In addition the judicial style evidenced in this dissenting judgement may 
be said to have influenced later generations of judges to find that path through obstructive 















Gillian Ward – Legitimate Discretion or Manifest Injustice? 
 
As we have seen previously, Denning’s judicial approach was very clearly expressed in 
that he was firmly of the opinion that it was the duty of the judge to do justice to the case 
that he was at present hearing, unfettered by what he perceives to be unjust previous 
decisions or ambiguous statutes.  
That does of course mean that he considers that he is entitled to exercise his discretion to 
deliver that justice and his discretion is coloured by his own personality and views. We 
have seen how the exercise of judicial discretion can be legitimate in the areas between 
the various pronouncements on the law.   
In this case Denning had to consider the construction of disciplinary rules adopted by a 
college which was constituted pursuant to an act of Parliament. He then had to consider 
the conduct of the disciplinary body enforcing those rules and to rule on an irregularity in 
that conduct which was at least arguably covered by existing precedents. 
He created the space to exercise his discretion without much difficulty in that he did not 
conduct an in-depth analysis of the rules or existing precedents but employed the 
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interesting device of effectively brushing them aside. Having created the space he needed 
he then used his discretion to arrive at a result which, whilst it may be argued did not 
entirely do justice to the case in front of him, nonetheless gave scope for the expression of 
some of those values and influences we have identified 
That case was that of Ward v Bradford City Council172. This is a case which at the time 
was said to have generated much adverse comment at least in the popular press. There is 
however little in the way of academic criticism of the decision. There does appear to be 
scope to argue that, in reaching his decision, Denning was more interested in his own 
views than in applying the law as it stood which he could quite easily have done and 
arguably should have done. There was no need on the facts of the case to create the 
space to exercise any discretion.  He could have found for Gillian Ward by a 
straightforward reading of the rules as originally drafted and by following existing 
precedent. In the final analysis the simple application of the rules of natural justice would 
have demanded he find in her favour. He did not do so.  His judgement makes clear that 
as he morally disapproved of her conduct he found himself backing a decision and a 
process which is, arguably, inherently unjust. 
The case arises from female students at the Margaret McMillan Memorial College of 
Education in Bradford allowing men to spend the night with them in Halls of Residence. 
The rules of the College Halls expressly precluded such arrangements. The College was 
engaged in training teachers and had as students both men and women, the living 
accommodation for the sexes were separate. Information came to the attention of the 
College Principal to the effect that a man was living in college with one of the women 
students. The rumour further said that was that he was connected with drugs. The staff 
organised a night-time raid on the female student accommodation with the police on hand. 
Five men were found to be in several different female students rooms. One of whom was 
with Ward. Ward admitted that he had been in residence for two months and that he did 
have a record of minor drug offences but that he had no current connection with drugs and 
was not taking any at the college. The Principal told Miss Ward that it might be better if she 
left the Hall of Residence and search to find other accommodation. Six days later Ward 
moved to private lodgings elsewhere in Bradford. 
It was the Principal’s intention to deal with the matter informally by using the house 
committee which was a less formal procedure than the disciplinary rules and was under 
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the control of the Principal. Before she had the chance to take this step, the affair got 
somewhat out of hand in that the local press got involved and approached Ward for 
comment. Miss Ward then seems to have made comments which got reported in the local 
papers and shocked certain people. The actual words are not reported in the law report 
but it is likely that they were somewhat dismissive of the College’s attitude and perhaps 
displayed attitudes which were deemed unsuitable for a prospective teacher. It is 
unfortunate that the actual words are not reported given that both the Governing body, 
who were the original decision makers and Denning himself, attached weight to them as 
demonstrating her unsuitability for the role she was then training for.  
The students of the college organised a petition which was signed by 200 of them who 
stated that they had all broken the terms of occupancy by allowing members of the 
opposite sex to spend the night in College Halls of Residence, clearly this was then a 
widespread practice and the College must have been aware of it at least to the extent of 
normally turning a blind eye.  
As this was now to some extent in the public domain and it was felt to be somewhat 
damaging to the reputation of the college, consideration was then given to what, if any,  
disciplinary action could be taken against the various offenders. The governing document 
was the College Constitution which was set up in accordance with the Education (No.2) 
Act 1968. This was an act which gave colleges a greater degree of autonomy from local 
authority control than had previously been the case and it was this to some extent which 
was the driver behind some of the problems thrown up by this case. Donald Naismith the 
then Assistant Director of Education for the council characterised the new relationship as a 
question of who was running the college, the Principal or the Council173. A sensible answer 
would have course have been both of them.  
The College had a Disciplinary Committee which was set up in accordance with the 
Constitution. The Committee consisted of nine members in total composed as follows:  
three members of the governing body, three members of College staff, and three students. 
The main issue confronting the Disciplinary Committee was that according to rule 4 of the 
disciplinary rules, the Disciplinary Committee could only consider cases of misconduct 
which were referred to them by the Principal. The Principal herself was not willing to refer 
these particular cases to the disciplinary committee for whatever reason. The Governing 
body of the College then decided to take matters into their own hands. At a meeting on 
                                                
173
 Very Near the Line Donald Naismith Authorhouse 2012 Bloomington Illinois  
83 
 
23rd March 1971, they first amended the rules of the Disciplinary Committee so that the 
governing body could refer cases of misconduct to the Disciplinary Committee as well as 
the Principal. This amendment was effectively retrospective as it was not in force at the 
time of the events forming the substance of the complaints to the committee. They then 
resolved that the cases of the seven female students it was alleged had broken the terms 
of occupancy should be referred to a meeting of the Disciplinary Committee on 31st March 
1971 and that the report of the Disciplinary Committee should be considered by the 
governing body on the following day. Finally the clerk to the governing body sent a letter to 
each of the students telling them that they were in breach of the terms of occupancy and 
that the matter would be considered by the Disciplinary Committee of 31st March. 
It is to be noted that this is a retrospective change of rule that had been brought in by the 
governing body, effectively substituting their judgement for that of the Principal and is more 
than likely to be in response to public pressure within the local community in Bradford. This 
in itself is arguably to some extent unjust and is conduct of which it is to be expected that 
in the normal course of events Denning would have disapproved.  
The Governing body and the Disciplinary Committee then went further. At the meeting on 
31st  March there were present the nine members of the committee itself (three governors, 
three staff and three students), but additionally three persons who were not members were 
present, namely;  the clerk to the governing body, the Assistant Town Clerk of Bradford 
and the Assistant Education Officer174. The accused students attended together with 
friends and there appears to be little to criticise in the conduct of the hearing itself. After 
the substantive part of the hearing, the students withdrew and the committee discussed 
the cases amongst themselves. At this stage it should have been only the committee 
members who were party to the discussion however the clerks and the Assistant 
Education Officer remained with the committee, notwithstanding that they were not 
members of the committee. From the report, the clerks appear to have said nothing very 
much but  the Assistant Education Officer, Donald Naismith did take part in the discussion. 
This is unfortunate on many counts; not least that Naismith was very much concerned to 
address what he saw as declining standards in teacher training and in education 
generally.175 What must be acknowledged at this stage is that he did not desire the 
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eventual outcome and regretted Gillian Ward’s expulsion and he did acknowledge his own 
central part in that expulsion. 
The Gillian Ward case which hit the headlines in 1971, was the appeal of a student 
against her expulsion, for which I hold myself largely responsible, from Bradford’s 
Margaret McMillan teacher training college, an unexpected outcome I regretted then 
and have done ever since; at the time, new to the job of assistant education officer 
for further education, I did not think anyone would pay much attention to what I had 
to say.176 
The outcome of the hearing was that the only student who was required to leave her 
course of study was Miss Ward. In the records of the committees discussion is a comment 
from Donald Naismith in which he said that he “considered that Miss Ward’s apparent lack 
of concern merited more severe treatment than the others. It was a serious offence and 
Miss Ward had knowingly flouted the regulations over a long period.” He also said that he 
had “been in touch with the Department of Education and Science and that they viewed 
the matter with concern and that because of the press report, the College had been made 
to look a fool” Thus the committee had allowed itself to be addressed by a non-member 
and further allowed that non-member to express his own opinion and recorded that opinion 
in the minutes. In addition, the committee had considered extraneous material (the 
conversation with the Department of Education). Gillian Ward was of course not at this 
stage aware of these facts, they had not been put to her and she had had no chance to 
respond. In any event the press content was not the subject of any disciplinary complaint 
which was merely concerned with the breach of the agreement by allowing a man to stay 
over in College Halls.  
These comments clearly influenced the committee as otherwise they would not have gone 
to the trouble of ensuring they were recorded in the minutes. The decision was made by 
six votes with three members abstaining, probably the student members, that Gillian Ward 
would be expelled from the College forthwith. This recommendation was approved by the 
governing body at a specially convened meeting the following day and Ward was duly 
expelled. 
There are clearly many grounds on which the decision of the Committee could be 
challenged, the rule change and therefore the validity of the original complaint to the 
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committee, the presence of non-members, participation by those non-members in the 
deliberations of the committee and the consideration of material in deliberation which had 
not been the aired in the hearing.  
Gillian Ward applied for an injunction to restrain the college from expelling her. The 
injunction was refused and she appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Appeal came on 
Before Denning and Philmore and Orr LJJ. 
The claim before the Court of Appeal was that effectively a de novo hearing that the 
decision of the committee was invalid and Ward applied for an interim injunction 
There were three grounds of appeal, the first being that the reference to the Disciplinary 
Committee was invalid because the rules had been changed and retrospectively applied. 
Denning dealt with this shortly by saying he could see no reason why the Governing body 
should not make a rule by which they themselves could refer cases to the Disciplinary 
Committee, so long as they are careful themselves to see that justice is done177. Quite 
what Denning meant by this is unclear. It is quite clear that in this case there was a severe 
risk that justice would not be done as the Governing body was to some extent acting as 
both prosecutor and tribunal. What Denning said was this: 
 In order to avoid that criticism, it would be desirable that the reference should be 
made by a sub-committee, none of whom is a member of the Disciplinary 
Committee. That was not done in this case. But we have seen the Minutes. These 
show that the Governing Body, when they decided to refer these cases, were 
careful not to discuss the merits of any individual case. They simply decided that 
there was a situation of such gravity that the cases ought to be referred to the 
Disciplinary Committee. I see nothing unfair or unjust in what the Governing Body 
did. I cannot accept, therefore, this ground of appeal.178 
Here Denning’s has accepted the minutes at face value, and pays no attention to the 
appearance of bias, not to say vindictiveness, that this rule change indicates. On the 
matter of the change being made to apply retrospectively, he simply says that there is 
nothing wrong in this, the amendment was a matter of procedure only. He quoted as 
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authority the case of Attorney-General v Vernazza179. (Interestingly the reference is 
actually wrong in the original report). 
This was a case in which Denning had been a member of the House of Lords that had 
heard the case and he had delivered what was broadly a consenting speech following in 
large part the leading speech by Viscount Simmonds. Denning was the only one of the 
Law Lords who actually dealt with the question of the legislation being retrospective and 
indeed on that point he differs from Viscount Simmonds who did not consider that the 
legislation considered by that particular case was retrospective and to that extent 
Denning’s comments in that case are obiter dicta, which makes no comment about his 
judgement in Ward but does none the less show that he had a different opinion on 
retrospective provisions in that case which contrasts to that which he exhibited in Ward. 
This is Denning giving himself the space to exercise his discretion and he does it simply by 
brushing aside any suggestion that the rules amendment was not valid, he does not 
analyse this in any way. It may well be that the point was in fact valid. Philmore LJ 
considered the point at more length and whilst he did not consider that the rules had been 
invalidly altered he was clearly concerned with a provision that allowed the Governing 
body to be both the instigator and the final decision point in the disciplinary process.  
Philmore LJ observed that  
To allow a reference by the Governing Body to the Committee could involve, if 
proper care were not taken, a danger that the requirements of natural justice may 
not be observed.180 
Given that the proceedings themselves had been conducted with a degree of irregularity it 
must have been clear that the necessary care would not be taken by this governing body 
in this case.  
The Vernazza case concerned a vexatious litigant who was appealing against an order of 
the High Court which stayed proceedings he had commenced prior to the enacting of the 
Supreme Court of Judicature ( Amendment) Act, 1959. The effect of that act was to enable 
the High Court to make an order staying proceedings that were in progress before the 
court prior to the date of enactment. Any reading of the two cases to would allow a judge 
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to find ample grounds for distinguishing the facts in Ward from those in Vernazza if he so 
wanted. 
In Vernazza, the procedural steps taken were pursuant to a general act of the UK 
Parliament covering the entirety of the jurisdiction and made for the general conduct of 
courts in England and Wales. In Ward, by contrast, the amendment which was applied 
retrospectively was limited in scope and had been passed with the sole object of capturing 
the particular students in question and enabling the governing body to take disciplinary 
proceedings against those students. It was in fact merely an amendment to internal 
disciplinary rules and is couched in such a way as to subvert the original disciplinary 
procedures which required the principal to institute disciplinary action. The amendment 
was made by the body which ultimately would rule upon the disciplinary case itself and 
apply the sanction. In the normal course of events it would be expected that Denning 
would take exception to this. There are strong indications in the way that the amendment 
was framed and passed that the governing body took a dim view of the alleged behaviour 
and to some extent it could have been said that they had prejudged the issue. This in itself 
would have been enough to invalidate the disciplinary proceedings however Denning was 
content to rely on Vernazza in support of the validity of the amendment which enabled him 
to go on to rule on the validity of the proceedings. It is by no means clear that Vernazza 
itself is unequivocal support for the contention that retrospective amendments can be 
effective.  
Indeed in the leading Speech of Viscount Simmonds in Vernazza he says this: 
I would respectfully doubt whether this could in any view be strictly called 
retrospective legislation, but, if it has this characteristic in any degree, it is of a 
procedural nature and, as I think, amply covered by the authority of Quilter v. 
Mapleson. 24 The cases of In re a Debtor (No. 490 of 1935)25 and Colonial Sugar 
Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving26 are distinguishable. I do not find the former case in all 
respects easy to understand, but in both cases the distinction is drawn between 
enactments which provide new remedies and those which affect substantive rights. 
An enactment without leave appears to me to fall within the former category. It 
would, I think, be wrong to say that a man was deprived of a vested or substantive 
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right, if it was still left open to him to prosecute any claim which was not an abuse of 
process and for which there was a prima facie case.181 
This is clearly a very different case from Ward and in any event Viscount Simmonds 
considers the point to be unclear in the extreme. What it is not is any sort of authority for 
saying that retrospective procedural amendments are lawful without more. 
Both Lord Keith and Lord Reid merely concurred with the leading speech. Denning, as was 
often the case expanded on his concurrence. He did conclude that the act in question was 
retrospective, this was not required by the case and indeed in his speech he demonstrated 
this: 
Applying this principle, the Act of 1959 was, as I have said, retrospective. So the 
Court of Appeal could give effect to it. And they should, I think, have done so. When 
Mr. Vernazza appealed to the Court of Appeal, seeking a finding that he was not a 
vexatious litigant, and asking that no order should be made against him, he thereby 
opened up the case for a rehearing, and by so doing, he let in the rule of court 
which authorises the Court of Appeal to make such order as the case may require. 
And the case required certainly this, that if he was found by the Court of Appeal to 
be a vexatious litigant, he should be prohibited then and there from continuing his 
pending litigation unless he obtained the leave of the court. It would be a work of 
supererogation to require the Attorney-General to go back to the High Court for an 
order when the Court of Appeal had seisin of the whole case and could make the 
order themselves.182 
Denning makes it clear that in considering the case in the Court of Appeal, the Court of 
Appeal was entitled to make the order as it had the procedural right to do so and this 
particular order was not retrospective as it relied on legislation current at the date of the 
appeal. The essential point in Vernazza being that the law changed between the case 
falling to be considered by the High Court and being considered by the Court of Appeal. 
Presumably Denning’s argument is that this is a procedural change and that the rule 
amendment brought in by the Board of Governors was also a procedural change. This is a 
very weak argument and takes no account of the yawning gulf between the facts in the two 
cases.  
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Lord Morris also gave an extended judgement and he disagreed that the legislation was in 
any event retrospective. His view was that the word retrospective was not wholly apt in 
that the amendment was in fact a new power that was given to the High Court and that the 
Court of Appeal was merely exercising that power when the matter came before it. 
This is not the same as Ward where the Board of Governors arrogated a power to 
themselves which had previously existed before and had been properly structured in such 
a way as to avoid the possibility of confusion between the rules of investigator, prosecutor 
and tribunal. The reason why the governors saw fit to take the power on themselves, it is 
clear, was to deal with the situation placed before them in accordance with their own 
views. They may have not been able to persuade the Principal to refer the matter to the 
Disciplinary Committee and had therefore determined to make the reference themselves. 
The original purpose of the rule was clearly to allow the person on the spot, the Principal, 
to investigate the complaint or issue and then to determine whether there was sufficient 
cause to refer the matter to the disciplinary hearing. In this case the Principal had 
conducted that investigation and had clearly taken the view that there was not sufficient 
cause for referral. 
What this demonstrates quite clearly is that it would not only have been open to Denning 
to find that the reference to the Disciplinary Committee was unfair but  further that it was 
fully in accordance with the law as it stood and in following the law,the proper course 
would have been to strike down the disciplinary committee’s decision. There would be no 
need for any exercise of discretion, nor to manoeuvre to create the space for that exercise. 
Denning clearly, on this occasion, was minded to find space to exercise his discretion and 
to do so he first needed to validate the rule change which assited in facilitating the referral 
to the Disciplinary Committee. 
Donald Naismith himself was not entirely happy with the changes in the disciplinary 
process and in particular with its retrospective application 
Whatever arrangement the governors were minded to make to deal with future 
cases, surely the matter in hand would need to be left where it was. How could the 
students receive a fair hearing from governors who had already discussed their 
cases, and had not the students been properly punished? Such niceties, however, 
did not weigh with the councillors nor the governors now alarmed at their weakness 
in the tug-of-war with an obdurate principal. The governors set up a disciplinary 
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committee, changed the rules to enable themselves as well as the Principal to refer 
cases to it, and, acting on this new authority, dealt with the alleged offences of the 
four(sic) students accordingly.183 
this is a clear contrast with Denning’s view and even given Donald Naismith’s brief from 
the council that had to bring some order to the disarray at Margaret McMillan, it is clear 
that he was a fair-minded individual who was concerned with due process being followed 
and he did not consider that such due process had been followed in this case, Denning 
obviously disagreed. 
Of more concern was Denning’s  treatment of the presence of the Assistant Education 
Officer (Mr Naismith) during the deliberations of the committee. In his judgement, Denning 
quoted the words of the then Master of the Rolls in the case of Middlesex County 
Valuation Committee v West Middlesex Assessment Committee184 who gave an explicit 
judgement 
It would be most improper on general principles of law that extraneous persons, 
who may or may not have independent interests of their own, should be present at 
the formulation of that judicial decision.185 
it would appear that this would be clear authority which invalidated the decision of the 
disciplinary committee, indeed it was authority Denning chose to use. He referred as well 
to the case of Leavy v National Union of Vehicle Builders186 in which clear support was 
given to the Middlesex decision. 
That case would have given even more support for the decision that the proceedings of 
the Disciplinary Committee were a nullity. 
This case concerned the decision of a union branch committee to expel a member for non-
payment of subscription. The deliberations of the committee were attended by a 
nonmember who was present as the delegate of a member who was at the time of the 
meeting in hospital and unable to attend. This nonmember took part in the discussions and 
voted on the eventual outcome of the deliberations. 
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In his judgment Megarry J relied on the authority of Lane v Norman187 and quoted from 
that judgement the words of North J 
Because another gentleman was present who ought not to have been. He took part 
in the discussion, and of course it is impossible to say what effect his views may 
have had upon the minds of the other persons who were present."188 
He then goes on to express his agreement with this 
I would respectfully adopt and apply this view of the matter. No doubt there may be 
cases in which it is not easy to draw the line between mere attendance on the one 
hand and participation on the other; but I do not think that this difficulty can affect 
the principle189 
The effect of this precedent then is clear, where a non-member of a particular decision-
making body is present in the room at the time the decision is made and participates to a 
greater or lesser extent than this invalidates the decision. The only discretion left to the 
judge is a finding of fact as to whether, in his judgement, there was such participation in 
the decision-making process. 
On the face of it, in the Ward case it seems to be quite clear that Naismith was an active 
participant in the decision-making process but it was of course down to Denning to 
consider where he should draw the line.  
It does seem that there can be little question that Naismith crossed the line between mere 
attendance and active participation in that he had clearly taken part in the discussions. 
Denning seeks to excuse this by saying that the general rule is subject to exceptions and 
cites in aid R V  Welshpool Justices ex parte Holley190. This was a case where the Clerk to 
the Justices withdrew with the justices during their deliberations, which led to the 
defendant appealing by way of case stated. This case was presided over by Goddard CJ 
and he made it plain that the clerk’s’ presence was acceptable when the justices required 
advice on the law. 
I do not think that anyone can misunderstand what the court meant by their 
judgment in Reg. v. East Kerrier Justices, Ex parte Mundy. It was that the clerk's 
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presence in the room when the justices were deliberating should be only for the 
purpose of advising them on the law.191 
Lord Goddard then went on to say that the mere presence of the clerk in the room did not 
invalidate the decision of the court but it was clear from his judgement that he did not 
expect the clerk to be taking part in any discussions on the facts. 
In Ward not only did Naismith stay in the room but he actively contributed to the 
discussion. Denning himself says that Naismith drew the attention of the committee to 
circumstance which made Miss Ward’s case (presumably in Naismith’s opinion) more 
serious than the others. This was clearly conduct which could have had an effect on the 
views of other members of the committee however Denning says that Naismith does no 
more than draw attention to the obvious. He then says no harm was done by what he 
said192. It is not clear at all on what objective basis Denning arrived at this view. Naismith 
was the assistant director of education, a position of some seniority and influence (albeit at 
the time he was a relatively young man). He was the professional, the senior council 
officer and had pretty trenchant views on the behaviour in question. In the judgement it is 
quoted that he had been in touch with the Department of Education and Science who 
viewed the matter with concern and that because of the press report the College had been 
made to look fools.   
Denning says this about the attendance of Naismith, which it could be said, clearly shows 
that he had every ground to invalidate the decision of the committee 
“If the Director of Education is entitled to attend, I think the committee can seek his 
advice if they need it. Otherwise there is not much point in his attending. I think 
however that the Disciplinary Committee must be careful to see that he does not 
overstep the bounds. He should not be allowed to give evidence as to facts or 
matters with which the students have not had a chance of dealing. He should not be 
allowed to voice his opinion as to guilt or innocence.” 
Denning himself has already acknowledged the contribution made by Naismith, at least in 
part, regarding his contact with the DES and his views on the effect this has had on the 
College. For Denning to say that this is not taking part in the decision-making process and 
it is merely giving advice is verging on the disingenuous. What did he think that the 
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committee would do with this information, it is not advice of procedure, it is not within the 
remit of a nonmember, and it is clearly prejudicial information which would weigh on the 
deliberations of any committee. Denning dismisses this albeit acknowledging that it is very 
near the line (the title of Naismith’s autobiography indeed). 
Naismith himself does not deal with any in any great detail his intervention but he does 
acknowledge the effect it had on the governors 
The disciplinary committee, which I attended, duly heard the case. It was clear that 
Gillian Ward’s offence stood out from those of the others and as such, I pointed out, 
deserved a greater penalty. The governors decided on expulsion.193 
Taken as a whole Naismith’s comments on this case clearly indicate his own view 
that he did influence the eventual outcome and indeed his comments quoted above 
to the effect that he holds himself largely responsible is a clear admission of  this in 
the face of that it is hard to see how Denning arrived at a contrary view. 
It is perhaps interesting to note and contrast this decision with Denning’s stance in the 
case of Bushell v The Secretary of State for the Environment194. The facts in this case 
were not entirely congruent with the Ward case but the essential issue, that of a 
procedural unfairness, was very similar and there is little to distinguish the procedural 
unfairness and its effect in Bushell from that in Ward. 
The Bushell case concerned an appeal against a planning inspector’s decision to build a 
motorway (later the M42) through land near Alvechurch in Worcestershire. The inspector’s 
enquiry had concentrated on the evidence of the expert witnesses for the Department of 
Transport in regards to traffic forecasts justifying the need for the new motorway. These 
expert opinions were based upon the “Red Book” which was a set of guidelines used at 
the time by the Department of Transport for traffic forecasting. The objectors to the 
motorway, of which Bushell was one, contended that the methodology adopted in the Red 
Book was unreliable in the conditions  then prevailing and wished to cross examine the 
Department’s expert witnesses. The inspector refused to allow them to cross examine and 
found in favour of the motorway proposal, Bushell then appealed. 
Denning upheld the appeal. In giving his judgement he dealt with the position of planning 
enquiries in general and had this to say 
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It is that thought that those in the department come to these inquiries with their 
minds made up and that they are determined to build the roads no matter how 
strong or how convincing the arguments against them. The inspector is regarded as 
the stooge of the Department: he is just there to rubber-stamp the decision already 
made. These feelings have become so widespread that there have been vociferous 
protests made by highly respected citizens, such as those of Winchester. Inquiries 
have been disrupted so that they could not be continued.195 
Denning is highlighting that it is important that there is confidence in the impartiality and 
fairness of these hearings. It is perhaps telling that he refers to the highly respected 
citizens of Winchester which indicates where his sympathies lie, around his boyhood home 
in the county of Hampshire. Again an example of his upbringing affecting his judicial 
behaviour.   
 
He then goes on to say on to say 
“Regrettable as these protests are they show to my mind that it is time for these 
courts to take a hand, we must use our authority to see that the inquiries are 
conducted fairly in accordance with the requirements of natural justice.” 
This is an admirable stance and in very much accordance with Denning’s principles that he 
has earlier set out. The thrust of this judgement is that it is essential to the process that the 
hearings are clear of taint and suspicion and further  that all parties can be sure that the 
proceedings have been conducted fairly and that all participants have had a fair hearing. 
This is particularly important where there are disparities in resources and where it is an 
individual against the state or a large body corporate such as in the Ward case. 
In dealing with the actual contents of the expert’s report he says: 
“For myself I do not regard these traffic forecasts as government policy at all. They 
are the predictions by the experts about the future. They are just as much matters 
of fact as the evidence of a medical man as to the prognosis of a disease. They are 
of much relevance to the inquiry. It seems to me that, on every principle of  fairness, 
the objectors should be able to have them examined by the inspector, to cross 
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examine the department’s witnesses on them and to call evidence of their own on 
the matter“ 
There is a clear correlation here in that Naismith is placing issues before the committee 
that are of extreme relevance to the consideration of the penalty to be given, indeed that is 
the express reason that Naismith gives for bringing it to the committee. Gillian Ward did 
not have any opportunity at all to challenge Naismith’s views in fact did not know of them 
at the time of the committee hearing. Denning could clearly have decided that this was 
contrary to the rules of natural justice and then take the opportunity to grant the injunction 
which would have prevented the disciplinary committee’s decision being implemented. 
His conclusion of the Bushell case was that the court did have power to intervene and 
expressed himself in clear and unequivocal language: 
“If there has been a failure of natural justice in coming to the decision-or, to use the 
expressive phrase of Lord Russell of Killowen in Fairmount Investments Ltd v The 
Secretary of State for the Environment, if the objectors have not had a fair crack of 
the whip - the court has power to intervene. In this case I do not think that the 
objectors have had a fair crack of the whip.”196  
Presumably Denning considers that Gillian Ward did get a fair crack of the whip. It is hard 
to see how he could think that and whilst the Ward case does predate Bushell by several 
years it is highly unlikely that his views had changed in the interim. The fact of the matter is 
that the solid landowners of South Worcestershire engaged his sympathy in a way that this 
young student teacher whose morals he disapproved of could not. The Bushell case 
clearly does express a clear view on procedural irregularities and it is worthy of note that 
the Court of Appeal decision in Bushell, in which Denning gives the leading judgement, sits 
between two contrary judgements of the Queen’s Bench Division and the House of Lords 
which do not follow Denning’s view. This leads to the view that he’s quite prepared to 
exercise his discretion in favour of obtaining natural justice when he feels that the 
circumstances of the case before him demand it. It is hard to overcome the view that he let 
the behaviour of Gillian Ward, which he clearly considered immoral, influence his 
judgement in her case. 
Denning’s behaviour in this case does not square with his expressed views on the role of 
the judge. Gillian Ward quite clearly did not get a fair hearing by any standards. There  
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was ample opportunity for Denning to have found in her favour, he chose not do so, his 
conclusion was expressed robustly and bears quoting in full 
If there was any evidence that Miss Ward had been treated in any way unfairly or 
unjustly, I would be in favour of interfering. But I do not think she was treated 
unfairly or unjustly. She had broken the rules most flagrantly. She had invited a man 
to her room and lived there with him for weeks on end. I say nothing about her 
morals. She claims that they are her own affair. So be it. If she wanted to live with 
this man, she could have gone into lodgings in the town: and no one would have 
worried, except perhaps her parents. Instead of going into lodgings, she had this 
man with her, night after night, in the Hall of Residence where such a thing was 
absolutely forbidden. That is a fine example to set to others! And she a girl training 
to be a teacher! I expect the Governors and the Staff all thought that she was quite 
an unsuitable person for it. She would never make a teacher. No parent would 
knowingly entrust their child to her care. Six members of the Disciplinary Committee 
voted decisively for her expulsion. Not a single vote was cast against it, nor for any 
less sentence.197 
This is quite clearly a moral rather than a legal judgement and it does not lessen Denning’s 
culpability in that Phillimore and Orr LJJ concurred. 
This was an impression prevalent at the time prompting Griffith to say 
“In Ward’s case, it is difficult to resist the impression that Lord Denning was more 
affected by moral conduct of which he disapproved… Than by the applicability of 
the rules of natural justice”198 
So what is Denning doing here? He is creating that interstitial space to exercise his 
discretion but is he creating a legitimate space and exercising his discretion in a legitimate 
fashion? 
It would have been relatively easy for him to have found in favour of Gillian Ward, the case 
could have been said to fall fairly and squarely within existing precedent. 
In the first instance the retrospective rule change, aimed as it was specifically at these 
particular students, could quite properly have been said to invalidate the reference to the 
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disciplinary committee. Indeed all the members of the Court recommended in their 
judgements that in future references should be made by a subcommittee of the governing 
body, none of whose members would sit on the disciplinary panel. This clearly shows that 
there was unease at the method by which these cases had come before the disciplinary 
committee.  
Denning chose not to do this and relied on a precedent which was easily distinguishable 
on the facts from this case. 
The second issue was the participation of Donald Naismith. Naismith quite clearly 
participated in the discussion although he was not a member of the committee and there 
was ample scope to bring this within the ambit of existing precedents and declare the 
findings of the disciplinary committee void. Indeed it was difficult to see by applying the 
precedents how that conclusion could be avoided. The only matter properly left to 
discretion was a finding of fact as to whether there was active participation in the process 
i.e. was the line in fact crossed.  
There was no interstitial space here for Denning to exercise his discretion when he created 
this by illegitimate means. He applied precedents to retrospective rule change which did 
not support a finding that he made, he did not analyse the precedent in any detail at all but 
merely quoted it in support. More importantly he made a finding of fact i.e. that Naismith 
had not crossed that line which was fully at odds with the facts before him. Naismith clearly 
crossed the line and it could be argued always intended to cross the line. 
Why did Denning do this? As Griffith says, it was a moral judgement of conduct which he 
disapproved of. This is late 19th-century Whitchurch in the Court of Appeal some 70 years 
later. Denning is clearly influenced by his upbringing and his strong adherence to the 
Anglican Church which we have seen was a constant throughout his life, also of course he 
had for a short time at least, been a teacher himself. As we’ve seen in exercising his 
discretion any judge is entitled to draw on his own values and experience but must always 
act in line with any societal consensus. There is no such consensus here; Denning is on 
this occasion leading a rearguard action against what he perceives to be the forces of the 
permissive society. 
The Individual appointed by the Council to do just that in this case, Donald Naismith did 
not think that Gillian Ward had got justice and reading the case and circumstances 
surrounding it is hard to disagree with this view. 
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In this particular case, Denning’s desire to do justice as he sees it to the case before him, 
guided by those factors which we have identified as influencing him have led him to a 
grave injustice and he deprived Gillian Ward of the opportunity to pursue her career. 
In summary; Denning here used an illegitimate method to create the space to exercise his 
discretion and then used that discretion in a way that accorded only with his own 






















Broome v Cassell and Co Ltd and Another 
In Defence of the Navy  
 
Of all Lord Denning’s cases, the case of Broome v Cassell and Co Ltd and Another199 is 
one which shows him at his most determined and some would say at his most maverick.    
I would disagree with this analysis; the case perhaps shows Denning at his most judicially 
inventive when his interest for justice was engaged. However it can be argued that this is a 
case where his interest in justice as an abstract, clouded his view of doing justice to the 
individual in front of him. It is unusual for Denning to take the abstract route as he was 
most often concerned with practicalities. 
This judgement can also be characterised as forming part of Denning’s on-going battle to 
free the Court of Appeal from what he regarded as the shackles of its own binding 
precedents and indeed the control of the House of Lords. 
As usual in this analysis there are two aspects, in the first instance how did Denning create 
the space to exercise his discretion, was it legitimate? How then did he exercise that 
discretion? In this particular case, to create the space, Denning declared a binding 
precedent of the House of Lords as having been decided per incuriam. And in exercising 
his discretion it could perhaps be said that he was overly influenced by his own sympathy 
with serving officers and his own brother’s involvement in the incidents which were the 
subject of the book which libelled Jack Broome. Denning may well also have been more 
influenced by the egregious conduct of the defendants in this case and there can be little 
argument that some form of exemplary compensation was called for. It is just unfortunate 
that the method that Denning chose resulted in more expense for the plaintiff which was 
the very person whom Denning set out to assist. 
The case was originally heard by Lawton J and is unreported except on the restricted point 
that exemplary damages cannot be claimed unless specifically pleaded200. This is an issue 
which was to exercise Denning when the case came to the Court of Appeal. He was 
eventually able to make an award of exemplary damages which was an entirely defensible 
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outcome but unfortunately in his zeal to do justice to the plaintiff as he saw it, he chose an 
illegitimate means of doing so. 
The subject of the trial was the book written by David Irving and published by Cassell and 
Co Ltd Entitled “The Destruction of Convoy PQ 17” The publishers blurb gives a flavour of 
the book and its style  
“The true story of the biggest ever Russian convoy which the Royal Navy left to 
annihilation”.(sic) 
It should perhaps be noted at this point that there is context missing from the above quote 
as it implies that there were other Russian convoys which the Royal Navy left to 
annihilation of which PQ 17 was merely the biggest. What is actually meant is that this was 
the biggest Russian convoy and the Royal Navy left this convoy to annihilation.  
The story of PQ17 is central to any understanding of this case and is worth setting out in 
some detail. It had long been a matter of some controversy and was a very sensitive 
subject with the Royal Navy hierarchy at the time and subsequently who were conscious 
that the allegation had been made in the past that the Navy had, on the mere threat of an 
appearance of strong German surface forces, abandoned the merchantman to their fate. 
The Russian convoys were one of the most arduous undertakings of the Second World 
War. Instigated in 1941 after Churchill promised Stalin support following the Nazi invasion 
of Russia. The only way that support could get to Russia was by the sea route around the 
North Cape and through the White Sea to the northern Russian ports of Archangel or 
Murmansk. The outward convoys were initially designated by the PQ series and inbound 
by QP. In addition to the often atrocious weather inside the Arctic Circle, the convoys had 
to endure the ever present risk of attack as the Germans occupied Norway and the 
convoys were therefore within range of aircraft and submarines based in Norway for most 
of the journey. In addition and most pertinent to this case, the battleship Tirpitz, sister ship 
to the Bismarck was based in fiords in the north of the country and an ever present threat 
to the convoys. The Admiralty and indeed Churchill himself were wary of the Tirpitz almost 
to the point of obsession  
It follows from all this that the convoys would need a strong naval escort if they were to 
have any chance of arriving in Russia at all. The escort usually comprised a close escort of 
destroyers and other smaller ships with the convoy and a shadowing force of cruisers. In 
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the case of PQ 17 this was backed up by heavy units of the Home Fleet to guard against 
the possibility of attack by the Tirpitz. 
It was the commander of the close escort on PQ 17 Commander (later Captain) J E 
Broome RN who was the target of the book and who was to become the plaintiff in this 
case. David Irving was, at the time, a young and aspiring historical author with an interest 
in the Second World War but with a decidedly individual slant which was to bring him 
before the courts again later in life.201 These later cases have damaged his reputation as 
an objective historian almost irreparably and subsequent judges have agreed with 
Denning’s assessment of Irving. 
PQ17 assembled off Iceland in late June 1942. Consisting of 35 merchant ships it sailed 
on 27th June and was escorted by a close escort of the First Escort Group of 6 destroyers 
and various smaller vessels under the command of Broome in HMS Keppel, further back 
was a cruiser covering force commanded by Rear Admiral Hamilton in HMS London with 
the Home fleet under the C-in-C Admiral Sir John Tovey about 100 miles distant, both of 
these officers were very much senior to Jack Broome who at that time was a Commander. 
All went well until the 2nd July when over the next two days the convoy came under 
repeated air attack losing three merchant ships; so far this was typical of the arctic convoy 
run. On the 4th July however matters took a more serious turn when the Admiralty received 
information which lead them to believe that an attack on the convoy was imminent. 
Broome in the Keppel received three signals in quick succession: 
“9:11 Secret Most Immediate, cruiser force is to withdraw to westwards at high 
speed” 
9:23 Secret, Immediate owing to threat from surface ships convoy is to disperse 
and proceed to Russian ports 
9:36 Secret Most Immediate My 9:23 convoy is to scatter.”202 
The order to disperse would entail the convoy splitting into smaller units and proceeding 
independently but still under escort, scatter was a more desperate expedient and required 
the convoy to spread out fanwise, each ship on an independent course and to make their 
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own way as best they could. Broome passed the orders on to the Convoy Commodore 
(the senior officer in charge of the merchant ships) and then turned with the other 
destroyers in company to join the cruisers to engage what he believed was a powerful 
enemy just over the horizon. The order to scatter was extraordinary and had only ever 
been given before when the convoy in question was actually under attack by powerful 
surface ships203 and led the commanders on the scene to believe that the Admiralty was in 
possession of intelligence that the convoy was in dire peril and that the order given was 
the only alternative to its total destruction. Broome and Hamilton steamed at full speed 
westwards expecting at any minute to encounter the Tirpitz. Unfortunately the order was a 
mistake and the Tirpitz was already safe back in its base in the Norwegian Fiords. Of the 
35 merchant ships of PQ 17 only 11 survived to reach safety in Russian Ports, the rest 
being sunk by aircraft and U Boats.  
Broome’s conduct was endorsed by his superiors and in particular Admiral Tovey who said 
“I do not consider that the commander of EG1 was in any way to blame for the 
subsequent heavy losses. From the signal which he had received, he deduced, 
quite reasonably, that surface attack was imminent: and was correct in his decision 
to concentrate his destroyers and join the Rear Admiral commanding First Cruiser 
Squadron”   
This was a major embarrassment to the Royal Navy and Tovey in his despatch after the 
operation said that  
“the order to scatter the convoy had been premature; the results were disastrous. “ 
The whole issue was investigated in the Admiralty and the Cabinet were advised that the 
Admiralty had given the order to scatter.  
The official historian Captain S. W. Roskill was of the opinion that the First Sea Lord at the 
time Admiral Dudley Pound was prone to interfering in operational matters that did not 
concern him. 
In the official history he has this to say to conclude his description of the destruction of 
PQ17 
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“There can be no doubt that Admiral Pound himself became markedly prone to 
make such interventions, often on trivial matters, such as telling individual ships to 
steer a particular course or to steam at such a particular speed. Nor did attempts to 
discourage such practices, made by senior members of the naval staff, who fully 
realised the dangers, Meet with any success.  When the Russian convoys became 
such difficult and dangerous operations, signalled interventions from London 
became very common indeed; and it has been mentioned that Admiral Tovey 
protested strongly on that score. That, sooner or later a serious misunderstanding 
would arise seemed all too likely to the Commander in Chief and the Flag Officers 
concerned; and the inevitable nemesis came with the attempt to exercise direct 
operational control over widely-spread forces, some of which were 1,500 miles or 
more from London, and working in conditions of which those ashore could not 
possibly be aware.” 204 
It is clear therefore what the official view was, this was a serious misunderstanding, largely 
caused by the Admiralty, and specifically the First Sea Lord, in issuing direct orders to 
commanders on the spot who would have a better tactical appreciation than the remote 
authority in London. Specifically, Commander Broome did not suffer any censure as a 
result of PQ17. He was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross and promoted to Captain 
in 1943, he finished the war in command of the Battleship HMS Ramillies and later went 
on to have a successful career as a writer. There is some evidence that Nicholas 
Montserrat based the lead character in “The Cruel Sea” to some extent on Broome. All of 
which indicates that Jack Broome was a well-regarded man with a good reputation. 
It was into this settled picture that David Irving came in the late 1960s. In originally 
conceiving the book, he had given it the title “the Knights Move” this being the title of the 
German operation against PQ17 (Rosselsprung). Irving had cast the whole debacle (for 
debacle it assuredly was) as the fault of Broome, the entire book was written in that vein. 
Irving accused Broome of two breaches of instructions with  regard to the orders given by 
Rear Admiral Hamilton in that he had taken the convoy 30 miles closer to German bases 
in Norway and also that he was accused explicitly of cowardly deserting the convoy. The 
assertion was that he had taken his destroyers and all the escorts away from protecting 
the convoy, leaving the merchantmen to their fate. Irving suggested that Broome had lost 
his head and that he had misunderstood the Admiralty signals. There was no evidence for 
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these assertions and indeed at trial it was proven to be entirely false and as has been 
seen the outcome of the trial was a large damages award for Broome. 
Irving had problems getting the manuscript published initially. He offered it in the first 
instance to William Kimber who were at that time his publishers, Kimber submitted the 
manuscript to Captain Stephen Roskill who was the official historian of the Royal Navy in 
the Second World War for him to read, his comment was as follows  
“In general this book reeks of defamation and any publisher should be very cautious 
before publishing it. I am no legal expert but I’d be surprised if the publisher of this 
book, as written, does not end up in the law courts’” 
Irving then sent the manuscript to Broome. Broom read it overnight and telephoned Irving 
the following day and the conversation concluded with an explicit warning that if it was 
published in its current form then Broome would sue for libel. 
Irving also sent his manuscript to a serving officer who had been on the cruiser HMS 
Norfolk at the time of the convoy this was Captain Lichfield and he wrote to Irving and 
concluded with this warning  
“Finally, Commander Broome, who is a central figure in your whole story, your 
criticisms are not supported by either the facts or, indeed by your own evidence. I 
do not believe that Nelson, Beattie or Cunningham would have acted differently to 
Jack Broome.  
Horatio Nelson, David Beattie and Andrew Cunningham being famous and revered 
Admirals from the Royal Navy’s history and therefore this is a ringing endorsement of Jack 
Broome.   
There were also further submissions of the manuscript to other distinguished writers, 
historians and those who might well be expected to pass an opinion on the manuscript. It 
became clear to Irving that William Kimber were not prepared to publish the book and at 
this point he sought other publishers and finally settled on Cassell and Co. Denning in his 
judgement considered that all this was clear evidence that Irving deliberately set out to 
attack Jack Broome and despite being warned several times persisted in his attack. 
Denning came to the view that this was because it would help to sell the book. Denning 
attached importance to the fact that Irving, prior to publication went to the Admiralty and 
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was allowed to see Broome’s report of proceedings which was written on 8 July 1942 this 
is what Denning had say  
“On the 6th of February 1967, the second defendant went to the Admiralty and was 
allowed to see the plaintiff’s report of proceedings, it was written on 8 July, four 
days after the disaster to the convoy. Any fair man reading it could see that the 
plaintiff was a brave man who did his duty. In it he said  
leaving PQ 17 and the remaining escort ships at such a moment was the most 
unpleasant decision I have ever had to make. I’ve seen the quality and spirits of 
those fine ships under their most able leader, Commodore J.C.K Dowding RNR and 
I had enjoyed the keen determination and splendid response of my escort.  
The plaintiff’s report was endorsed by Admiral Tovey who approved of all that he 
had done. Yet the second defendant (Irving) having seen that report did not make 
any modifications of substance to his manuscript, or at any rate not so far as they 
affected the plaintiff. He let the accusations stand” 
Denning made it clear also, that Cassell and Co. were well aware of the warnings and 
Jack Brome’s attitude to the book yet they still went ahead and published. Indeed prior to 
publication Broome warned them once again that he intended to sue for libel and the reply 
from Cassell and Co was  
“You will be glad to know that in the light of your comments, Irving has made drastic 
revisions to the original text.” 
As Denning pointed out no modifications of any significance with regard to the attack on 
Jack Broome nor indeed, in Irving’s criticism of him, had been made in the book. It was 
eventually published in substantially the same form as Jack Broome had seen it. 
It is not difficult to see what Irving and the publishers hoped to achieve by this widespread 
dissemination of prepublication material. The inescapable conclusion must be that they 
were generating publicity for a controversial and incendiary treatment of the story. 
Cassell and Co released proof copies of the book and Broome sued, it was Cassell and 
Co.’s response to these writs that, not surprisingly, seems to have particularly come 




“On 5 March 1968 the plaintiff issued a writ for libel against the first and second 
defendants. This was in respect of the proof copies. On 21 May 1968 he served a 
statement of claim. On 14 June 1968 both defendants put in a defence pleading 
justification and fair comment. Meanwhile the stop order remained. The book was 
not published. Then, on 7 August 1968, the first defendants made a surprising 
decision. They published the book in a hard-back edition with the dust-cover which I 
have described. It was virtually the same as the proofs. On 23 August 1968, the 
plaintiff issued another writ for libel. The two actions were consolidated, and were 
heard by Lawton J and a jury in January and February 1970. But two days before 
the hearing the book was published in a paper-back edition. This must have been 
pre-arranged to coincide with the trial. The plaintiff has issued another writ for this; 
but it does not come into the two consolidated actions. That conduct speaks for 
itself. I have no doubt that the jury thought that the conduct of the first defendants in 
publishing the hard-back edition was absolutely outrageous. The first defendants 
had before them the writ in the first action, so they knew exactly what to expect. It 
was the most explicit warning possible. Yet they persisted in publishing it. Why did 
they do it? Presumably because they thought that the profits from sales would 
outweigh the damages in the libel action.”205 
The importance of this passage will become clear. Denning here is again applying his own 
values to the facts. The appeal was against the award of exemplary damages and 
Denning’s own judicial philosophy, coloured by those influences on him which have been 
earlier set out, led him to a conclusion which, whilst it may have accorded with his own 
philosophy actually damaged the party he had most sympathy with and had set out to 
help, how did that occur and what in particular were those influences that in this case led 
him into error.  
As this was a libel case, the damages were determined by the jury. In this case the jury 
had fixed damages in the total sum of £40,000. They have divided the damages in the 
sums of £15,000 by way of compensatory damages and then exemplary damages in the 
sum of £25,000. Both defendants appealed the £25,000 exemplary damages and Irving 
alone appealed the £15,000 by way of compensatory damage. Broome obviously feeling 
that the exemplary award was not enough to reflect the level of behaviour and Irving 
considering that he had not libelled Broome at all.  
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It was at this point that Denning felt the law as it stood at the time of the appeal did not 
accurately reflect what he considered to be the equitable and fair position. In short he felt 
that the recent decision of the House of Lords in the case of Rookes v Barnard206 was a 
fetter on the ability of the courts to award punitive damages. Certainly at the level he 
thought should be awarded in this case.  
It was Denning’s view that the existing common law position prior to the decision in 
Rookes v Barnard was not only the correct view but was fair and equitable. He outlined 
what he considered to be the previous position as follows:- 
'Such damages are variously called punitive damages, vindictive damages, 
exemplary damages, and even retributory damages. They can apply only when 
the conduct of the defendant merits punishment, which is only considered to be 
so where his conduct is wanton, as when it discloses fraud, malice, violence, 
cruelty, insolence, or the like, or as it is sometimes put, when he acts in 
contumelious disregard of the plaintiff's rights ... Such damages are recognised 
to be recoverable in appropriate cases of defamation.'207 
It can be seen that this approach would appeal to Denning in that it leaves to the judge 
and the jury the power to punish wrongdoers who have acted with malice or at least in 
some way that would be regarded as calculating and increasing the level of harm suffered 
by the victim. The problem of course with this approach is that it imports the notion of 
penalty and punishment into the law of tort. This was acknowledged in Rookes v  Barnard 
and indeed is one of the driving factors behind Devlin’s judgement in that case. Devlin later 
commented that the reason why the Law Lords sought in Rookes to tidy up the law on 
punitive or exemplary damages was not to deprive or provide Mr Rookes with a greater or 
lesser amount of damages but because they considered the law was a mess on this 
point.208  
Applying Denning’s view on exemplary damages to the present case, he would have liked 
to have the power to punish what he clearly regards as outrageous behaviour on the part 
of Cassell & Co. and Irving. Denning considered that the decision in Rookes v Barnard had 
taken this power away. He was probably wrong on this in the particular facts of the case 
but it is certainly true that the House of Lords had taken away any general and unfettered 
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power that might have existed to award exemplary or punitive damages in a wide category 
of tort cases.  
Rookes v Barnard was not a libel case. It was a claim which arose from a closed shop 
agreement that a union had with a company whereby all employees had to be members of 
a trade union.  In this instance, Mr Rookes, a union member had resigned from the union 
and some of the remaining members had conspired together to threaten the management 
that unless their former member was dismissed from his employment then they, the 
remaining members, would come out on strike. The company had given in to these threats 
and dismissed the former member, Mr Rookes. 
The trial had been held in May 1961 before Sachs J and a jury209. The appeal had been 
(inter alia) on the basis of a direction from the judge to the jury that deliberate illegality 
might be punished by exemplary damages.210 
The question of exemplary damages was considered by Lord Devlin in his judgement 
when the matter finally reached the House of Lords in 1964. Devlin considered the 
common law position and covered all the relevant precedents on exemplary damages and 
came to the conclusion that the house could not, in 1964, reverse what had apparently 
been the common law position that exemplary damages could be awarded in civil cases 
however much their lordships may have wanted to do so given the view that punishment 
had no place in tort law. It is important at this point to note that at the time that Devlin gave 
his speech in Rookes there was, as he pointed out, no decision of the House of Lords 
approving an award of exemplary damages so this presented a unique opportunity to state 
the law on exemplary damages. .211 
Devlin traced the history of exemplary damages back more than 200 years to the case of 
the famous MP John Wilkes. Wilkes had been a thorn in the side of the government of 
George III and had had his house searched under a general warrant as a sort of fishing 
expedition to see what evidence could be turned up. The damage itself was trifling but the 
Lord Chief Justice upheld a decision to award exemplary damages. The rationale was 
stated to be that  
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“damages are designed not only as a satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as a 
punishment to the guilty to deter from any such proceeding for the future, and as a proof of 
the detestation of the jury of the action itself.”212 
After rehearsing all the relevant precedents, Lord Devlin concluded that the common law 
position was, and always had been, that exemplary damages could only be awarded in 
two restricted categories.   
In the first instance Devlin said it was always open to award exemplary damages in cases 
where there had been oppressive and arbitrary or unconstitutional action by servants of 
the government213 and secondly where the defendant’s conduct had been calculated by 
him to make a profit for himself which may well exceed the compensation payable to the 
plaintiff.214 
That is an interesting reading of the law extent at the time and it is one with which Denning 
would clearly disagree as this view is that exemplary damages were effectively at large 
and would fall within the discretion, normally of the judge but in this particular instance that 
discretion is that of the jury. Denning was always minded to allow himself as wide an arena 
as possible in which to exercise his discretion and it is probable that he saw this 
judgement as an unnecessary fetter on the discretion of judges in the lower courts. 
If we pause at this point, it can be seen that the defendant’s actions in the case before 
Denning could quite easily be said to fall within the second category. It was not therefore 
strictly necessary for Denning to embark upon the exercise that he did and it raises the 
question whether he did this to give justice to Jack Broome or whether it was part of his 
wider campaign to give the Court of Appeal freedom to overturn previous decisions both of 
itself and of the House of Lords. 
This however may be an overly harsh criticism of Denning as it may well be that he 
thought it was not quite as easy to bring the case within the second limb of Rookes as 
might at first be presumed. 
The first problem that Denning faced however was that Devlin had used the word 
“calculated” and whilst there was evidence that Irving and his publishers had expected that 
the profits from the book would outweigh any damages in a libel action, there was no 
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explicit calculation of profit and loss with the publicity engendered by the defendants 
behaviour and without it.  It could be argued that, given the restrictive nature of the House 
of Lords judgement it would be necessary to adduce evidence that the defendants had 
actually engaged in such an exercise and had reached the conclusion required by Devlin. 
On this point Denning decided to take a broad interpretation and to include within this 
category anybody who took their chance on their profits exceeding the damages215. This 
was a sensible and defensible position as it is highly unlikely that anybody, particularly 
someone with nefarious intent, would go so far as to conduct an accounting exercise to 
calculate whether their actions would be worth it or not. Denning used calculate in the 
sense of plan deliberately. He was undoubtedly correct in this interpretation.  
A more serious problem was that Lord Devlin had said that the jury can only be directed to 
award exemplary damages in cases where the sum that they award by way of 
compensatory damages is, in the opinion of the jury, inadequate to punish the defendant 
for his conduct. In Devlin’s words 
'... if, but only if, the sum which they have in mind to award as compensation 
(which may of course be a sum aggravated by the way in which the defendant 
has behaved to the plaintiff) is inadequate to punish him for his outrageous 
conduct, to mark their disapproval of such conduct and to deter him from 
repeating it ... '216 
Denning dealt with this by remarking that whilst the original trial judge’s direction did not 
comply explicitly with those words and that therefore on a strict construction it could be 
criticised, nonetheless he decided that on a broader interpretation, the judge’s explanation 
to the jury that exemplary damages were to be additional to any compensatory damages 
was sufficient to satisfy the conditions set out by Lord Devlin in Rookes v Barnard. Again 
he is probably correct here in that there is no such requirement for a direction in specific 
terms in Rookes and it must be enough that the jury understood that they were awarded 
an additional sum of damages to take into account the defendant’s behaviour.  
So far Denning has simply interpreted the previous judgements of the House of Lords in 
accordance with the facts in this case and there is nothing illegitimate in the way that this 
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and it could be said that he has created a legitimate arena to exercise a limited discretion 
in this case it would have been in favour of the plaintiff in this case.  
Denning could have left the matter there; he had done enough to deal with the points on 
exemplary damages and had at this stage complied with the binding precedent of the 
House of Lords in a way that was entirely legitimate.  He then however mounted a 
scathing attack on the judgement and in particular on Lord Devlin in which he prayed in aid 
judgements in other common law jurisdictions. 
“The High Court of Australia has subjected this new doctrine to devastating criticism 
and has refused to follow it: see Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd. The Privy 
Council has supported the High Court of Australia in a judgment which marshals 
with convincing force the arguments against the new doctrine: see Australian 
Consolidated Press Ltd v Uren. The Supreme Court of Canada, together with the 
Courts of Alberta, Ontario, British Columbia and Manitoba, have repudiated the new 
doctrine: see McElroy v Cowper-Smith and Woodman; McKinnon v F W Woolworth 
Co Ltd and Johnston; Bahner v Marwest Hotel Co Ltd and Fraser v Wilson. The 
Courts of New Zealand also declined to follow it: see Fogg v McKnight. The Courts 
of the United States of America know nothing of this new doctrine. They go by the 
settled doctrine of the common law as to punitive damages and would not dream of 
changing it. It is well stated in the Re-statement of the Law of Torts (Vol 3, para 
908).”217 
He considered that Devlin had overturned the common law and set up a new doctrine on 
exemplary damages. He went so far as to assert that the decision in Rookes v Barnard 
had been arrived at per incurium. The paragraph in his judgement that deals with this is 
probably the strongest condemnation of the upper house by a lower court that could be 
found in any search of the Law reports, he said 
“All this leads me to the conclusion that, if ever there was a decision of the House of 
Lords given per incuriam, this was it. The explanation is that the House, as a matter 
of legal theory, thought that exemplary damages had no place in the civil code, and 
ought to be eliminated from it: but, as they could not be eliminated altogether, they 
ought to be confined within the strictest possible limits, no matter how illogical those 
limits were. Yet I am conscious that, in all that I have said I may myself be at fault. 
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Some will say that it is our duty to follow the House of Lords and not to question 
their decision. We are not to reason why. Ours is but to do and die. If this be so, 
then I turn to consider the case on the footing that we are bound by Rookes v 
Barnard.”218 
Even this, whilst it may well have irked the House of Lords, could not of itself have been 
grounds for substantive criticism of Denning and the Court of Appeal. However he 
concluded his judgement with an exhortation to trial judges to effectively ignore the House 
of Lords and apply what he considered to be the law prior to Rookes v Barnard. 
“I must say a word, however, for the guidance of judges who will be trying cases in 
the meantime. I think the difficulties presented by Rookes v Barnard are so great 
that the judges should direct the juries in accordance with the law as it was 
understood before Rookes v Barnard. Any attempt to follow Rookes v Barnard is 
bound to lead to confusion.”219 
It was this paragraph that was to lead to the inevitable appeal to the House of Lords and 
the equally inevitable rebuke for Denning from the House of Lords.  
The question which must be asked now of course is why Denning chose to do this. There 
are a number of possible reasons. Charles Stevens sees it as the culmination of Denning’s 
campaign to gain acceptance for his view that judicial discretion should be able to overrule 
the doctrine of binding precedent in order to do justice to the particular individual220. Whilst 
there are many examples of Denning finding his way around precedents he didn’t like, 
sometimes in a creative manner. Stevens makes the point that Denning had started his 
assault when in the House of Lords and had argued that the house should be able to 
depart from his own previous decisions in the interests of justice and indeed had spoken 
about this point in his 1959 Romanes lecture at the University of Oxford221. The force of 
Denning’s argument was that the doctrine that the house was bound by its own previous 
decisions was an invention of the mid-19th century. Denning contended that once lay 
members of the House of Lords had ceased to take part in the judicial process, the 
remaining judicial members had felt that they had no political authority to back up their 
judgements and as a result had adopted a cautious approach. 
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It has to be said that Denning was probably right in that the doctrine that the House of 
Lords is bound by its  own previous decisions is a construct of the mid-19th century and 
according to Louis Blom- Cooper222, can be traced to the decision in Beamish v 
Beamish223. This was a case considering an earlier decision of 1844 on what constituted a 
common law marriage.224 in his speech in that case Lord Campbell said  
“that the law laid down as your ratio decidendi, be clearly binding on all inferior 
tribunals, if it were not considered as equally binding upon your Lordship’s, this 
house would be arrogating to itself the right of altering the law, and legislating by its 
own separate authority. 
 Blom Cooper characterises this as a judicial affirmation of the sovereignty of Parliament. 
Denning himself probably had in mind the speech of Lord Halsbury in London Street 
Tramways Co. Ltd v London County Council225 who based his decision on the 
inconvenience that would be caused by failure to adhere strictly to precedent. In a speech 
that is the direct antithesis of Denning’s judicial philosophy, Halsbury said: 
“Of course I do not deny that cases of individual hardship may arise, and there may 
be a current of opinion in the profession that such and such an opinion is 
erroneous; but what is that vocational interference with what is perhaps abstract in 
justice, as compared with the inconvenience-the disastrous inconvenience-of 
having each question subject to being re-argued and the dealings of mankind 
rendered doubtful by reason of different decisions, so that in truth and in fact there 
will be no real final Court of Appeal?.”226 
Denning was also correct in that this had not been the approach of the House of Lords 
prior to the middle of the 19th century and he may have had in mind Lord St Leonard’s 
speech in Bright v Hutton227 
“You are not bound by any rule of law which you may lay down, if upon the 
subsequent occasion you should find reason to differ from that rule that is, that this 
house, like every court of justice, possesses an inherent power to correct an error to 
which it may have fallen.” 
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This of course is much more in tune with Denning’s own views and approach. Denning 
was not on all in his opposition to the doctrine being binding upon the House of Lords, 
Lord Reid had criticised the rule in Midland Silicones Ltd v Scruttons Ltd228 when he said 
“I have on more than one occasion stated my view that this rule is too rigid in that it 
does not in fact create certainty but I am bound by the rule until it is altered.” 
The modernisers finally prevailed and the practice statement of 1966 allowed the house to 
depart from its own previous judgements when it appears right to do so229 
The statement in full says 
“Their lordships regard the use of precedent as an indispensable foundation upon 
which to decide what is the law and its application to individual cases. It provides at 
least some degree of certainty upon which individuals can rely in the conduct of 
their affairs, as well as a basis for orderly development of legal rules. 
Their lordships nevertheless recognise that too rigid adherence to precedent may 
lead to injustice in a particular case and also unduly restrict the proper development 
of the law. They propose therefore to modify their present practice, and while 
treating former decisions of this house as normally binding, to depart from a 
previous decision when it appears right to do so. In this connection they will bear in 
mind the danger of disturbing retrospectively the basis on which contracts, 
settlements of property, and fiscal arrangements have been entered into and also 
the especial need for certainty as to the criminal law. 
This announcement is not intended to affect the use of precedent elsewhere than in 
this house.” 
This is perhaps somewhat less than the radical approach that Denning would have 
preferred and it goes without saying that it did not authorise the Court of Appeal to overrule 
or ignore decisions of the House of Lords. 
It may well be that the promulgation of the practice statement had emboldened Denning in 
his stance against the doctrine. 
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Denning himself wrote about his attitude to the doctrine of binding precedent most tellingly 
perhaps in the Discipline of Law. Denning started his career in the House of Lords with a 
dissenting judgement in a case where he considered that the relevant authorities were out 
of date230. The case was considering the matter of sovereign immunity. Denning carried 
out his own researches during the long vacation and in  his own words decided the case 
on the basis that when sovereign states are engaging in commercial transactions they 
should not be entitled to claim immunity. His speech in the case is illuminating of his 
personal jurisprudential approach to the doctrine. 
“My Lords, I acknowledge that, in the course of this opinion, I have considered 
some questions and authorities which were not mentioned by counsel. I’m sure they 
gave all the help they could and I have only gone into it further because the law on 
this subject is of great consequence and, as applied at present, it is held by many to 
be unsatisfactory. I venture to think that if there is one place where it should be 
reconsidered on principle, without being tied to particular precedents of a period 
that is passed, it is here in this house: and if there is one time for it to be done, it is 
now, when the opportunity offers, before the law gets any more enmeshed in its 
own net. This I have tried to do. Whatever the outcome, I hope I may say, as Holt 
CJ once did after he had done much research on his own: “I have stirred these 
points which wiser heads in time may settle.”” 
As may have been expected, and indeed as Denning did expect, this did not appeal to his 
brother judges and Viscount Simonds speech sets out what was very much the orthodoxy 
at the time: 
“My Lords, I must add that since, since writing this opinion I have had the privilege 
of reading the opinion which my noble and learned friend, Lord Denning, is about to 
deliver. It is right that I should say that I must not be taken as assenting  to his 
views upon a number of questions and authorities in regard to which the house has 
not had the benefit of the arguments of counsel or of the judgment of the courts 
below.” 
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Denning continued his campaign throughout his time in the Lords and in his last case in 
the Lords, also gave a dissenting judgment231 in which he attempted to overturn previous 
precedent. Once again his nemesis was Lord Simonds. 
As Stevens has said, Denning used the Romanes lecture as a vehicle to set out his views. 
Denning acknowledged this explicitly in the Discipline of Law. He quotes at length from his 
lecture but it is perhaps the concluding paragraph of the lecture which illuminates his 
approach best. 
“And what does it all come to? I have shown you how in times past the House of 
Lords used to correct errors into which the lower courts had fallen and indeed errors 
into which the house itself or its predecessors had fallen, and how it used to create 
new precedents so as to meet new situations. If the law is to develop and not to 
stagnate, the House must, I think, recapture this vital principle, the principle of 
growth. The House of Lords is more than another court of law. It is more than 
another Court of Appeal. It is the Court of Parliament itself. It acts for The Queen as 
the fountain of justice in our land. It must, of course, correct errors that have been 
made by the courts below: but it should do more. It lays down, or should lay down, 
the fundamental principles of the law to govern the people; and, whilst adhering 
firmly to those principles, it should overrule particular precedents that it finds to be 
at variance therewith. Then only shall we be able to claim that freedom broadens 
slowly down from precedent to precedent.”232 
this was not Denning’s first attempt to overturn precedents set by the House of Lords and 
it may be that he was encouraged in his stance by the reception given to his dissenting 
judgement in Conway v Rimmer233. This is a case concerning crown privilege which had 
been considered settled by the 1942 House of Lords judgment in Duncan v Cammell Laird 
& Co. Ltd. 234. Denning delivered a powerful dissenting judgement and threw the matter 
back to the House of Lords for reconsideration. In concluding his judgment and referring to 
judgements of commonwealth countries which had declined to be bound by the decision in 
Duncan he said  
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“Despite this impressive array, my bretheren today feel that we are still bound by 
the observations of the House of Lords in Duncan v Cammell Laird & Co Ltd. I do 
not agree the doctrine of precedent has been transformed by the recent statement 
of Lord Gardiner LC, this is the very case in which to throw off the fetters. Crown 
privilege is one of the prerogatives of the Crown. As such, it extends only so far as 
the common law permits. It is for the judges to define its ambit and not for any 
government department, however powerful. And when I say the judges, I mean not 
only the judges in England. I include the judges of the countries of the 
Commonwealth. The Queen is their Queen, as she is ours. Crown prerogative is the 
same there as here. At least it should be. When we find that the Supreme Courts of 
these countries, after careful deliberation, decline to follow the House of Lords, 
because they are satisfied it was wrong, that is excellent reason for the House to 
think again. It is not beneath its dignity, nor is it now beyond its power, to confess 
itself to have been in error. Likewise with this court. We should draw on the wisdom 
of those overseas, as they in the past have drawn on ours. Thus we shall be our 
part to keep the common law a just system yes, a just and uniform system 
throughout its broad domain.” 
When the case reached the House of Lords, the original decision was overturned however 
the Lords did not do this on the basis of the reasoning outlined by Denning in his 
judgment, this is a point Denning does not make in his book. 
When he turned to talk about Broome in the Discipline of Law, he acknowledged that it 
was a disaster for him235. He does throw some light on his decision in that it was not clear 
for some time that the defendants were going to appeal. He does also acknowledge that 
he was a little strong in his criticism of the House of Lords.236 
So the question falls to be asked, in this case was Denning trying to create a legitimate 
space to exercise his discretion, whether in fact it was necessary, or was he using this 
case, and by extension, Jack Broome to further his own judicial agenda. 
We should therefore also look at whether there were any particular reasons why in this 
particular case he chose to take this stance, what factors may have caused him to take the 
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position he did.  Once again we will see Denning’s individual experience colouring his 
judicial philosophy.  
We have seen that Denning is influenced by his Edwardian upbringing in Whitchurch and 
that family formed an important part of that upbringing. Norman Denning, his younger 
brother, had joined the Navy as a paymaster officer. The paymaster branch in the Navy at 
that time provided the majority of the Navy’s bureaucracy and secretariat. Norman was 
extremely successful and at the time that convoy PQ 17 sailed, he was a Commander in 
naval intelligence, by coincidence, the equivalent in rank to Jack Broome. As such he 
would have been responsible, at least in part for the interpretation of the intelligence 
relating to the sailing of the Tirpitz and it may be thought by some that he should have 
shared at least some of the blame for the eventual tragedy that befell the convoy. Roskill 
makes the point that whilst Pound has shouldered much of the blame down the years for 
the decision, and indeed as the senior officer responsible he would be expectd to do so, 
the decision must to some extent have been collegiate and Admiralty staff officers would 
have been involved. The has however never been any attempt to lay any blame upon 
Norman Denning and as will be seen, as a matter of fact Norman was not in any way to 
blame. 
By way of background and to show how integral Norman was to the processing of Naval 
Intelligence at that time. He had set up the operational intelligence centre in 1937. This 
was responsible for coordinating all sources of intelligence available to the Admiralty 
including photo reconnaissance. Norman together with Roger Winn QC (Later Lord Justice 
Winn) who was responsible for the submarine tracking centre advised Pound that there 
was no evidence of any movement by German surface units beyond the forward 
positioning moves that had already been reported, in other words there was no evidence 
that Tirpitz was threatening PQ 17.  Despite this Pound still sent the fatal signals which 
directly led to the destruction of the convoy.  
As we have seen, the Denning’s were a particularly close family and it is inconceivable 
that Norman had not to some extent discussed PQ 17 with Denning at some time between 
the end of the war and this case. Irving did not accuse Norman of any complicity in the 
disaster and there is no mention of Norman in the book at all. Nonetheless, at least on the 
face of it, there is some suspicion perhaps that Denning felt that he must protect the Navy 
and by extension this meant Jack Broome. There is an argument that given his personal 
interest in PQ 17 that Denning should have recused himself from this case. There is no 
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evidence that this was ever considered. It is not suggested, that Denning was actively 
concerned to protect Norman but there is no doubt that given all the influences on 
Denning’s character and development that we have discussed that Jack Broome will have 
engaged his sympathy far more than David Irving would. 
Despite what Denning may have thought about appeal, the defendants did appeal to the 
House of Lords and a special panel of seven law lords led by the Lord Chancellor, Lord 
Hailsham, sat to determine the appeal. 
The case is perhaps most known for the somewhat magisterial rebuke handed down by 
Lord Hailsham with regard to Denning’s direction to lower courts to ignore the House of 
Lords decision in Rookes v Barnard. 
“The fact is, and I hope it will never be necessary to say so again, that, in the 
hierarchical system of courts which exists in this country, it is necessary for each 
lower tier, including the Court of Appeal, to accept loyally the decisions of the higher 
tiers. Where decisions manifestly conflict, the decision in Young v.Bristol Aeroplane 
Co. Ltd. [1944] K.B. 718 offers guidance to each tier in matters affecting its own 
decisions. It does not entitle it to question considered decisions in the upper tiers 
with the same freedom. 
Even this House, since it has taken freedom to review its own decisions, will do so 
cautiously.”237 
Even though, through Lord Hailsham the house delivered this rebuke, nonetheless 
individual members clearly had difficulty in accepting the position set out in Rookes. The 
decision was not unanimous and three of the Lords of Appeal dissented. 
Viscount Dilhorne in particular found that the reasoning in Rookes was less than clear. 
However Dilhorne would have reduced the amount of exemplary damages on the basis 
that the judge did not give the clear direction which he considered was required by Lord 
Devlin’s speech in Rookes.  
He does agree with Denning however that Devlin had restricted the categories of cases in 
which, prior to Rookes, courts would have been able to award exemplary damages. He 
then goes on to criticise the categorisation adopted by Devlin and refers to it as being too 
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narrow. He again went on to say that he does not feel that the narrowing of the category 
was justified by the earlier cases upon which Devlin bases his decision. He says that the  
“Power to  award exemplary damages may be an anomaly, but I doubt whether it is 
beneficial to the law to seek to reduce the area of that anomaly at the price of 
creating other anomalies and illogicality’s. Surely it is anomalous if a person guilty 
of oppressive conduct should only be liable to exemplary damages if a servant of 
the government. In these days there are others than the government who can be 
guilty of oppressive conduct. Why should they be treated differently? I can find 
nothing in the three cases to indicate that if the conduct complained of had been by 
persons other than servants of the government liability to exemplary damages 
would have been excluded.”238   
He also attacked the second category as set out by Devlin in quite strong terms 
“It may also be contended that Lord Devlin's second category is also too narrowly 
drawn, for why should conduct lead to exemplary damages if inspired by the profit 
motive or some material interest, and similar conduct due to other motives not do 
so? But the substantial criticism that can be made is that by his categorisation, the 
previously existing and recognised power to award exemplary damages is 
restricted. Lord Devlin indeed appreciated the novelty of what he was doing when 
he said that acceptance of his views would "impose limits not hitherto expressed on 
such awards" (p.1226). I do not think that this should have or could properly be 
done. It should have been left to the legislature. This conclusion does not, however, 
mean that the jury's verdict as to liability must be interfered with.”239 
 
From this it can be seen that there was at least some justification in the stance taken by 
Denning however tactlessly he may have decided to formulate it.  
Lord Reed however was perhaps a little more circumspect in his criticism of Rookes and 
chose instead to treat the judgment more as a jurisprudential exercise. 
He chose not to have to disagree with Devlin’s speech but to concede, with hindsight, that 
perhaps there was a lack of clarity, albeit the main responsibility lay with those whose task 
it was to interpret Lord Devlin’s speech. 
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“The very full argument which we have had in this case has not persuaded me to 
change the views which I held when Rookes v Barnard was decided or to disagree 
with any of Lord Devlin’s main conclusions, but it has convinced me that I and my 
colleagues made a mistake in simply concurring with Lord Devlin’s speech. With the 
passage of time I have come more and more firmly to the conclusion that it is never 
wise to have only one speech in this house dealing with an important question of 
law. My main reason is that experience has shown that those who have to apply the 
decision to other cases and still more those who wish to criticise it come to find it 
difficult to avoid treating sentences and phrases in a single speech as if there are 
provisions in an act of Parliament. They do not seem to realise that it is not the 
function of noble and learned Lords or indeed of any judges to frame definitions or 
to lay down hard and fast rules. It is their function to enunciate principles and much 
that they say is intended to be illustrative or explanatory and not to be definitive. 
Where there are two or more speeches they must be read together and often it is 
generally much easier to see what are the principles involved and what are merely 
illustrations of it.” 
Louis Blom-Cooper regards this speech as having been the best model for the appellate 
function.240 this is certainly one view, however, it is abundantly clear that even minds as 
sharp as Denning’s can struggle to divine the true meaning from a judgement and perhaps 
he can be excused from thinking that Lord Devlin meant what he actually said on this 
occasion, which would go some way to explaining why he decided he needed the 
discretionary space that would have been provided by attempting to declare Rookes v 
Barnard to be per incuriam. . 
Lord Hailsham himself, the deliverer of the magisterial rebuke to Denning acknowledged 
that the Court of Appeal could not be criticised for the view that Rookes v Barnard was in 
need of further consideration by the House of Lords. 
He says  
“I make no complaint of their view that Rookes v Barnard clearly needs 
reconsideration by this house, if only because of the reception it has received in 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand.” 
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This clearly is a very inconsistent position; he starts his speech by rebuking the Court of 
Appeal and reaffirming the principle that it is the job of the Court of Appeal and indeed all 
lower courts to follow, loyally, the judgements of the House of Lords. He then goes on to 
acknowledge that the original judgement in question, Rooks v Barnard, is in need of 
reconsideration. Given the nature of the hierarchical court structure it is hard to see how 
that reconsideration could take place unless the Court of Appeal delivered a judgement 
along the lines of that given in this case. Earlier in the speech Hailsham does suggest that 
the Court of Appeal could have made reference to the leapfrog appeal system set out in 
the Administration of Justice Act 1969 but this would depend on litigants in a lower court 
being prepared to appeal directly to the House of Lords and for the judge in the lower court 
to certify that the case was suitable for such a leap frogging appeal. 
Hailsham defends Devlin’s categorisation by disagreeing with Denning that before Rookes 
v Barnard the position of exemplary damages was settled. He quotes Denning and refers 
to Denning’s reliance on the leading textbook of the time on the subject of damages. He 
sets out Denning’s use of the textbook and quotes at length the passage relied on by 
Denning. He then refers to a later paragraph in the textbook which does contradict the 
stance which Denning had taken. 
“Through all these various cases however, runs another thread, giving a very 
different explanation of the position, for indeed it cannot be said that English law 
has committed itself finally and fully to exemplary damages and many of the above 
cases point to the rationale not of punishment of the defendant but of extra 
compensation for the plaintiff for the injury to his feelings and dignity. This is of 
course not exemplary damages at all. It is another head of nonpecuniary loss to the 
plaintiff.”241 
This was not in any sense necessary to the judgement and Hailsham here is seeking to 
undermine Denning’s decision and effectively deny him the space to exercise his 
discretion. 
As we have seen Denning was often considered to be ahead of his time and therefore 
consideration should be given to the treatment given to the question of exemplary 
damages in the time since Broome to see if this lends support to the stance Denning took 
at that time. 
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Pausing before doing so however, it must be acknowledged that prior to Denning’s attack 
on the decision in Rookes it had been expressly approved and followed by the Court of 
Appeal in McCory v Associated Newspapers and others242 where Pearson LJ 
acknowledged that the difference between punitive and compensatory damages had now 
been settled by the House of Lords in Rookes and that the decision in Rookes should be 
followed not only in cases within the generality of tort law but also in defamation cases. 
Also in the case of Broadway Approvals Ltd v Odhams Press Ltd243 the Court of Appeal 
had again applied the full ratio in Rookes without demur.  
All this lends credence to the proposition that it was the particular circumstances of Jack 
Broome allied to Denning’s own views, arising and influenced by his background, that led 
him to seek to overturn, or at least avoid Rookes. 
The decision was applied in many cases following Broome as it was not until 1985 when it 
fell to be considered again by the Court of Appeal. In this case244 the court accepted that 
the position on exemplary damages in defamation was settled and relied on authoritative 
textbooks245 to supply this definition 
“Exemplary damages can only be awarded if the plaintiff proves that the defendant 
when he made the publication knew that he was committing a tort was reckless 
whether his action was tortious or not, and decided to publish it because the 
prospects of material advantage over eight the prospects of material loss. What is 
necessary is that the tortious act was begun with guilty knowledge for the motive 
that the chances of economic advantage it when the chances of economic perhaps 
physical penalty. The mere fact that a libel is committed in the course of the 
business carried on for profit, for example the business of the newspaper publisher, 
is not by itself sufficient to justify an award of exemplary damages.” 
This would seem in many ways to be a vindication of Denning’s stance. Denning’s primary 
concern was that in cases where the tortfeasor’s behaviour had been particularly 
egregious that the court should have available to them the ability to make an award in 
damages that reflected the jury’s, and by extension society’s, view of the tortfeasor’s 
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behaviour and provided a message to the world at large that such behaviour would not be 
tolerated. 
Whilst Riches affirmed Denning’s view, it became clear in the case of MGN v John246 that 
notwithstanding this jurisprudential line, the judiciary still wanted to retain the right to 
control exemplary damages to some extent. 
This case concerned the famous pop star Elton John. In 1992 it was reported in the 
Sunday Mirror247 that Elton John had embarked upon a bizarre diet characterised as “eat 
but don’t swallow.” This allegedly consisted of Elton John chewing whatever he wanted but 
spitting it out before swallowing it. The report in the newspaper purported to be that an 
eyewitness report had quoted that someone had seen John at a party in Los Angeles, 
chewing food and then spitting it out into his handkerchief. Before trial the newspaper had 
accepted that the allegation was completely unfounded. Notwithstanding this, at trial the 
newspaper ran the defence that was a case of mistaken identity, the witnesses had been 
sure that the person exhibiting that behaviour was in fact Elton John but the newspaper 
accepted that he had not actually been at the party in question. The jury did not accept this 
defence and awarded John the total sum of £350,000 being made up of compensatory 
damages of £75,000 and exemplary damages of £275,000. 
The leading judgement was that of Lord Phillips MR, he dealt at length with the question of 
compensatory damages and then turned to exemplary damages. On reviewing the 
authorities he concluded that for exemplary damages to be awarded in a defamation case 
the jury had to be persuaded that the defamatory statement in question had to have been 
made either in full knowledge that it was not true or recklessly as to the truth. In coming to 
this conclusion he relied in part on Devlin’s speech in Rookes which referred to a “cynical 
disregard for a plaintiff’s rights.”248 He then followed this line through Lord Hailsham’s 
speech in Broome where at page 1079 Hailsham said that what was required was  
“knowledge that what is proposed to be done is against the law or a reckless 
disregard as to whether what is proposed to be done is legal or illegal.” 
This of course is exactly the stance which Denning took in Broome. Where Denning was at 
odds with the current legal thinking was that he was prepared to leave all this to the jury. In 
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the Elton John case, the judiciary was not prepared to allow the jury to have free rein with 
exemplary damages. Lord Phillips MR had this to say 
“It is plain on the authorities that it is only where the conditions for making an 
exemplary award are satisfied, and only when the sum awarded to the plaintiff in 
compensatory damages is not itself sufficient to punish the defendant, show that 
tort does not pay and deter others from acting similarly, that an award of exemplary 
damages should be added to the award of compensatory damages. Since the jury 
will not know, when making their decision, what costs order will be made, it would 
seem that no account can be taken of the costs burden which the unsuccessful 
defendant will have to bear, although this could in itself have a punitive and 
deterrent effect. It is clear that the means of the defendant are relevant to the 
assessment of damages also relevant are his degree of fault and the amount of any 
profit he may be shown actually to have made from his unlawful conduct”249 
Denning may have been minded to agree in part with this dictum, but it still relies in large 
part on satisfying the Devlin criteria set out in Rookes. It is clear also that Lord Phillips 
would regard himself as the ultimate arbiter of the amount of exemplary damages to be 
awarded. He does consider that there is an article 10 point under the ECHR to be taken in 
that excessive exemplary damages would be a potential breach of the defendant’s right to 
freedom of expression as he says 
“The authorities give judges no help in directing juries on the quantum of exemplary 
damages, since however, such damages are analogous to a criminal penalty, and 
although paid to the plaintiff play no part in compensating him, principle requires 
that an award of exemplary damages should never exceed the minimum sum 
necessary to meet the public purpose underlying such damages, that of punishing 
the defendant, showing that tort does not pay and deterring others. The same result 
is achieved by the application of article 10. Freedom of speech should not be 
restricted by awards of exemplary damages save to the extent shown to be strictly 
necessary for the protection of reputations.” 
This stance is of course illogical. The tort exists to protect reputations and when measured 
in the balance, the law over the centuries has clearly come to the conclusion that the 
protection of reputation is more important than unfettered free speech. If a jury, following 
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Lord Phillips views on the criteria for awarding exemplary damages, decides that those 
criteria have been met then it must follow that the jury are those best placed to decide on 
the amount of damages which will best record society’s view of the defendant’s behaviour. 
To attract an award of exemplary damages, under the criteria set out in the years since 
Rookes, a defendant’s behaviour must have been either a deliberate lie or at the very 
least, in publishing a story, the defendant must have been reckless as to the truth. This is 
the very circumstances which actually pertained in MGN v John. It cannot be that the right 
to freedom of expression and hence a free press requires that publishers should be free 
from the fear of exemplary damages awards, even excessive exemplary damages awards, 
when they make reckless statements and particularly when they lie deliberately. There is 
nothing in the judgement of Lord Phillips that would suggest any support for this point of 
view and it is difficult therefore to understand why he felt it necessary to couch his 
decision, or at least this part of the decision in these terms and on that rationale. 
Having decided that the compensatory element was too large at £75,000 and reducing this 
to £25,000, Lord Phillips then turned to exemplary damages and assessed them in the 
sum of £50,000. He justified this by reference to the following criteria: 
“The question is whether the sum which we have awarded for compensatory 
damages is sufficient to punish the newspaper and deter it and others. In our 
judgement it is not, since we do not think that this adequately reflects the gravity of 
the newspaper’s conduct, or that it would deter it or other national newspapers of a 
similar character from such conduct in future. An award of exemplary damages is 
therefore, in our judgement necessary to meet these two requirements. We think 
that those requirements will be fully met by an award of £50,000 exemplary 
damages.”250 
This judgement in many ways reflects Denning’s judgement in the earlier case. And it may 
well be said that Denning was leading a consensus towards changing the law and 
therefore it could be argued that this was a good example of judicial creativity. Denning of 
course explicitly said that he was attempting to return the law to the state it had been in 
prior to the judgement in Rookes v Barnard. These of course are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive it would be  possible for Denning to be creative in guiding the law to what he 
                                                
250
 Ibid at p64 
127 
 
believed was a better outcome. In other words it is perfectly possible to be both restorative 
and creative. 
We have said previously, that to exercise judicial discretion legitimately, the judge must 
create that interstitial space between settled law and may then exercise his discretion in 
accordance with a social consensus and applying his own views and values. Did Denning 
do that here? 
Denning was explicit in that he thought that the judgement in Rookes was wrong and that it 
had changed the law for the worse and he set out to put that right. He had of course 
always been clear that he thought the first duty of the judge was to do justice to the case 
presently in front of him, how did he think that he would do justice to Jack Broome, who 
already had an award of exemplary damages in his favour, by seeking to avoid entirely the 
effect of Rooks v Barnard. 
The answer is that in attacking the position set out in Rookes, Denning was seeking to 
some extent to protect Jack Broome from a possible appeal on the basis that the trial 
judge had misdirected the jury on exemplary damages. To do this you need to create the 
space for himself to operate and he did this in two ways. Firstly by giving a broad 
interpretation of the requirement that the defendant must have calculated that his conduct 
resulted in increasing his profit. This must surely have been right; it cannot be that the 
narrow interpretation of an accountancy type of calculation being put in evidence was what 
was required. The occasions on which this must happen are vanishingly small and the 
occasions on which the evidence itself would come into the hands of the plaintiff would be 
even smaller, if that were possible.  
He then gave another broad interpretation of what was required by way of direction to the 
jury and decided that an explicit direction was not necessary and the guidance given by 
Lawton J was sufficient to satisfy the requirements set out in Rookes. 
Having created the space he then exercised his discretion in favour of Broome and left the 
award as it was. 
Pausing here, we should consider whether it is likely that an appeal would have been 
mounted had he left his judgement at this point. 
On the first point, there was little chance of the House of Lords disagreeing with the Court 
of Appeal; Lord Hailsham was clear in his view on the facts before them 
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“The jury were perfectly entitled to infer that they had calmly calculated that the 
risks attendant on publication did not outweigh the chances of profits.”251 
Denning must have known his would be the case as there was little that was controversial 
in his interpretation of the requirement for a calculation. 
Denning was however much more percipient with regard to the second point as the House 
of Lords did struggle with this point and indeed Hailsham did say: 
I am bound to say that I found the greatest difficulty in accepting the summing up on 
this point as adequate.252 
Hailsham however did come to the conclusion, as he put it, that the direction was just 
adequate 
Lord Reid again had little difficulty in accepting the first point  
“I say no more than that the jury were fully entitled to hold that the appellants knew 
when they committed this tort that passages in this book were highly defamatory of 
Captain Broome and could not be justified as true and that it could properly be 
inferred that they thought it would pay them to publish the book and risk the 
consequences of any action”.253 
On the second point, Lord Reid is equally robust than simply says: 
“I agree with your Lordships that that argument must fail. A judge’s direction to a 
juror is not to be considered in vacuo. It must be read in light of all the 
circumstances as they are then existed and I cannot believe that the jury were left in 
any doubt as to how they must deal with this matter.”254 
The other judges dealt with this in similar vein and Denning must have been able to 
calculate himself the chances of a successful appeal were negligible. That having been 
said why then did he go on to declare Rookes v Barnard as per incuriam and give the 
direction that he did give to lower courts to ignore a House of Lords judgment.   
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To keep the analysis congruent, we would say that he gave himself the space to restate 
the law on exemplary damages by declaring that the House of Lords had decided the case 
per incuriam. We should remind ourselves at this stage that per incuriam means “through 
want of care; inadvertently. A mistaken decision of a court”255 
Leaving aside the question as to whether Denning was right or not, could this ever be a 
legitimate way of creating that interstitial space necessary for the exercise of discretion. 
The answer almost by definition must be no. As we have seen the interstitial space 
operates between the gaps in the law. There is no gap existing here, it is closed by the 
decision in Rookes. To create the Gap, Denning most dispose of that decision and he 
does so not by disagreeing with it but by declaring it to be wrong and thereby opening up a 
wide space in which he can operate. This cannot be legitimate and it follows from that in 
the way in which he exercises his discretion is also not legitimate. 
This is an example of Denning being irked by the constraints imposed upon him by binding 
precedent and seeking to manoeuvre to avoid it. Unfortunately the impact of his attempt 
fell in the main on Jack Broome. Denning had invited Broome’s counsel to address the 
court on the validity or otherwise of Rookes and as a result of this, the House of Lords in a 
separate hearing256, deprived him of half of his costs in the Court of Appeal and the House 
of Lords. This of course meant that Broome had to pay these from the proceeds of the 
damages award and the net result therefore was that in seeking to protect the exemplary 
damages award, Denning had in fact substantially deprived Broome of the benefit of them.  
Denning does not acknowledge any faults in his legal reasoning but lays the blame on the 
fact that he was insubordinate to the higher court: 
Yes-I have been guilty-of lese majesty. I had impugned the authority of the house. 
That must never be done by anyone except the house itself least of all by the 
turbulent Master of the Rolls.257 
as has been noted earlier, Denning considered that the outcome of the case was a 
disaster for him, it will be submitted that any disinterested observer may conclude that 
whilst the outcome of the case was a disaster, it was Jack Broome who bore the brunt of it, 
he was libelled in the most egregious manner and then ended up being dragged all the 
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way to the House of Lords at considerable cost because of what some may see as an 
error by one of the most senior judges in the land. 
Denning’s misgivings on the effects of Rookes may however not have been entirely 
without justification. The question arose again in AB v South West Water Services Ltd258  
and it was considered in that case that the combined effect of the speeches in Rookes and 
in the House of Lords in Broome was such as to restrict the ambit of exemplary damages 
to only those categories for which pre 1964 authority (date of Rookes in the house) could 
be found. The Court of Appeal considered the tenor of the speeches in coming to this 
conclusion and it can be seen why this might be the case  
“I would, logic or no logic, refuse to extend the right to inflict exemplary damages to 
any class of case which is not already clearly covered by authority”259   
It was this restraint on the provision of exemplary damages that had exercised Denning in 
his judgement. It was also of concern to the wider world of the law and this restrictive 
approach came to be considered further by the House in 2001 in Kuddas.260 This was a 
case concerning exemplary damages for misfeasance in a public office. There was no 
question raised in this case that exemplary damages should no longer be available and 
the House was concerned that the provision of such damages should adapt to changing 
social conditions 
“The genius of the common law is its capacity to develop and it appears strange 
that the law in this particular topic should be frozen by decisions that had been 
taken prior to and including Rookes v Barnard. This has led Professor W H Rogers 
to comment in Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (15th ed 1998) p746, that this decision 
commits the law to an irrational position in which the result depends not on principle 
but upon the accidents of litigation.”261  
Lord Mackay then went on to consider whether the decision in AB was a fair reading of the 
dicta in Broome and whether that justified the conclusion freezing the question of 
exemplary damages in its pre-1964 position so far as the categories were concerned. He 
came to the conclusion which was unanimous that it was not justified and that the 
categories were not frozen. 
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It was clear that the house was not entirely comfortable with the interpretation that has 
been placed on Rookes v Barnard, whilst in 1964 exemplary damages were regarded as 
somewhat of an anomaly, indeed it is possible to discern something close to 
embarrassment in certain of the speeches in the House of Lords in Broome Lord Nicholls 
was clear that they still have a place 
“from time to time cases do arise where rewards of compensatory damages are 
perceived as inadequate to achieve a just result between the parties. The nature of 
the defendant’s conduct calls for a further response from the courts. On occasion 
conscious wrongdoing by the defendant is so outrageous, his disregard of the 
claimant’s rights so contumelious, that something more is needed to show that the 
law will not tolerate such behaviour. Without an award of exemplary damages, 
justice will not be done. Exemplary damages as a remedy of last resort, fill what 
otherwise would be a regrettable lacuna”262 
Denning could not have put it better himself. This is to some extent vindication of 
Denning’s misgivings regarding the state that Rookes had left exemplary damages in at 
the time.  
Shortly afterwards the Privy Council had occasion to consider the limits of exemplary 
damages in A v Bottrill263 this was a New Zealand case concerning medical negligence. 
The Privy Council clarified further the criteria for an award of exemplary damages noting 
that it was not restricted to cases where the defendant intended to cause the harm or was 
consciously reckless as to the risks involved.  
The question does continue to exercise the courts but insofar as it can be ascertained the 
current state of the law would seem to be that exemplary damages are available for all 
torts where the defendant’s conduct warrants it. This was the outcome that Denning had 
always aimed for in this case and perhaps to some extent this does legitimise his decision 
although it could be argued that by his direct challenge to the House of Lords he gave the 
opportunity for the Lords to augment Rookes and further muddy the waters and was to that 
extent the author of his own misfortune.  
 
 
                                                
262
 Ibid per Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead at p46 
263




Candler and Crane Christmas264 
A Vindication    
This case could perhaps be said to be Denning’s most important contribution to the law of 
tort. Even though it is a dissenting judgement, the stance taken by Denning has been 
vindicated and having been adopted in later cases it is now right to assign to this judgment 
the status of the bedrock of the law of negligence. It is the principles that Denning 
enunciated in this case that enabled judges in later cases to develop the law in such a way 
as to give credence to the position outlined by Denning in his judgment. 
As is noted above, this was a dissenting judgement and therefore it must be taken that the 
other members of the court could not discern any space within the interstices and 
therefore declined to exercise their discretion. Denning did find that space and was able to 
exercise his discretion in a way that clearly pointed the way to creating new law and 
perhaps even served to inform the consensus. 
We must consider whether the methodology used to create that space and then the 
subsequent exercise of his discretion were legitimate. It is not enough to say that both of 
these were subsequently legitimised by the adoption of Denning’s reasoning by other 
judges, there must be an internal legitimacy within the case for Denning to have operated 
legitimately and therefore for his judgement have any real validity.  
The case came before the Court of Appeal consisting of Lords Justices Cohen, Asquith 
and Denning in December 1950 on appeal from a first instance decision of Mr Justice 
Lloyd-Jacob.  
On the face of it there is nothing in the facts of this case that would cause one to think that 
it would lead to any startling new developments in the law. The essential point around 
which the case revolves is that there is no contractual nexus between the careless 
accountant and the victim who has lost his money. This is similar of course to Donoghue 
and Stevenson265 which had been decided 19 years prior to Candler. 
The facts of the case are central to Denning’s reasoning and therefore need to be set out 
in some detail  
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In November 1944 Mr Donald Ogilvy formed a company called Trevanance Hydraulic Tin 
Mines Ltd, the purpose of the company was to work a deposit of surface tin that Ogilvy had 
found in Cornwall. In June of 1946, Ogilvy instructed a firm of accountants, Crane 
Christmas and Co to prepare the accounts of the company as he had decided to seek a 
substantial injection of capital. He also asked them to place an advertisement in the Times 
and this was done for him in the following words 
“10,000l. Established Tin Mine (low capitalization) in Cornwall seeks further capital. 
Install additional milling plant. Directorship and active participation open to suitable 
applicant - Apply", etc.” 
This appeared in the Times of 8 July 1946. The plaintiff replied shortly thereafter with 
these words 
"I should be interested to take an active part in a Cornish tin mine and have about 
2,000l. to invest. Will you let me have particulars?" 
At this stage the defendants did no more than send on this reply, unopened, to Ogilvy. 
A meeting took place in September 1946 between Ogilvy and the plaintiff. Ogilvy showed 
Candler round the Cornish workings and in return for a £2000 investment he offered a 
directorship of the company with a service agreement of £10 per week for two years. 
Candler very sensibly stated that he wished to see the balance sheet for the company first.  
It was at this stage that the defendants’ clerk, Mr Fraser became involved. Ogilvy told 
Fraser that he wanted the accounts preparing as quickly as possible as he wished to show 
them to a potential investor in the company and he gave Fraser the name of Mr Candler. It 
is worth noting at this stage that at first instance Fraser was asked whether he assumed at 
that stage that the accounts that Ogilvy wanted had some relation to his negotiations with 
Candler. Fraser’s reply was  
“I thought there would be a connection, of course. Yes, I suppose so” 
Fraser began working on the accounts extensively and in evidence he stated that he went 
round to Ogilvy’s flat 2 or 3 times a day for his explanation of various items. The problem 
with this seems to be that Fraser had formed the impression that Trevanance was in fact 
Ogilvy’s business and that he therefore accepted all of Ogilvy’s statements and 
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explanations without the need for any verification. This would on the face of it seem to be 
at the very least careless if not actually negligent.  
On 17 September 1946, Fraser met Candler at the request of Ogilvy in order to go through 
the accounts with Candler. Fraser was introduced by Ogilvy to Candler as the 
representative of Crane Christmas and Co who, Ogilvy stated, were the accountants and 
auditors of the company. Candler was introduced to Fraser as a person who was 
considering making an investment in Trevanance. It was established at first instance that 
Fraser knew that one of the prime considerations for Candler was that he should be 
satisfied with the balance sheet of the company. The draft accounts were shown to 
Candler and they included an unsigned certificate which stated 
“We have audited the balance sheet as above set forth. We have obtained all the 
information and explanations we have required and we report that such balance 
sheet is in our opinion properly drawn up so as to exhibit a true and correct view of 
the state of the company’s affairs, according to the best of our information and the 
explanations given to us and as shown by the books of the company.” 
Fraser assured Candler that the certificate would be signed within a couple of days and 
was only the subject to one or two small alterations which he wished to consider. At the 
meeting, Candler took a copy of the accounts which he wanted to place before his own 
accountant for advice. The judge at first instance made the following important finding of 
fact 
“"Having regard to the fact that Fraser was plainly aware of the purpose for which 
the draft accounts were required, I entertain no doubt at all that he was aware of 
and acquiesced in the showing of these accounts to the plaintiff: indeed, the 
meeting would have been wholly pointless but for that purpose". 
This clearly is important consideration and was further emphasised by the Judge’s next 
finding  
“that, when the meeting of the 17th broke up, Fraser must have been satisfied, not 
only that the plaintiff was considering an investment in the company, but that he 
was taking with him and relying on the draft accounts which he had prepared.”  
The parties met again on 20 September and after going through some small revisions 
which Fraser had made to the accounts, Candler told Ogilvy that he had received advice 
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from his own accountant and that he was satisfied and would invest £2000 in the 
company. Candler sent £500 to Ogilvy that day and paid the balance of £1500 on the 25th 
September. 
The accounts, as seen by Candler on the 20th of September, were certified by the 
defendants on 27th September in precisely the same form as the draft. 
The accounts were in fact completely inaccurate and there had been no verification by the 
defendants of any of the information they had been given by Ogilvy. Examples of this were 
insertions such as “Freehold cottages £650” when the company did not in fact own the  
cottages but Ogilvy owned them and had  mortgaged them to support his own overdraft. 
Another example is “leasehold buildings £650” again these properties were not owned by 
the company but by Ogilvy and in fact the leases were ultimately forfeited. The defendants 
admitted that they had failed to use proper care and skill in the preparation of the accounts 
which was in any event self-evident.  
The upshot of all this was catastrophic for Mr Candler. He had moved to Cornwall to work 
at the mine and indeed had invested a further £200 on top of his original investment. His 
suspicions first became aroused upon discovering that the £2000 he had invested had not 
been applied for the use of the business but had been withdrawn by Ogilvy for his own 
private purposes. Candler issued writs against the company and it was wound up 15 
December 1947. The company had no assets and Ogilvy himself was bankrupt which 
resulted in Candler losing his £2000. 
This was a significant sum of money at the time and Candler, not surprisingly, was looking 
to recover. Candler looked to Crane Christmas & Co. to compensate him. His contention 
was that had he seen accounts that had been properly prepared (it will be remembered 
that the defendants had admitted their failure in this regard) he would not have invested in 
the company and therefore of course he would not have lost his money. 
Having made the admission that the accounts had been prepared negligently, the only 
defences which the accountants could raise at trial were that Fraser was not acting in the 
course of his employment and even if he was acting in the course of his employment, they 
owed no duty of care to Candler. 
Denning gave a dissenting judgement and therefore before turning to that judgement it is 
perhaps more useful to look at the majority judgements which followed a more orthodox 
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line. By doing this we will be able to see not only what the current state of the law was 
considered to be but also to assess whether there was any space between precedent for 
the exercise of judicial discretion and also to consider why Asquith and Cohen declined to 
use that space and exercise their discretion. 
The leading majority judgement was given by Lord Justice Asquith and it is worth setting 
out here the proposition upon which he based his disinclination to extend the duty of care 
to cover negligent misstatement. In starting his judgement he said266 
On two points I entirely agree with the judgment delivered by Denning, L.J. I agree 
that the cause of action based on an alleged breach of duty occurring after the 
plaintiff became a shareholder cannot be made out if only because the damage 
relied on preceded the breach. I also agree, for the reasons he has given, that 
Fraser was clearly acting within the scope of his employment by the defendant firm 
in showing the draft accounts and giving certain other information to the plaintiff.  
But I have the misfortune to differ from my brother on the more important point 
raised in this case. The point may be put in this way: assume that Fraser's negligent 
misrepresentations had been made by his employers, the partners in the defendant 
firm. Assume further, as the fact is, that there was no fraud and no contract or 
fiduciary relationship between them and the plaintiff. Would they, in those events, 
have been liable to the plaintiff in respect of damage incurred by him through acting 
on those negligent misrepresentations? The defendants say "No". They do not 
question that in the absence of fraud, contract and fiduciary relationship there are 
cases in which A may be under a legal obligation to B to use reasonable care for 
some purposes. Their proposition is that, under the conditions assumed in this 
case, the defendants were under no duty, sounding in tort, to the plaintiff to take 
care that their representations of fact should be true. They rely in support of this 
contention on Le Lievre v. Gould, a decision binding on this court. I agree with the 
trial judge in considering that authority to be conclusive in their favour, unless it can 
be shown to have been overruled or to be distinguishable.  
It is clear that Asquith is relying on LeLievre v Gould267 and is applying what he considers 
to be the binding precedent in this case. He does not see that there was any space within 
this to exercise his discretion and is not minded to do so. 
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As this case is central to the whole analysis it is essential that at this stage we look in more 
detail at the case before continuing. The reason for this is that it sets out the orthodoxy 
Denning was seeking to develop into his more creative vision for negligent misstatement. 
The brief facts of this case are that the plaintiffs, a Miss LeLievre and a Mr Dennes were 
the mortgagees of properties intended to secure the mortgage advance to Mr Lovering, a 
builder. Lovering had received the mortgage advances in order to complete the building of 
certain properties. The mortgage advances, as is usual, were to be made in stages 
dependent on the building of the properties reaching certain specified goals. The 
defendant Gould (an architect) was to certify that the properties had reached these certain 
milestones which would then trigger payment of the mortgage advances. 
Gould was given a copy of the schedule setting out the basis on which payment was to be 
made and the stages which needed to have been reached for the advances to be paid. 
Gould then issued certificates confirming that the stages had been reached ostensibly in 
accordance with the schedule, however it was found as a matter of fact that the certificates 
had been issued negligently and that the architect had not made the proper investigations 
when signing certificates but had relied on assurances from Lovering which of course later 
turned out to be false. 
The issue at the centre of the case and upon which the case turned, was that there was no 
contractual relationship between the mortgagees who had lost the money and Gould who 
was the negligent architect. 
In the context of this case there is some justification for the argument that the absence of a 
contractual nexus is fatal to any claim. The basis on which the money was to be advanced 
was contained in the mortgage deed between Hunt and Dennes. This was detailed and the 
specific details of the covenants to advance the money were clearly set out in that deed. 
The architect, Gould, was not aware of the contents of the deed. The certificates were 
addressed to Hunt and no evidence was produced to the effect that Gould had any 
knowledge of the business relationship between Hunt and Dennes. Dennes subsequently 
transferred the mortgage debt and the security to Miss LeLievre and it was she that 
brought the subsequent action against Gould. The original claim was couched in terms 
that Hunt was the agent of Dennes in employing Gould and that Gould did not use due 
care and skill and diligence in issuing the certificates and was in breach of a duty owed to 
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the mortgagee. This is the essential point of the claim. The defence was a denial of 
employment by the mortgagee, a denial of any undertaking of any duty towards the 
mortgagee and an assertion that the certificates were neither fraudulent nor negligent and 
had been given in good faith. 
It can be seen, even at this stage, that this is not in any real sense on all fours with 
Candler where there was a much closer connection between Crane Christmas and Co and 
Candler. In the instant case there is not even any evidence that Gould was aware of 
LeLievre. 
The matter came on at first instance and it was held that no duty was owed by Gould to 
the mortgagee. 
When the matter came to the Court of Appeal the leading judgement was given by Lord 
Esher, the Master of the Rolls at the time. He dealt firstly in short order with the contractual 
point and concluded that there was no contract between Gould and Dennes. This was 
fairly self-evident and it did not really occupy much space in the judgement. 
Turning to the question of negligence, Lord Esher was in no doubt that Gould had given 
untrue certificates and that it was negligence on his part so to do. The important question 
in his view was whether a duty was owed as alleged. He started his treatment of this as 
follows 
“The question of liability for negligence cannot arise at all until it is established that 
the man who has been negligent owed some duty to the person who seeks to make 
him liable for his negligence. What duty is there when there is no relation between 
the parties by contract? A man is entitled to be as negligent as he pleases towards 
the whole world if he owes no duty to them.”268 
He then reviewed the decision in Heaven v Pender269 which was advanced in support of 
the mortgagees case and concluded that the circumstances of this instant case did not fall 
within the ambit of that decision, which in his judgement required proximity to either person 
or property. Clearly that does not apply in this case.  
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Lord Esher relied on the judgement in Derry v Peek270 which at that time was of course 
relatively new. The import of this case was to restate the long held common law view that 
in the absence of a contract an action for negligence can only be maintained where there 
is fraud. The decision at first instance, before the official referee, had found that although 
Gould had behaved negligently he had not been guilty of any fraud. The most that he had 
done was to give untrue certificates negligently and that being the case, no cause of action 
could arise in the absence of any contract. This decision was unanimous. 
This is a strong judgement which, whilst it may be possible to distinguish it on the facts, it 
is a clear statement of the law which would appear to negate any possibility of liability to 
third parties for negligent misstatement. 
This was the state of the law when Candler came before the Court of Appeal. The leading 
majority judgement was given by Lord Justice Asquith. He approached the case from the 
standpoint that the LeLievre v Gould was binding unless it could be shown to have been 
overturned271. He acknowledged that the plaintiff’s case was based on the proposition that 
Donoghue and Stevenson had effectively overruled the previous case. He was clearly not 
concerned with the facts of the case if the space did exist for him to exercise his discretion. 
The premise on which he said he approached LeLievre v Gould was on the basis of Lord 
Esher’s judgement that: 
 “All that [the defendant] had done was to give untrue certificates negligently, such 
negligence, in the absence of contract with the plaintiffs, can give no right of action 
at law or equity”272. 
He then proceeded to determine whether this had actually been overruled and apart from 
acknowledging that the authority was qualified by the decision in Nocton v  Ashburton273 
only to the extent that the words  
“Or in some circumstances where a fiduciary relationship exists between the 
defendant and the plaintiff were to be added.” 
This would seem to imply that he may be prepared to be creative but the implications of 
finding that there was a fiduciary relationship between Candler and Crane Christmas & Co. 
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would be far reaching and much more than was required to extend the law of negligent 
misstatement, it is not surprising, as we shall see, that he declined to take this path. At this 
point it should be noted that this is not a path which recommended itself to Denning and 
probably for much the same reasons. 
He then turned to Donoghue and to Lord Atkins formulation of the neighbour principle and 
concluded that the literal interpretation of Atkins dicta would be such as to extend the law 
of negligence to such an extent as to bring negligent misstatement within it 
“This passage, if read literally and without regard to the qualifying effect of its 
context or of the "subjecta materies"274, might be taken to comprehend not only 
conduct causing physical injury to person or property through setting a certain kind 
of chattel in motion or in circulation (the case immediately under review); but also 
conduct of any kind, through any means (including negligent misstatement) causing 
damnum of any kind recognized by the law, whether physical or not, to anyone who 
could bring himself within Lord Atkin's definition of a "neighbour””275 
He was however not prepared to go anywhere near that far and refused to believe that an 
application of this broad interpretation could have been intended by Atkin himself. In 
support of this he referred to the fact that Gould’s case was, in 1932, very well-known and 
Atkin must have considered it, yet he made only a passing comment on it in his judgement 
and therefore he has this to say on the effect of Donoghue and Stevenson on the instant 
case 
“The inference seems to me to be that Lord Atkin continued to accept the distinction 
between liability in tort for careless (but non-fraudulent) misstatements and liability 
in tort for some other forms of carelessness, and that his formula defining "who is 
my neighbour" must be read subject to his acceptance of this overriding 
distinction.”276 
He then moved on to review the authorities which were being relied on to show that 
negligent misstatement had been accepted in the past. These were contentions which he 
rejected. 
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As has been previously noted, the facts in Candler are possible to distinguish from those in 
Gould particularly on the issue of proximity, this did not appeal to Asquith. He did not 
accept that the present case could be distinguished from Gould on the grounds of 
proximity, that is to say that proximity existed in this case in contrast to Gould. In Gould it 
was contended that there was not sufficient proximity as Gould was unaware of the 
contract between his own client and the mortgagee whereas in this case Fraser was 
clearly aware of the connection with Candler.  Asquith did not accept this as in his view 
there was sufficient proximity in the Gould case, given that Gould must have known that 
the certificates would be relied upon by somebody it was not necessary to identify the 
ultimate recipient thereof. Similarly in Donoghue, there was no suggestion that the 
manufacturers of the ginger beer had to be aware of the identity of the ultimate consumer. 
Asquith dismissed the appeal with these words 
“In the present state of our law different rules still seem to apply to the negligent 
misstatement on the one hand and to the negligent circulation or repair of chattels 
on the other; and Donoghue's case does not seem to me to have abolished these 
differences. I am not concerned with defending the existing state of the law or 
contending that it is strictly logical - it clearly is not. I am merely recording what I 
think it is.  
If this relegates me to the company of "timorous souls", I must face that 
consequence with such fortitude as I can command. I am of opinion that the appeal 
should be dismissed.”277 
As we shall see the reference to being one of the company of timorous souls is in 
response to Denning’s comments in his own judgement. Whether this is fair to Asquith will 
also be visited later. What is clear however is that Asquith had identified a space to 
operate in that he could have distinguished the case on the facts but he chose not to do 
so. It is arguable that if he had decided to go down that route it would not have produced 
the result of embodying negligent misstatement in the law as a general statement but 
would have given a more restricted reading of the principle which it would have been 
relatively easy to tie down to its own facts.   
The next judgement was given by Lord Justice Cohen; he also relied on Gould which he 
considered to be binding on the court and directly applicable to the facts of this case. 
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“The principle of that decision seems to me directly in point in the present case. It is 
binding on us unless it can be said to be inconsistent with some other decision of 
this court or of the House of Lords. I am unable to find any such decision. Mr. 
Lawson asked us to say that it is inconsistent with the principle laid down by Lord 
Atkin in Donoghue v. Stevenson 215. It is to be observed that in Donoghue v. 
Stevenson 216 Lord Atkin himself cited with approval some passages from the 
judgments of Lord Esher, M.R., and A. L. Smith, L.J., in Le Lievre v. Gould, and I 
am unable to believe that if he had thought the ratio decidendi in that case was 
wrong he would have cited those passages without making it clear that he was not 
approving the decision. I think, therefore, that although the relevant passages in 
Lord Atkin's speech  are couched in such general terms that they might possibly 
cover the case of negligent misstatement, that question was not present to Lord 
Atkin's mind or intended to be covered by his statement.”278 
Again, Lord Reid has identified the gap that is there to be exploited. To be precise it is the 
interpretation to be placed on Lord Atkin’s formulation of the neighbour principle. He has 
chosen to give it is narrow interpretation and it must be said with some justification as it 
would have been open to Lord Atkin to have either ignored and failed to mention Gould or 
indeed to have deprecated it. Against that however, a narrow interpretation does not take 
into account the fact that in Donoghue, Lord Atkin was attempting to formulate a broad 
principle and to deconstruct the obiter dicta behind the principle to support a narrow 
interpretation seems to be a little perverse or at the very least not in the spirit of 
Donoghue.  
Lord Reid has seen the opportunity but has declined to take it. As will be considered later, 
this would put him with together with Asquith in the company of Denning’s timorous souls. 
Whether this is entirely fair or not will be considered after an analysis of Denning’s 
judgement.  
If it were not for Denning’s judgement in this case, then this would be just another case in 
a long line of failed appeals attempting to extend the neighbour principle. Denning grabbed 
the opportunity offered by this case to attempt to extend the ambit of the principle to cover 
negligent misstatement and it is that judgement which must be considered next. 
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In this judgement, Denning lays out his essential judicial philosophy which we have seen in 
earlier chapters is to do justice to the case in front him by his own lights.  
It is very clear that where the matter to be uncluttered by previous authority, he would 
unhesitatingly find in favour of Candler. He's very definite about the essential question in 
the case which is that the major concern is whether these defendants in this case owed a 
duty to Candler in all the circumstances. 
He has this to say. 
“Now I come to the great question in the case: did the accountants owe a duty of 
care to the plaintiff? If the matter were free from authority, I should have said that 
they clearly did owe a duty of care to him. They were professional accountants who 
prepared and put before him these accounts, knowing that he was going to be 
guided by them in making an investment in the company. On the faith of those 
accounts he did make the investment, whereas if the accounts had been carefully 
prepared, he would not have made the investment at all. The result is that he has 
lost his money. In the circumstances, had he not every right to rely on the accounts 
being prepared with proper care; and is he not entitled to redress from the 
accountants on whom he relied? I say that he is,279” 
He then recited the words of Lord Justice Knight Bruce in Slim v Croucher280  
“a country whose Administration of Justice did not afford redress in the case of the 
present description would not be in a state of civilisation” 
This paragraph and subsequent quotation are a clear indication that Denning is not going 
to tamely follow what the majority of the court considered to be the then current state of 
the common law. He is not prepared to be one of the timorous souls that he will refer to 
later in his judgement. It is this willingness to depart from and to use when appropriate, 
precedent that has led to what is arguably the most fertile and useful application of the 
modern law of negligence.  
After quoting, in outline, authorities which he considers may support him; he turns to the 
major obstacle in his path which is of course the decision in Gould which has just been 
considered. 
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It is clear from the judgements of Lord’s Asquith and Reid that there is some scope for 
fashioning a legitimate arena and then exercising a degree of creative discretion to drive 
changes in the law on negligent misstatement. This is what Denning proceeds to do. 
Denning first identifies what he considers to be two principal errors in the reasoning behind 
the decision in Gould which he attributed to flaws in 19th-century legal analysis of the 
case. 
As has been seen, the decision in Gould is posited on the lack of any contractual nexus 
between the architect issuing the certificates and the claimant in the case who was the 
eventual mortgagee. 
Denning's view is that this requirement for a contractual relationship had bedevilled legal 
reasoning in the intervening period. It is inarguable that Bowen LJ did not consider 
negligent words within the class of things that created a duty to those who were not a party 
to any contract in question. 
Denning considered that Donoghue v Stevenson had dealt a mortal blow to that 
proposition and in his view the essential point he took from that judgement was the 
presence of a contractual relationship did not necessarily defeat an action in negligence 
brought by a third party provided always that the circumstances of the case gave rise to 
such a duty.  
Denning here is seeking to make the space that he needs to arrive at the position of being 
able to develop the law by the entirely justified expedient of distinguishing the cases on the 
facts. 
The interpretation that Denning puts upon Donoghue is a very modern reading of 
Donoghue which would be recognised by any 21st Century common lawyer and that is to 
some extent indicative of the influence of this judgement of Denning that is being 
considered this chapter. It is by no means certain that in 1951 this view of the principle 
flowing from Donoghue would have found much support in the judiciary however the 
consensus that is required for legitimacy is not a judicial consensus. As has been 
considered earlier Lord Justice Asquith expressly deprecated the notion that Lord Atkin in 
the earlier case had intended any such consequences to follow from his speech in that 
case. He further considered that the other speeches in that case would not support any 
such reading of the outcome of that case. Lord Justice Cohen pointed to many cases 
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which had attempted to extend Donoghue as far as negligent misstatement and each of 
those cases had failed.281He quoted at length Mr Justice Wrottesley’s  emphatic rejection 
of the broader view espoused by Denning and it is that view which forms the orthodoxy in 
1951  
The textbook view is given by the second edition of Charlesworth on Negligence, which in 
1951 was written by Charlesworth himself. Charlesworth has this to say 
The duty to take care is ultimately based on the possible consequences which will 
occur if care is not taken. What the consequences may be of any particular act or 
omission is often a very difficult problem involving enquiry into questions of 
causation. This enquiry is difficult enough in cases where physical damage is 
concerned in which the cars, whether it be defective vehicles or machinery lack of 
care and skill in management, can usually be accurately traced. To regard the issue 
of the certificate, an opinion, report is carrying the same duty of care as a delivery of 
a defective chattel will be to introduce a most disturbing factor into the mutual 
intercourse of society282 
Charlesworth then sees this as a policy decision which derives its reasoning both from the 
inherent difficulty of deciding on the necessary level of skill and care and presumably also 
because he thinks will introduce an unnecessary legal element to interactions both of the 
business world and socially. 
These are enough to give a demonstration of the orthodox view of the post Donaghue 
state of the common law on negligent misstatement which was extant in 1951. Denning is 
prepared to go a long way beyond that view and as it is his view that has prevailed and it is 
argued now forms basis of the law, his argument in favour now needs to be examined. 
Denning posited a second error in that previous legal thinking had ascribed to Derry v 
Peek the authority that no action can lie for a negligent misstatement even though it is 
intended to be acted upon, and is acted upon causing the plaintiff loss. Of the effect of this 
error Denning says this  
“This error led the Court of Appeal in Low v Boucher to deny the correctness of Slim 
v Croucher and in Le Lievre v Gould to deny the correctness of Cann v Wilson. The 
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cases thus denied were so plainly just that the very denial of them was itself an 
error.”  
He then says that the error was exposed by Nocton v Ashburton283 which in Denning’s 
opinion decided that an action did lie for negligent misstatement when circumstances 
disclosed a duty to be careful. He then makes the bold sweeping statement that 
“In my opinion, these decisions of the House of Lords in Donaghue v Stevenson 
and Nocton v Ashburton are sufficient to entitle this court to examine afresh the law 
as to negligent statements.”284 
This then is Denning creating that space that he needs. He has done so by deploying 
existing precedent but not relying on them. He is not saying that he is bound by these 
precedents but merely that these precedents indicate that there was a sufficient body of 
judicial opinion in favour of the proposition that negligent misstatement is a cause of action 
to enable him to re-examine it, in effect that he is following a consensus. 
Is this in any sense legitimate? Is this an interstitial space between the operation of the law 
or is it merely Denning choosing to ignore a precedent that he doesn’t want to follow. That 
very much depends. Denning’s fellow judges in the case are clearly of the opinion that the 
law is settled and that there is no space to exercise judicial discretion. Denning on the 
other hand has constructed a robust argument that there is such a space and that the law 
does not mean what it has been taken to mean for some time and that the cases cited are 
not authority to say that no action can lie for negligent misstatement. 
Whether this is legitimate or not depends very much on the cases Denning himself deploys 
in support of his creation of the space.in which case therefore, before moving on to his re-
examination of the law, it is worth considering whether the judgement in Nocton can stand 
the weight that Denning places upon it. 
The claim in Nocton concerns advice given by a Solicitor to his client in respect of a 
substantial mortgage transaction which eventually resulted in the mortgaged property 
being insufficient security for the sum advanced with the consequence that the claimant 
was some £65,000 out-of-pocket, a significant sum in 1914.. 
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The claim in contract had become statute barred and therefore could not be sustained. 
The alternative claim was one of fraud and the House of Lords, relying on Derry v Peek 
stated that for such a claim to succeed then actual fraud must be proven. In this case it 
was taken not to be so and that dealt comprehensively with the claims at common law. 
The case turned on the House of Lords interpretation of the duty of a fiduciary in equity. 
The leading speech was given by the Lord Chancellor, Lord Herschell. He delved into the 
history of Chancery jurisdiction and resurrected the notion of constructive fraud which he 
defined as 
“The Court of Chancery exercised an exclusive jurisdiction in cases which, although 
classified in that Court as cases of fraud, yet did not necessarily import the element 
of dolus malus. The Court took upon itself to prevent a man from acting against the 
dictates of conscience as defined by the Court,”285 
he expands on this by saying 
“it is a mistake to suppose that an actual intention to cheat must always be proved. 
A man may misconceive the extent of the obligation which a Court of Equity 
imposes on him. His fault is that he has violated, however innocently because of his 
ignorance, an obligation which he must be taken by the Court to have known, and 
his conduct has in that sense always been called fraudulent, even in such a case as 
a technical fraud on a power. It was thus that the expression "constructive fraud" 
came into existence. The trustee who purchases the trust estate, the solicitor who 
makes a bargain with his client that cannot stand, have all for several centuries run 
the risk of the word fraudulent being applied to them. What it really means in this 
connection is, not moral fraud in the ordinary sense, but breach of the sort of 
obligation which is enforced by a Court that from the beginning regarded itself as a 
Court of conscience.”286 
Denning of course had a background in equity and would have recognized the concept of 
a court of conscience and indeed it could be argued in many ways he considered himself 
such a tribunal.  
Having said that though, however else this can be characterised it is a long way from 
Denning’s assertion that this case established that an action can lie for negligent 
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misstatement where the circumstances dictate such a course. It is quite clear that the 
House of Lords in this case are dealing with the question exclusively within the realm of 
equity. 
Where this case does lend some support to Denning is that it quite clearly enunciates the 
requirement for a special relationship and does not preclude finding that negligent 
misstatement could attract relief. Lord Herschel says this at the conclusion of his speech 
“As a consequence fraud has been charged in the peculiar sense in which it was 
the practice to charge it in Chancery procedure in cases of this kind. But the facts 
alleged would none the less, if proved, have afforded ground for an action for mere 
negligence.”287 
It is striking that throughout the various speeches, their Lordships never once state the 
proposition that an action cannot accrue to a person outside of the contractual relationship 
for the negligent statement. This would seem to leave the door open to further 
interpretation.  
It is of course Denning's position that Derry v Peek has received a much more rigid 
interpretation than it warranted; he does not however expand on the Nocton jurisprudence 
and leans more heavily on more recent strands of thought. 
He deals with the defendant's three propositions, namely that this was a novel action in 
that, apart from cases of either a contractual or fiduciary relationship, no action for 
negligent misstatement had ever been successful, a duty to take care only arises were a 
breach will cause physical damage to either persons or property. Finally that the correct 
interpretation in this case was that the duty was only owed as a contractual duty and 
therefore no duty could lie to a person outside the contractual relationship. 
In respect of the first proposition Denning comments that this argument has been put 
forward in many cases that resulted in progress in the law and that it has nearly always 
been rejected. He called on the now famous dicta of Lord Macmillan in Donoghue when he 
said 
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“The criterion of judgement must adjust and adapt itself to changing circumstances 
of life; the categories of negligence are never closed”288 
it is also at this point that he makes the comment about timorous souls 
“On the one side there were the timorous souls who were fearful of allowing a new 
cause of action. On the other side there were the bold spirits who were ready to 
allow it if justice so required.”289 
It is clear which side of the line Denning considers himself to fall and indeed this is a 
central plank of his judicial philosophy. He would always maintain that he was always 
prepared to drive the law along new paths if necessary to do justice in any particular 
instance. 
He deals with the second proposition regarding physical damage being necessary for an 
action for breach of duty to succeed by simply stating that once duty exists, liability cannot 
depend on the nature of the damage; it is of course this very point which drives the 
majority in this case depending as it does on the judgement in Gould. This is an interesting 
proposition as of course the position of the majority is that liability does not exist. Denning 
does not at this stage deal with that point. 
The third point regarded a contractual duty, he simply considers it to be dealt with and 
dismissed by Donoghue. He does not expand on this but he is of course right if all his 
other reasoning is right and a duty is found then the contractual nexus point will simply fall 
away.  
Turning next to the creative part of his judgement. This is the construct upon which later 
judgements have built the law of negligent misstatement and as such is an essential and 
substantial part of the modern law of negligence. There is no question here but that 
Denning is creating new law, the question that does remain is how? 
Denning starts by outlining the persons on whom he considers that the duty should lie. 
These are people whose profession and occupation is to examine books etc and prepare 
reports. He draws a distinction between professional men such as accountants and 
surveyors and others who are not expected to bring any professional knowledge or skill 
into the preparation of the certificates, reports or statements. He relies on established 
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common law principles that every man professing to hold a particular skill is expected to 
exercise that skill properly. He introduces a particular Denning touch at this point by 
referring to ancient authority and quotes Fitz-Herbert 
“If a smith prick my horse with a nail I shall have my action on the case against him, 
without any warranty by the smith to do it well for it is the duty of every artificer to 
exercise his art rightly and truly as he ought”290 
This of course is Denning as the creative positivist lawyer submitting that all he's doing is 
finding out and restating the ancient law in other words going back to a natural law 
tradition, in some ways that sits somewhat uneasily with his self-identification as a bold 
spirit who is driving the law in new directions but of course as has already been discussed 
this is the essential dichotomy at the heart of Denning’s judicial life. It is this essential 
conservative feeling that he gets from his upbringing, his devout Anglicanism and other 
factors we have identified that drives the desire to for a connection to the past but his 
desire to do justice drives the need to move the law along new paths when he identifies 
the requirement.  
Having identified who owes the duty, in his opinion. He then considers to whom that duty 
may be owed. This he says is firstly to the client or employer and then any third person 
that they show the accounts or other reports to and as, in this case, he is dealing with 
accountants he then crucially goes on to include any person to whom they know their 
employer is going to show the accounts with a view to inducing to invest money or 
otherwise rely on them, thus squarely catching Crane Christmas in the particular facts of 
this case. 
At this point however it would seem that the decision in Gould would preclude such a 
finding, requiring as it does a contractual nexus. Denning deals with that by pointing out 
that it is a feature of that case that the mortgagee did not have to rely on the certificates 
produced but had the opportunity to have their own surveyor inspect the work. This, 
Denning says, is in contraindication of the position in Donoghue itself where there was no 
opportunity of intermediate inspection of the ginger beer bottle between factory and 
ultimate consumer. Therefore Denning's conclusion is that such a relationship is too 
remote to give rise to a duty of care and it therefore falls that Gould is correctly decided. Is 
this pure sophistry on Denning’s part, a statement of the law or a subtle (or not so subtle) 
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attempt to avoid the precedent? The answer is that Denning is making what he believes to 
be a true statement of the law. An essential part of Atkins reasoning in Donoghue was that 
there was no possibility of intermediate inspection between the manufacturer and the end 
consumer Denning has the used this to distinguish Gould from Candler and create the 
space he needs.  
Having said this then to whom does Denning consider that the duty is owed and how is 
that nexus arrived at? 
To resolve this point he then turned to consider proximity. As is usual he seeks older 
authority to support his proposition that proximity is satisfied provided the accountants 
know that the accounts were to be submitted to a third party and used by that third 
party291. He relies also on Cann v Wilson292 which is directly on the point, that case had 
been overturned by Gould but Denning finds a way around this by relying on the fact that 
the underlying case, George v Skivington293 , which was at the time of Gould considered to 
be wrongly decided, was reinstated in Donoghue v Stevenson294 therefore Denning 
considers Cann v Wilson to also be reinstated which provides good authority for his 
proposition that the accountants owe a duty of care in this case to Candler. 
He restricts the ambit of this duty, however, to those transactions which flow directly from 
the reliance of the third party on the accounts. He concludes that in the instant case that 
means that the defendants are liable for the original £2000 invested but not for the £200 
invested by Candler after he had been with the company for two months. He makes this 
distinction on the basis that by that stage Candler had had the opportunity to investigate 
the company and could make his decision based on his own observations of the company 
rather than relying on Crane Christmas accounts. That is of course entirely consistent with 
his earlier point that Atkins judgement turns on the impossibility of intermediate 
examination. He is saying that between the first investment and the later injection of funds 
an inspection was possible and Candler must bear the responsibility for his own decision 
here.  
What Denning fails to explore at this point though is whether this goes to the reliance 
point. If after two months Candler, having seen the company and presumably in Denning’s 
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view having gained some insight into its parlous state, then made the decision that he was 
going to invest a further £200 then it is at least arguable that he was not relying on the 
accounts prepared by Crane Christmas when he made his original investment of £2000. 
The counter argument must be put and that is that when he put the £200 in, he did know 
the true state of the company’s finances but he put in the extra money in a desperate 
attempt to keep the company afloat and rescue his original investment this would have 
been as a direct result of the original negligent misstatement. The point is impossible to 
determine now and in any event it would not affect the central thrust of Denning’s 
judgement on the duty of care as it would really only go to causation. Denning would not of 
course want to cloud the issue by introducing extra considerations and it is likely that he 
leaves this behind so he can continue with his agenda in the case.   
Denning concludes his judgement by setting out the underlying philosophy behind his 
decision in which he says that the law should hold accountants and auditors liable to third 
parties in the particular circumstances he has set out because, without this, particularly in 
cases where a company or firm is controlled by one man, there is no motive for 
accountants to verify the information given to them by that one man who runs the 
company. That was of course the case here where the accountants took the word of 
Ogilvy at face value and his word turned out to be worthless. 
Denning states categorically that: 
“In my opinion, accountants owe a duty of care not only to their clients, but also to 
all those with a reliance on the accounts in the transactions for which those 
accounts are prepared.”295 
This is a strong statement in a minority judgement and it should be remembered that the 
decision of the majority of the court was to follow Gould and stated that in the absence of 
any contractual nexus and absent actual fraud, no liability would lie with the accountants 
and thereby ignored the opportunity to extend the law on negligent misstatement.  Denning 
of course was aware of this and that is why he has drafted his judgement to lay out a very 
clear path to enable a later court to follow him and develop the law on the tort of negligent 
misstatement. 
He did this by clearing away some of the clutter of accumulated precedent which was 
perceived by some to be blocking the way to this end. By giving a broader interpretation to 
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Lord Atkin than his judicial brethren were inclined to give, and by distinguishing the main 
precedent of Gould on the grounds that there was the availability of intermediate 
inspection he was then able to exercise his discretion so that it was possible for liability to 
be incurred for negligent misstatement. To further develop the law it would need another 
court to utilise this line of reasoning and develop it into a majority judgement which would 
establish the precedent. 
That opportunity arose some 10 years later in the case of Hedley Byrne &Co Ltd v Heller & 
Partners Ltd296. The facts of Hedley Byrne are too well known to require setting out in 
detail here. In brief, the plaintiff’s, who were an advertising agency agreed to place 
substantial advertising for a company by the name of Easipower Ltd. The terms of the 
contract were that they, the plaintiff’s, were to be personally liable for the cost of all these 
orders. Not being acquainted with the company they asked their own bankers to enquire 
into the financial standing of that company and accordingly their bankers made request of 
the company’s bankers, the defendants in this case.  The defendant’s reply to the bankers 
was favourable and Hedley Byrne’s bankers passed the references on to them. In fact, at 
the date of the references, the company had serious financial problems and the bankers 
were aware of that, shortly after the references were given, the company went into 
liquidation and the plaintiffs lost the greater part of the money they had expended. 
It is worth pausing at this point to note that on the face of it this was not the most promising 
case to bring before the court to try and change the law on negligent misstatement. The 
actual reference had been given in a telephone conversation between two bankers and the 
contents of the conversation were uncontroversial and had been expressed to be in 
confidence and without responsibility on the part of Heller. It is this latter consideration that 
makes it surprising that this case was pursued as far as the House of Lords. At this 
distance it is difficult to understand the motives behind the desire to take the case as far as 
this and the only conclusion can be the amount of money involved (some £8000) was 
enough to persuade the plaintiffs to expend what must have been considerable sums in 
pursuing the case to the highest court. 
In addition of course the plaintiffs must have been reasonably confident of success in the 
High Court and that can only be because they were aware of the minority judgement of 
Denning in Candler and could see this being a strong point in their favour in establishing 
liability for negligent misstatement. This was further encouragement to bring the case. 
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The Court of Appeal dealt with the case in fairly conventional terms and considered 
themselves bound by the decision in Candler and did not examine Denning’s minority 
judgement at all and decided the case on the basis that in the absence of a contractual, 
fiduciary or other special relationship there could be no duty of care in the making of 
statements in the absence of fraud. 
As was anticipated probably by all parties the matter in due course arrived at the House of 
Lords297 
The decision itself turns on the very narrow point that the disclaimer contained in the 
telephone assertion was enough to exclude the defendants from liability on the facts of this 
case. As this was very different reasoning to the Court of Appeal who had relied on the line 
of authority culminating in the majority judgement in Candler which required certain 
species of relationship, i.e. a contractual nexus to found liability, the House of Lords 
examined the authorities and expressly disapproved both Candler and Gould and 
approved of Denning’s minority judgement in the former case. 
The leading opinion was that of Lord Reid. He does not refer much to Denning’s 
judgement but it is quite clear throughout that he is following a strong line of reasoning set 
out by Denning in his judgement.  
The reasoning starts from the premise that the then present state of the law required more 
than a mere negligent misstatement to give rise to liability and then moved on to examine 
the authorities to determine what more is required to fix liability. 
Denning of course had set out in detail early in his appraisal that it was an overreliance on 
a strict interpretation of the judgement in Derry v Peek that had led to the rigid rule that in 
the absence of fraud a contract was required to make a representee liable for negligent 
misstatement. Lord Reid is quite clear that in his view Derry did not establish the rule often 
ascribed to it which led him to denigrate the statements to that effect in the cases on the 
point between 1889 and1914. This of course includes Gould. Following the reasoning 
through Lord Reid arrived at the conclusion that Candler had been wrongly decided. It was 
at this point that he touched on Denning’s judgement and noted that Denning had 
distinguished Gould on the facts.  
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He then turned to Gould itself and referred to the rule which was stated in that case and 
has been restated in this chapter many times, that in the absence of a contract, fraud is 
necessary to maintain an action for negligence. However as later judgements of the House 
had to some extent removed the artificial limitations that had been put in place by Gould, 
Lord Reid had no hesitation in declaring that Gould was wrong and that the decision in 
Cann v Wilson ought not to have been overruled. This of course was the decision which 
Denning reached by a much more direct route.  
In his judgement, Lord Hodson dealt with Denning’s judgement in Candler in more detail 
and had this to say about it 
“So far I have done no more than summarise the argument addressed to the Court 
of Appeal in Candler’s case to which affect was given in the dissenting judgement of 
Denning LJ with which I respectfully agree insofar as it dealt with the facts of the 
case. I am, therefore, of opinion that his judgement is to be preferred to that of the 
majority.” 298 
The next judgement was that of Lord Devlin and to begin with he reviewed the authorities 
in much the same way as Lord Reid had done and came to the conclusion that Gould had 
been wrongly decided. Devlin decided that it was necessary for there to have either been 
an undertaking or voluntary assumption of responsibility, which was of course what 
Denning had argued in the Court of Appeal. On the question of what would constitute an 
undertaking to voluntary assume responsibility Devlin had this to say 
“But insofar as your lordships describe the circumstances in which an implication 
will ordinarily be drawn, I'm prepared to adopt any one of your lordships statements 
showing the general rule; and I pay the same respect to the statement by Denning 
LJ in his dissenting judgement in Candler v Crane Christmas and Co …. about the 
circumstances in which he says a duty to use care in making a statement exists”299 
Denning’s point of course was that the defendant would know that his work would be 
shown to the plaintiff and the plaintiff would rely on that work.  
The established and accepted ratio of Hedley Byrne is of course that liability can lie for 
negligent misstatement just as much as for negligent acts and it is arguable that in large 
part this is due to Denning’s dissenting judgement in Candler. Given that it is Hedley Byrne 
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which is the generally accepted basis of the doctrine and that at least on the face of it, the 
House of Lords in Hedley Byrne made no more than passing reference to Denning it is 
necessary to look beyond the words of the judgement itself to support this. 
Denning himself was in no doubt as to the impact of his dissenting judgement he wrote 
about it at length in The Discipline of law300. He starts by a full chapter (albeit a small one) 
on the subject which does admittedly consist mainly of verbatim quotes from his own 
judgement.301 At the beginning of the next chapter will does say that 
 14 years later my dissent in Candler v Crane Christmas was approved by the 
House of Lords302 
 He is even more certain of his ground when dealing with impact of Hedley Byrne when he 
says 
The House of Lords, in a series of obiter dicta, considered the decision in Candler. I 
was gratified to find that they approved of my dissent and give reasoning on the 
same lines.303 
 He is very clear that in his opinion this dissenting judgement altered the law  
“let me recall a few which pointed to the way ahead, and have led to decisions by 
the Lords which might never have taken place except for my dissenting from 
previous precedents; such as Candler v Crane Christmas about negligent 
statements….”304  
Denning was also prepared to ascribe this level of importance to his judgement in open 
court and referred to it many times in later cases. As an example in Ministry of Housing v 
Sharp he had this to say 
“The case comes foursquare within the principles which are stated in Candler v 
Crane Christmas and Co and which were approved by the House of Lords in 
Headley Byrne Ltd v Heller and Partners Ltd”305 
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On the face of it does seem that Denning may well be overestimating his contribution to 
this development especially given the fact that on a reading of the House of Lords various 
judgements in Hedley Byrne it does give the impression that their Lordships had arrived at 
the decision independently of Denning and really only gave a passing nod to his dissenting 
judgement. 
This however is to ignore the effect that the judgement in Candler had on those 
contemplating bringing actions for negligent misstatement. If, Candler had been taken to 
have settled the point that no action can lie for negligent misstatement then no competent 
lawyer could have advised his client to bring such an action. Ironically if he had given 
advice to bring the action then such advice could have been deemed to be negligent and 
as there would have been a contractual relationship between lawyer and the client which 
even under the law as it then stood an action for negligence could have been brought 
against the lawyer, an irony Denning would surely have appreciated.     
Looking for the influence that Denning wielded in this area of the law at this time, it is 
instructive to look at the arguments advanced by counsel in putting forward the proposition 
that liability should lie for negligent misstatement. Counsel for Hedley Byrne largely 
adopted Denning’s position in Candler and Crane Christmas although at least in the Court 
of Appeal they were of course bound by the earlier decision and had to seek to distinguish 
it. 
The position adopted was Denning’s in that the majority stated the law too narrowly and 
that the law since Donoghue and Stevenson had developed beyond that stated in Gould’s 
case. The question of negligent misstatement had not been canvassed or decided in 
Donoghue and in counsels view was still open for discussion. In argument counsel 
specifically referred to Denning’s judgement and had this to say 
“There is logically no reason why there should be a distinction between liability for 
financial loss and liability for physical injury. The results in either case can be 
catastrophic. A banker in answering enquiries about the credit of a customer is in 
the same relationship of proximity as a surgeon about to operate on the patient. 
Each assumes responsibility likely to have important effects on another person who 
falls within Lord Atkin’s definition of neighbour. Like a surgeon, a banker operates 
on a set of facts. He is a professional man holding himself out as giving a skilled 




service to the public, and he is within the class of persons enumerating by Denning 
L.J. in Candler’s case, for his is a particular art and he issues skilled reports.”306 
This is Denning’s point of course which he makes by reference to the law going back to 
1534 Denning says 
“It is, I think also applicable to professional accountants, they are not liable, of 
course, for a casual remarks made in the course of conversation, nor for all the 
statements made outside their work, or not made in their capacity as accountants: 
but they are, in my opinion, in proper cases, apart from any contract in the matter 
under a duty to use reasonable care in the preparation of their accounts and in the 
making of their reports.”307 
Denning had the opportunity to clarify and refine his views in the case of Ministry of Local 
Government and Housing v Sharp and another308. This was a case in which the clerk for a 
local authority had been negligent in his keeping of the local land charges register and the 
question arose whether he ordered a duty to incumbrancers and purchasers of the 
property for such negligence this was Denning’s view 
“I have no doubt that the clerk is liable. He was under a duty at common law to use 
due care. That was a duty which he owed to any person - incumbrancer or 
purchaser - whom he knew, or ought to have known, might be injured if he made a 
mistake. The case comes four square within the principles which are stated in 
Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co. [1951] 2 K.B. 164, 179-185, and which were 
approved by the House of Lords in Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners 
Ltd. [1964] A.C. 465. 
Mr. Hunter submitted to us, however, that the correct principle did not go to that 
length. He said that a duty to use due care (where there was no contract) only 
arose when there was a voluntary assumption of responsibility. I do not agree. He 
relied particularly on the words of Lord Reid in Hedley Byrne's case [1964] A.C. 
465, 487, and of Lord Devlin at p. 529. I think they used those words because of the 
special circumstances of that case (where the bank disclaimed responsibility). But 
they did not in any way mean to limit the general principle. 
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In my opinion the duty to use due care in a statement arises, not from any voluntary 
assumption of responsibility, but from the fact that the person making it knows, or 
ought to know, that others, being his neighbours in this regard, would act on the 
faith of the statement being accurate. That is enough to bring the duty into being. It 
is owed, of course, to the person to whom the certificate is issued and whom he 
knows is going to act on it, see the judgment of Cardozo J. in Glanzer v. Shepard 
(1922) 233 N.Y. 236. But it also is owed to any person whom he knows, or ought to 
know, will be injuriously affected by a mistake, such as the incumbrancer here.309 
Here Denning is expressly rejecting the position that a voluntary assumption of liability is 
necessary and quite clearly considers that foreseeability is the test. It is this refinement of 
Denning’s Candler judgement that has come forward. 
Hedley Byrne lead to a positive avalanche of cases seeking to extend the ambit of the duty 
of care which reached its apogee in Anns v Merton London Borough Council310 in which, 
effectively, liability was automatic unless there were policy reasons to exempt particular 
circumstances. 
The retreat from the high water mark of Anns began with Yianni v Edwin Evans and sons 
Ltd311 and in this case the judge at first instance (the case was not appealed) quoted large 
sections of Denning’s judgement in Candler and noted that this had been approved in 
Hedley Byrne and considered that this was enough to fix liability for a negligent surveyor. It 
was Denning’s requirements for some undertaking or assumption of responsibility rather 
than the blanket liability of Anns that formed the basis of the judgement in this case. 
The issue of liability of surveyors and valuers reached the House of Lords in the case of 
Smith and others v Eric S Bush and others312 which effectively overturned the decision in 
Anns. In the leading speech in this case, Lord Templeman quoted Denning’s formulation 
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Denning L.J., at pp. 178-179 rejected the argument that: 
"a duty to take care only arose where the result of a failure to take care will cause 
physical damage to persons or property. … I can understand that in some cases of 
financial loss there may not be a sufficiently proximate relationship to give rise to a 
duty of care; but, if once the duty exists, I cannot think that liability depends on the 
nature of the damage." 
“The duty of professional men "is not merely a duty to use care in their reports. 
They have also a duty to use care in their work which results in their reports," p. 
179. The duty of an accountant is owed: 
"to any third person to whom they themselves show the accounts, or to whom they 
know their employer is going to show the accounts, so as to induce him to invest 
money or take some other action on them. But I do not think the duty can be 
extended still further so as to include strangers of whom they have heard nothing 
and to whom their employer, without their knowledge may choose to show their 
accounts … The test of proximity in these cases is: did the accountants know that 
the accounts were required for submission to the plaintiff and use by him?": pp. 
180-181. 
Subject to the effect of any disclaimer of liability, these considerations appear to 
apply to the valuers in the present appeals.”313 
The current position of the law on negligent misstatement and indeed on negligence in 
general can quite reasonably be said to be represented by the House of Lords decision in 
Caparo Industries plc v Dickman and others.314 
Denning’s position on the matter was expressly approved. In his speech Lord Bridge made 
express referral to Denning’s dicta in Candler 
“In advising the client who employs him the professional man owes a duty to 
exercise that standard of skill and care appropriate to his professional status and 
will be liable both in contract and in tort for all losses which his client may suffer by 
reason of any breach of that duty. But the possibility of any duty of care being owed 
to third parties with whom the professional man was in no contractual relationship 
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was for long denied because of the wrong turning taken by the law in Le Lievre v. 
Gould [1893] 1 Q.B. 491 in overruling Cann v. Willson (1888) 39 Ch.D. 39. In 
Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co. [1951] 2 K.B. 164, Denning L.J., in his 
dissenting judgment, made a valiant attempt to correct the error”315 
Lord Harwich went on to set out that there are circumstances in which the defendant is 
fully aware of the purposes for which the plaintiff requires the information and that he will 
rely on the information in carrying out any transaction that is in contemplation. To support 
his analysis he quotes Denning’s judgement extensively and inserts approximately the four 
pages of Denning’s judgement in Candler within his own judgement (pages 180 to 184 of 
Candler)316 
Having quoted extensively he then says 
“It seems to me that this masterly analysis, if I may say so with respect, requires 
little, if any, amplification or modification in the light of later authority and is 
particularly apt to point the way to the right conclusion in the present appeal.”317 
In the other substantial speech, Lord Oliver distilled Denning’s dissenting judgement into a 
three stage test. 
“Denning L.J. suggested three conditions for the creation of a duty of care in tort in 
such cases. First, the advice must be given by one whose profession it is to give 
advice upon which others rely in the ordinary course of business, such as 
accountants, surveyors, valuers and the like: p. 179. Secondly, it must be known to 
the adviser that the advice would be communicated to the plaintiff in order to induce 
him to adopt a particular course of action: p. 180. Thirdly, the advice must be relied 
upon for the purpose of the particular transaction for which it was known to the 
advisers that the advice was required:”318 
Both of the other judgements in Caparo referred to the dissenting judgement of Denning in 
terms that clearly indicated that they considered that Hedley Byrne had approved 
Denning’s judgement in Candler and that it was taken to be settled law. 
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The judges in Caparo, took Denning’s dissenting judgement, and used it as the basis of 
their test for proximity which of course is the first of the three requirements of the three 
stage test in Caparo the other two being that the damage that ensued was reasonably 
foreseeable and that in all the circumstances it is fair just and reasonable to impose liability 
on a particular defendant. 
It could perhaps be said that the House of Lords managed to reach this point within 40 
years of Denning.  
Denning did not write anything substantial after retiring from the Court of Appeal except 
The Closing Chapter 319which he finished in September 1983. He was of course still alive 
and very active in 1990 and must have been aware of the decision in Caparo   but there is 
no evidence that he ever considered writing about it. 
His first biographer (apart of course from himself) merely says that  
“The dissenting Judgement in Candler v Crane Christmas and Co widened the 
scope of negligence and was the start of a new era”320 
This is true but more than a little understated and as this is an authorised biography would 
presumably largely accord with Denning’s view. 
His later (also authorised biography) describes the judgement as one of the great 
dissenting judgements of the common law 321 
A.L. Goodhart wrote in the Law Quarterly Review of April 1951 
“There can be little doubt that Candler v Crane Christmas will give rise to more 
debate that any other case in recent years”322 
Warren A. Seavey said  
“It is the brilliant dissent by Denning LJ that makes the case memorable”323 
Not all comment was as supportive and it is asserted that Denning at this stage was 
engaged in an exercise of judicial lawmaking which did not do not attract the unreserved 
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approbation of the judicial hierarchy. Lord Jowett the then Lord Chancellor was asked what 
House of Lords would do if there was an appeal to the House of Lords in Candler. 
We should regard it as our duty to expound what we believe the law to be and we 
should loyally follow the decisions of the House of Lords if we found there was 
some decision which we thought was in point. It is not really a question of being a 
bold or a timorous soul; it is a much simpler question than that. You know there was 
a time when the earth was void and without form, but after these hundreds of years 
the law of England, the common law, has at any rate got some measure of form to 
it. We are really no longer in the position of Lord Mansfield who used to consider a 
problem and expound it ex aequa et bona what the law ought to be... I do most 
humbly suggest to some of the speakers today that the problem is not to consider 
what social and political conditions do today require; that is to confuse the task of 
the lawyer with the task of the legislator. It is quite possible that the law has 
produced a result which does not accord with the requirements of today. If so, put it 
right by legislation, but do not expect every lawyer, in addition to all his other 
problems, to act as Lord Mansfield did, and decide what the law ought to be. He is 
far better employed if he puts himself to the much simpler task of deciding what the 
law is324 
This is very much the voice of orthodoxy and no doubt Denning would have politely 
dismissed Lord Jowett as a timorous soul. This division of the judiciary is of course in line 
with Denning’s own judicial philosophy but in this case there is merit in what Jowett has 
said and indeed it may even be said that this is an occasion on which Lord Simon’s rebuke 
that Denning was undertaking a “naked usurpation of the legislative function.” Was to 
some extent justified although in this case it would be perhaps more of a compliment.  
What did Denning actually do in this judgement? 
The first was to create the space around established precedent and what it was commonly 
the law would be. He does this by closely examining the history of the cases that have led 
to the law being in its present state. In particular the reasoning that led to the major binding 
precedent that of Gould. Having arrived at this he then analyses that judgement closely to 
find a way to distinguish that from the facts in Candler and finds that in the impossibility of 
intermediate examination, in effect the reliance point.  
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To give support to his contention that there is a clear philosophy behind liability for 
negligent misstatement he takes on board Lord Atkins judgement in Donoghue and then 
subjects that to analysis in such a way as to arrive at the conclusion that liability for 
negligent misstatement can lie and then further that the reasoning for it is the impossibility 
of intermediate examination. He then follows that through to consider the categories of 
negligence misstatement and arrives essentially at professional men giving professional 
advice in circumstances in which they know it will be relied upon. Thereby creating liability 
for Crane Christmas and Co.  
Is this legitimate? The answer must be yes, there is an interstitial space within the law on 
negligent misstatement and that space is to be found by analysis of earlier judgements 
that lead to the conclusion that the law is not as settled and sure as may have been 
thought. Having created the space he then exercises his discretion by close reference to 
earlier judgements and very much in line with an increasing consensus to expand the law 
of negligence. 
In examining this judgement, can it be said that Denning is simply considering what he 
thinks the law ought to be or as suggested by Jowett is he taking into account social and 
political conditions extant at the time of the judgement. Denning may well say that in this 
case he is doing neither of these; he is merely expounding what the law actually is. That is 
not the case. There is little question that Denning is being judicially creative but he is by no 
means being capricious and there is intellectual rigour and a clear logic to the path that he 
carves out to his ultimate conclusion. This was one of the earliest opportunities for him to 
follow the philosophy he had set out. Thus we can conclude in addition that he was 
following a consensus amongst lawyers given that at the first opportunity in a case that 
reached the House of Lords, his reasoning was followed and his conclusions adopted and 
now in the large part form the bedrock of the modern law of negligent misstatement if not 
negligence itself.  
There can be little doubt that this one carefully constructed and well-aimed dissenting 








Coda and Finis 
In the introduction the thesis to be explored is set out and is repeated here for clarification 
and ease of reference.  
Thesis 
it is generally accepted that judges are entitled to exercise discretion where  existing law 
does not provide an appropriate answer for the case currently in front of them, because 
the case is in that interstitial space between established precedent and/or statute law. Lord 
Denning, on many occasions during his judicial career, exercised this discretion. There are 
several questions to be answered. In the first case was he operating within the interstitial 
spaces that are recognised as a legitimate arena for judicial discretion or did he extend 
this beyond what is legitimate. Secondly if he did so extend, how far was this and his 
subsequent exercise of his discretion coloured by and influenced by those events in his 
early life and education which contributed to his overall philosophy. Thirdly, did the overall 
exercise of his discretion, taking into account all these factors, fall within any recognisable 
school of jurisprudential thought; in particular was Denning, as a judicial activist also a 
legal positivist. The final question is whether the answers to all of the above result in 
Denning’s legacy in the law being positive or overall was he a negative influence.325 
Conclusion 
In summary therefore, the threads need to be drawn together and the questions answered. 
 What did Denning do?  How did he do it?  Why did he do it?  Was it legitimate in terms of any accepted jurisprudential theory?  What was the overall effect of what he did? 
It must be accepted that within the confines of this exercise it may not be possible to 
answer all of these questions with the necessary degree of precision and in particular the 
last question can only be answered within the context of this study. 
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Creating the Space 
The space in question here is that interstitial space between established laws, whether 
precedent or statute and the facts of the case in front of the judge at the time in question.  
As has been explored earlier, interstitial space is a the more appropriate term here than 
the legal lacuna. This refers to a gap in the law (cf the non liquat jurisdiction in international 
law) somewhat bigger than would necessarily be required for any legitimate exercise of 
discretion. Interstices are more often taken to be narrow gaps and it is these that Denning 
exploits. If we restrict the legitimate arena only to what the law would regard as a lacuna 
then it would delegitimise most if not all of the space that Denning creates in these cases 
and many others and indeed would probably result in most judges being unable to 
exercise discretion.  This is because it is not only the obvious gaps that are utilised, in fact 
Denning in these cases identifies and utilises gaps that at first glance may well not appear 
to exist. The use of the word seems to stem from Oliver Wendell Holmes in 1917326 in an 
American Supreme Court judgement in which he was referring to precisely these small, 
almost indiscernible gaps in the law.  
It is in creating this space that Denning is at his most active and has in general provided 
the most material for analysis. Where he was most careful with the creation of the space 
as in Candler327, in which he took care to deal properly with existing precedent and refer 
this to the facts of the instant case. Then the eventual result is more coherent and resists 
hostile critical analysis. Where he was less careful such as in Ward328 where he was 
somewhat cavalier in his treatment of the law and indeed the requirements of natural 
justice, his judgement then is more open to question. 
This demonstrates the need to carefully examine the legitimacy of this creation of the 
space as it is this which eventually determines the legitimacy of the final decision.    
Legitimacy 
The concept of legitimacy is vital as it is only those decisions which are legitimate which 
can constitute valid law which will then be followed by subsequent judges. The concept of 
legitimacy is inextricably bound in with the exercise of discretion. It matters not if Denning 
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creates the space in an entirely legitimate fashion if he does not then exercise his 
discretion in such a way as to arrive at a valid decision. 
This leads inevitably to the moral basis of Denning’s decisions, which themselves depend 
on those factors which have been identified in earlier chapters as influencing his judicial 
and indeed wider outlook. 
Hart comments on the moral aspect of interpretation as it applies to judges as follows329 
at this point judges may again make a choice which is neither arbitrary nor 
mechanical; and here often display characteristics judicial virtues, the special 
appropriateness of which to legal decision explains why some feel reluctant to call 
such judicial activity “legislative.” These virtues are: impartiality and neutrality in 
surveying the alternatives; considerations for the interests of all those who will be 
affected; and a concern to deploy some acceptable general principle as a reasoned 
basis for decision. 
Hart clearly feels that the gaps, the interstices, are narrow. The natural lawyer of course 
would argue that there are no gaps simply that the law exists and has not been stated in 
this particular concept. It must be true that the gaps that the more creative judge exploits 
are narrow as any settled system of law is reasonably comprehensive. No litigant comes to 
court and in effect says to the judge “there is no law that covers my claim, but I think I’m 
entitled to redress and I ask you to invent the law so that it will give me that redress.” On 
the contrary the claimant will come to court and will be armed with a bank of statutory 
authority and prior precedent which he says he supports his claim to be entitled to redress 
under the law as it presently stands. This of course does not imply that there can never be 
any novel claims but that any novel claims will be based on an edifice of existing law.  
There are other views on what constitutes legitimacy in judicial decision making; Dworkin, 
for instance, would argue that to have legitimacy a particular law (and that would include a 
judicial decision) must form part of a morally coherent system of law330, Dworkin would of 
course also argue that there is always a right decision which is a proposition that has not 
always met with universal acclaim. He would contend that the law is a complete set of 
rules and it is only the imperfect adjudication and appreciation of it that leads to a 
perception that there are any gaps. Dworkin would be of the view that judges do not in fact 
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have any discretion in making law. He would consider that law is a set of principles which if 
applied in the correct way will only provide one answer to any given situation and it follows 
therefore that the answer provided must be the correct one.  
It follows then that for any decision of Denning is to be considered to be a legitimate 
exercise of his discretion and for to have legal validity it must demonstrate continuity and 
be capable of a rational defence based on interpretation and precedent. 
I would contend that it is impossible to demonstrate that in any particular situation the 
given decision is uniquely correct; however it can be made acceptable as a reasoned 
product of an informed impartial choice331. 
It is the notion of impartiality which is most impacted by the deployment of those influences 
and views that Denning has absorbed exhibited throughout his career and in cases where 
he has let these have too much influence on his decision than it can be argued that 
impartiality is impaired and therefore this renders the validity of the decision questionable 
at best. 
In each of the individual cases, Denning uses existing precedent to a greater or lesser 
degree to create that interstitial space that he needs in order to exercise his discretion to 
do what he considers to be justice in each of the case is in front of him. In broad terms he 
analyses existing case law to find the gaps that he considers must exist in the law, he 
would consider that the gaps are there in the main because he does not agree that 
applying the law as it is generally understood would allow him to give the judgement that 
he considers justice demands in each individual case. In other words what he is saying is 
that if the judge’s job to do justice, the law as it is normally expounded will not do justice in 
this case therefore the law is wrong or misunderstood and I will correct it. 
We will now look at each of the cases studied in turn to assess the techniques that 
Denning uses to create the space in each instance and asses the legitimacy of these 
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In each case, the first thing that Denning does is expound the law and then analyse it to 
find the gaps. The main variations between these cases are in the depth of the analysis 
that applies in each instance. 
In Ward he is at his least creative and his least analytical. He does not create the space by 
avoiding existing precedent but in this case by simply applying existing precedent on 
retrospective rule changes whilst declining, or at least omitting to analyse and apply that 
precedent to the case before him in any detail. He does little more than say that the case 
in question is sufficient authority to allow this rule change to have retrospective effect. 
On the question of the presence and participation of Donald Naismith, he considers this 
under the rules of natural justice and again without any particularly deep analysis he 
concludes that the rules had not been breached, despite the considerable misgivings of 
Naismith himself and the appearance, to any unbiased bystander, that the proceedings are 
not entirely fair. He then declines to give any relief and allows Gillian Ward to be dismissed 
from the course and be effectively barred from her chosen profession of teaching. 
In the case of Broome, he is much more rigorous in his analysis. The case that he has to 
deal with in this instance is Rookes v Barnard, the leading authority at the time on 
exemplary damages in tort. On the face of it this case should have given him little difficulty 
as it was more than possible to do what he considered to be justice to Captain Broome by 
applying Rookes. He then attempted to make his decision essentially unappealable. There 
was a risk that the House of Lords may have considered that the trial judge’s direction was 
inadequate in terms of the decision in Rookes and to obviate this Denning mounted an 
attack on the decision itself. He invited submissions that the decision had been decided 
per incuriam and therefore was not binding on him and of course it follows that it would not 
bind lower courts. To cement this in, he then explicitly instructs lower courts to ignore the 
decision of the House of Lords. This really does create the space and he exercises his 
discretion. The results are catastrophic for the very person he intended to help. 
The final case is, it is submitted, a masterclass in the legitimate creation of an arena 
followed by the legitimate exercise of discretion. 
In Candler, Denning submits the whole line of cases which the rest of the court considers 
to be a constraint on the extension of negligence to cover misstatement to rigorous 
analysis. He constructs a reasoned and cogent argument, based on authority, which he 
contends would give him the opportunity to consider such an extension. He then deploys 
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the leading authority on negligence, Donoghue, to find a reasoned path to allowing a claim 
for negligent misstatement to be brought under the tort of negligence.  Whilst this was a 
minority judgement nonetheless it was so well constructed and so clearly legitimate that 
later judgements were able to utilise that path beaten out by Denning to achieve the end 
that Denning had in mind 
The reason why he felt it necessary to create the space and exercise discretion was given 
by Denning early in his judicial career and has been quoted extensively previously. He 
considers that it is the job of the judge to do justice on the facts of the particular case 
before him at that time. The issue that he faces of course is that the words of the oath do 
actually require that justice is administered according to law. Denning makes it clear in the 
Road to Justice and many times later that he is a firm believer in the rule of law, as would 
be expected. This leaves Denning, in common with other judges, the task of squaring the 
circle where the application of the law as it stood would lead to an injustice. This is of a 
course a dilemma that has faced other judges before and despite their best efforts they 
have not succeeded in finding that interstitial space. The case of Fitzpatrick v Sterling 
Housing Association Ltd332 is an interesting illustration of the point. This was a case 
concerning the right to succession to a tenancy under the Rent Act 1977. The claim was 
from the same sex former partner of the by now deceased tenant. The wording of the act 
extended the right to succession beyond a lawful spouse to those living together as man 
and wife. The House of Lords considered the wording of the act and decided to give the 
words a restricted meaning in that man and wife implied a partnership between persons of 
different sexes. This is understandable but society had moved on between 1977 when the 
act was passed and 1999 when the claim was brought and the House had the perfect 
opportunity to find the space and create the law in accordance with a societal consensus. 
They declined to do so; would Denning have taken the opportunity? That is of course 
impossible to answer and it is also impossible to speculate how his own morals would 
have come in to play in circumstances such as these. Would he have recognised the 
changing social mores and given them expression in the law or would there have been a 
repeat of the Gillian Ward case albeit without the overt injustice.  
In Denning’s case, as we have seen, he considers that the just judge is the ideal person to 
administer the law and it is this that drives him to find these interstitial spaces particularly 
                                                
332
 [2001] 1 AC 27 
171 
 
in cases where his sympathies have engaged those influences from his early life that we 
have identified then come into play. 
In the Ward case it was his long-standing and profound commitment to the Anglican 
church which he absorbed in Whitchurch as a boy and then reinforced throughout his adult 
life which led him to the conclusion that Gillian Ward’s morals were such that she should 
not be allowed to teach children. The presumption being no doubt that she would pass on 
what Denning considered to be her dubious morals to her charges. This resulted in him 
creating a space to enable him to exercise his discretion to refuse an injunction and, it is 
submitted, to allow a manifest injustice to prevail. This profound Anglicanism has been 
explored in earlier chapters, he was a regular churchgoer, a founder of the Christian 
Lawyers Association and of course he married a vicars’ daughter.  
In Broome, there are two influences at work. The first and more obvious of the two is his 
sympathy with Jack Broome. This, it is contended, stems at least in part from his close 
association with the Royal Navy in that both Gordon and Norman were naval officers and 
indeed Norman was closely connected with the PQ17 incident. It is important to distinguish 
that influence from any conscious or unconscious bias. The influence does not leave him 
to take the path that he does but perhaps renders him a little less analytical in his 
methods. The second influence is his respect for the common law and the damage that he 
perceives that the decision in Rookes has wrought upon it. It is perhaps this rather than his 
sympathy to Jack Broome that leads him to try and overturn that binding precedent. 
Additionally it may also be that this was another shot in his campaign to free the Court of 
Appeal from the strict application of the doctrine. 
Turning next to Candler: as we have seen, Denning cleared space by a rigorous and 
exhaustive review of the authorities. There is no doubt that he was motivated by a desire 
to do justice to Mr Candler but that is not enough to explain why he exercised his 
discretion in the way that did. In this case it is his extensive knowledge of the law which he 
had gathered from his time as editor of Smith’s leading cases and his instinctive respect 
for the common law coupled with a clear vision that the law should be developed in this 
way. As has been noted there was a consensus building in the profession and in the wider 
societal context that this was needed and was possible to some extent overdue. He was 
however aware of the fact that this would be a minority judgement and to have any lasting 
impact it needed to be much more than mere dissent. It was for that reason that he 
constructed his judgement so carefully so as to lay down a clear path leading from 
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established authority, praying in aid the seminal judgement of Lord Atkin in Donoghue and 
then laying down very definite markers for a subsequent court to adopt his judgement and 
thus give effect to this significant change in the law. 
We have looked at the notion of legitimacy and the requirements that need to be satisfied 
for a decision to be considered legitimate. Essentially it is necessary that in creating the 
space and exercising his discretion, the judge complies with a set of established norms 
and follows the rules of interpretation and adjudication that are normally accepted within 
the law as it stands at the time. In exercising his discretion he is impartial and neutral and 
there is a valid and acceptable narrative to validate his decision. 
How does Denning measure up to those criteria in the individual instances that are the 
subject of this study. 
It is reasonably clear that in the case of Ward, there is a strong argument that the decision 
lacks legitimacy. There is no clear and cogent reason expounded to explain why the 
authorities that Denning relies upon are in fact applicable to the facts in Ward and binding 
on the court. This is followed by an unreasonably brusque treatment of the requirements of 
natural justice in the deliberations of the committee. This is then concluded by the 
moralistic nature of the final judgement which is clearly influenced by Denning’s personal 
beliefs. To follow the model, he does not legitimately clear a space for himself which 
precludes him from exercising his discretion even before we address the question of 
whether discretion was validly exercised. We have seen how it is legitimate for judges to 
rely on their own experience and values. Denning had not even reached that space and 
therefore the exercise must be illegitimate. 
In Broome, there is a much more coherent narrative and there is legitimacy in the way 
which clears the space by relying on previous authority however he ultimately fails. It is a 
paradox that he has a coherent narrative with a powerful rationale for arriving at the 
decision that he doesn’t arrive at but by ignoring established rules and norms (the doctrine 
of binding precedent) he renders the final decision illegitimate by attempting to bypass the 
authority of the House of Lords. 
Candler can be dealt with quite shortly. A comprehensive and rigorous analysis of the 
authorities provides the narrative which identifies the interstitial space. He then utilises the 
space to create a coherent rationale for his decision which establishes a clear path to 
follow. It is not deprived of legitimacy simply because it is a minority judgement. 
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Notwithstanding that Dworkin maintains there is always one correct answer we are not 
obliged to accept that the majority judgement must always be the right answer. It can also 
be argued that the decision can acquire its legitimacy from its subsequent effect on the law 
including having been cited with approval by other judges.  
Legitimation by acclamation or approval is nonetheless valid as it indicates that Denning 
was acting in accordance with a respectable consensus in society and the law albeit it 
could be said that in this particular instance he was somewhat anticipating it, this does not 
detract from the legitimate exercise of his discretion in this instance. 
There are two possible threads leading from each of these judgements. The first is the 
immediate and proximate effect of the judgment on the law as distinct from its 
consequences for the parties involved. The second is the contribution made by the judicial 
style of reasoning to the overall climate of judicial decision making. This is harder to 
assess than the former and will require a further more extensive study to properly assess 
that contribution.  
In Ward there is no evidence of any long term or widespread effect following the 
judgement especially as society had moved or was in the process of moving from the more 
regimented and repressive laws of the immediate post-war period to the more permissive 
attitudes of the late 1960s, some sections of society faster than others and it was clear that 
in this instance Denning was neither leading a consensus nor even keeping up with it. The 
Ward case is more of interest for its illustration of the effects of Denning’s upbringing and 
influences on his exercise of his judicial discretion. 
The immediate legal effect of Broome was to cement in the authority of the House of Lords 
even more firmly than it had previously been. In the longer term however it caused a re-
evaluation of the law on exemplary damages and Denning’s influence was recognised in 
Kuddas333 which reiterated that exemplary damages were available for all torts and that 
they had a place in the common law. The Privy Council in Bottrill334 confirmed in a New 
Zealand case that all that is required is outrageous conduct by the defendant thus 
expanding the ambit beyond servants of the government and perhaps restoring the 
position to that which Denning considered the common law represented. The wider ambit 
of the decision is the gradual loosening of the absolute grip of the doctrine of binding 
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precedent but for that Denning was only reflecting the zeitgeist of the times and 
responding to a gradually forming consensus. Denning was concerned that the availability 
of exemplary damages should not disappear from the armoury of the common law and in 
that he has been vindicated.  
It is in Candler that we see the most effective use of judicial discretion by Denning. The 
immediate effect was negligible, The lasting effect however was that the opportunity was 
given to subsequent court’s to use the line of reasoning set out by Denning to establish the 
tort of negligent misstatement. 
There is no reason why Denning’s methodology has to sit within any recognised theory of 
adjudication or any jurisprudential system. There are in fact elements of several schools in 
his approach. There is a definite natural law element in that he seeks to return to the law 
as he thinks it has been established, on occasions such as in Broome where he seeks to 
affirm exemplary damages. This does not make him a natural lawyer although he would 
endorse Aquinas definition that law is “an ordinance of reason made for the common 
good”335 Denning would not endorse the positivist approach that there is a disjuncture 
between law and morality. What the decisions examined show is that there is a clear 
connection between the law as expounded by Denning and his own moral compass. In 
each instance he has used his own values as a guide. Firstly in deciding that there is an 
arena for his discretion and then creating that arena. Secondly, in its influence on the 
exercise of that discretion. That is shown vividly in Ward where it could be said that he 
gave particular free rein to his own values which in that case might even be said to be 
verging on prejudice against the behaviour which Gillian Ward had exhibited.  
It is not of course the case that positivism would disdain any connection between law and 
morality and in later works Hart came to accept that there could be such a connection. In 
the second edition of Law and Morality he was moving to the view that there could be a 
connection if morality, whilst not itself a source of law was validated by things that are a 
source of law.336Hart attempts to develop a theory of inclusive positivism which, whilst it is 
not possible to examine this in detail here (Hart never really finished this) it is clear that he 
did consider that the sources of law could include morality. He set this out in 1958 when he 
said that  
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“In some systems of law, as in the United States, the ultimate criteria of legal 
validity might explicitly incorporate besides pedigree, principles of justice, or 
substantive moral values..”337 
There is no such explicit incorporation in English law as there is no written constitution as 
there is in the United States however this does not of itself preclude substantive moral 
values from validating legal decisions. Denning was very clear in the road to justice that he 
did not endorse the view that lawyers are only concerned with what the law is not what it 
ought to be and that leads to an unjust result then so be it. 
The legal profession, by its exponents in days past and present must account for 
every injustice done in the name of the law.338 
Hart started moving towards a view of inclusive positivism but it was his successor as 
Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford, Ronald Dworkin who took this further.  Dworkin, in 
Laws Empire,339 posited that there is a place for morality in legal systems. This has 
resulted in a division within legal positivism. Inclusive positivists accept that it is possible, 
as a concept that a norm should depend for its validity on accepted moral principles but 
that this is not essential for a norm to be valid. As might be expected, the supporters of 
exclusive positivism would take the opposite view and assert that a norm can never 
depend upon any moral content for its validity. The exclusivists’ position rests on the 
proposition that if the law lays claim to authority and to being the guiding principle in 
human conduct then the inclusivists’ assertion that morality can play a part in decision 
making is logically inconsistent with that claim leading to the position that law derives its 
ultimate authority from morality, a proposition that positivism has rejected.   
The point here is that if the law does not extend to the case and there are these interstices 
which we have identified then what can fill these gaps. Noting here of course that any 
follower of Dworkin would assert that there cannot be any gaps and the law always 
provides the right answer. Experience however shows that there are gaps and the only 
logical answer must be that values are the only thing that can fill that gap.  
Where are these values derived? These values are those of the judge and must derive 
from his own moral compass. This means the value system that any particular judge holds. 
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Values are not inherent and are a product of experience, education and societal norms 
and this is the proposition that we have been examining in this study. The issue in 
question is the effect that the influences which acted on Denning in his formative years 
and early life had on his later decisions as a judge. These influences would in large part 
form Denning’s Value system and his morality.   
This does to some extent suggest, that at least for practical purposes in connection with 
adjudication that the large scale distinction between natural law and positivism is to some 
extent illusory in that they are inextricably linked with each needing elements of the other 
to provide a coherent basis for adjudication.  
So where does that take the argument? As set out earlier, the act of interpretation of the 
law cannot be divorced from morality. Interpretation of the law must inevitably involve an 
evaluative process which cannot be divorced from the values and morality of the evaluator 
i.e. the judge. In chapter two, Denning’s view of the qualities that make a judge was set 
out; it is these qualities which he ascribed himself that he deploys in his judgements. 
Labels are to some extent iniquitous but to some extent Denning could be described as an 
inclusive positivist with a natural lawyer’s instinct for the connection between morality and 
the law. The shorthand for this perhaps would be to label him a Denningist. 
Coda     
This study has attempted to show in some small way how one of our most famous judges 
used the law to administer justice and how he himself was shaped by his upbringing and 
early influences which led in turn to those influences being perpetuated through his 
influence on the law.  It was noted at the outset Denning was chosen as the subject 
because of the fecundity of his judgements and the wealth of material to work with. This 
has inevitably meant that selections have had to be made to fit within the constraints of 
this study. There is much more research to be done both on Denning himself and on his 
contemporaries at a time when judicial activism was becoming more prevalent and it is 
these judges who have shaped the current senior judiciary and legal thinking. A more 
extensive project will allow a proper evaluation to be made of Denning’s approach coupled 
with that of the likes of Devlin and others and how this has influenced modern judicial 
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